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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 




DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE B U m L L ,  in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 




) Case No. CV OC 0706619 
1 
) RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 ORIGINAL 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court should deny Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. The law does not 
support what Two Jinn wants to accomplish as a result of this lawsuit. Two Jinn wants to 
mandate that every Fourth Judicial District judge allow any bail agent licensed by the 
Department of Insurance to act in their court, regardless of conflicts of interest, bad 
history of individual performance, or the agent's criminal history. It is Two Jinn's 
position that judges have to accept any individual bail agent, as long as those agents were 
licensed by the Department of Insurance. Simply stated, Two Jinn asks this Court to strip 
administrative judges of all authority to regulate the conduct of bail agents in their courts. 
Fortunately for the courts and the public, Two Jinn's position is not supported by the law. 
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion should be denied. 
11. 
STATEMENT OF OPPOSING FACTS 
For the purpose of Defendants' summary judgment motion only, Defendants 
conceded all of the facts in the Amended Complaint, except the facts set forth and 
discussed in Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants ' 9/5/08 Motion for 
Sumnzary Judgment, p. 5. In responding to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 
however, Defendants point out that there may appear to be genuine issues of material 
fact. The Court cannot resolve genuine issues of material fact on a motion for summary 
judgment - it must carry them over for trial. On closer inspection, Plaintiffs have not 
presented any admissible evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact? and 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 
(1) Plaintiffs claim that removing James Garske from the list of approved bail 
agents "results in a complete inability of Aladdin to conduct its business in the Fourth 
Judicial District," citing to Exhibit B attached to James Garske's 9/5/08 Affidavit 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion Jor Summary Judgment, p. 33);  however 
the attachment does not support Plaintiffs' contention. The exhibit, which is 
inadmissible,' supports the claim that Aladdin did the most statewide business over 
Martin Luther King weekend in 2007, followed by 2005,2006, and 2004, in that order. It 
does not support the claim that, over the Martin Luther King weekend in 2006, Aladdin's 
business came to a screeching halt in the Fourth Judicial District as a result of James 
Garske being removed from the approved list. The evidence simply is not there. 
Plaintiffs have not met their initial burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to this claim. 
(2)  Plaintiffs claim that James Garske did not have an opportunity to contest 
his removal from the list prior to being removed in 2006. Memorandum in Support of 
Plaint@' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 34-35.* Defendants disagree because the 
facts are otherwise. 
In her 8/21/08 Supplemental Affidavit at 3, Diane Burrell attests: "On January 
3, 2006, the Trial Court Administrator's office sent a letter to Mr. Garske, informing him 
that his name would be removed from the list of approved agents if the Trial Court 
Administrator did not receive certain documents from him by January 13, 2006." A copy 
of that letter was attached to Ms. Burrell's affidavit as Exhibit 1 .  In that Exhibit, Mr. 
Garske is referred to the Guidelines, sections 5 and 14.1.B(3) for further information. 
Section 14.1 .B(3) of the Guidelines specifically instructs agents that if the "affected bail 
' Exhibit B attached to James Garske's 9/5/08 affidavit is inadmissible. See Defendants' 9/10/08 
hlotion to Strike, arguing that this exhibit lacks foundation and is replete with hearsay. 
" Plaintiffs' claim with respect to Mr. Garske has changed significantly from what they alleged in 
their First Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that the Assistant 
TCA removed Mr. Garske and his sub-agents "without prior notice to Aladdin.. . based on the 
assistant TCA's mistaken belief that Mr. Garske had failed to submit to a criminal history 
check.. ." First Amended Complaint, p. 1 1 at 'f/ 50. Now, in their motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs are not alleging a lack of notice; rather, Plaintiffs claim that when Mr. Garske received 
the January 3, 2006 violation notice, "Mr. Garske did everything under his power to comply with 
the 'violation notice' by submitting his renewal application on January 5, including a receipt that 
he had submitted to the criminal history check on January 5." Memorandum in Support of 
Plainrzfjs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p.3 5 .  
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agent believes the Trial Court Administrator has committed an error in hislher intended 
action to remove the bail agent.. .he or she may, by the deadline stated in the notification 
letter, request the Trial Court Administrator to review the reasons for the intended action 
and/or may ... file a petition with the Clerk of the Court for a hearing before the 
Administrative District Judge for review of the Trial Court Administrator's intended 
action." 
By the terms of the Guidelines, Mr. Garske had an opportunity to have a hearing; 
however, he did not request one. Defendants contend that (1) notice was provided to Mr. 
Garske prior to removing him from the list and that (2) Mr. Garske did have an 
opportunity for a hearing prior to being removed from the list. Diane Burrell 8/21/08 
,4fjduvit and attached exhibiu; Diane Burrell 7/9/08 AfJidavit, and Guidelines, Section 
13. The evidence before the Court supports Defendants' contentions. 
(3) Based on Plaintiffs' briefing on the motion for summary judgment, there 
appears to be a factual disagreement about how the Guidelines operate and are 
implemented with respect to removing bail agents from the list. It may be no more than a 
misunderstanding. 
Plaintiffs seem to believe that Aladdin can be shut down whenever one of its 
agents is removed from the list. ("Section 14.1.B. provides for the removal of a 
supervising agent when a subagent fails to rectify a violation concerning the submission 
of renewal materials as set forth in 14.I.B(3). The removal of the supervising agent 
carries the risk of removing all subagents and, therefore, this provision carries the 
potential to shut an entire agency down because one agent is unable to timely complete 
renewal." Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21) 
Plaintiffs' belief is not correct. 
As explained in Diane Burrell's affidavit, submitted with this response, the only 
time that all subagents will be removed from the list for a violation is when the violator is 
the supervising agent. Diane Bwrell 9/23/08 Affidavit at f j  5. Thus, the situation posed 
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by Plaintiffs, in which a subagent violates the Guidelines and the entire agency is 
removed from the approved list as a result, simply would never happen under the current 
Guidelines. 
An example before this Court illustrates this point. Tarnrny Day (subagent) was 
removed from the list for a violation, and her supervising agent James Garske was also 
removed from the list; however, no additional subagents were removed. This is 
consistent with how the Guidelines are applied, as explained in Diane Burrell's 9/23/08 
Affidavit. Plaintiffs' misunderstanding of the Guidelines can be seen in how they 
interpreted the situation involving Tarnmy Day. Plaintiffs wrote that ". . .a strict 
application of the Guidelines required the removal of all Mr. Garske's 
subagents ...[ flortunately, on this occasion, Defendants elected to not apply the 
Guidelines' literal language and, instead, removed only Mr. Garske." Plaintiffs' 
illemorandurn in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for 
Reconsideration of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, p. 10. A strict application did not 
require removal of all of Mr. Garske's subagents because the supervising agent Mr. 
Garske was not the violator. Only when the supervising agent violates the Guidelines 
will all subagents be in danger of being removed from the list. 
To the degree that Plaintiffs' misinterpretation of the Guidelines constitutes a 
factual dispute, Defendants ask that the Court find the facts as explained in Diane 
Burrell's 9/23/08 Affidavit and outlined above. 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief. Defendants have 
previously argued that this case does not present a live case-or-controversy because no 
Plaintiff has an ongoing or threatened injury and Plaintiffs have already received all the 
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relief to which they are entitled. 7/10/08 Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider and Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-9. Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment again claims that they are entitled to relief under Idaho's declaratory judgment 
act; however, their argument is misplaced. 
Plaintiffs argue that because Idaho's declaratory relief statute provides for any 
person aggrieved by an ordinance, contract, statute or franchise, to have their legal rights 
adjudicated, Plaintiffs have a right to have a court "adjudicate" the Guidelines. Id. 
However, as argued previously, merely being affected by a court action is not enough to 
have standing. Indeed, even past injury is not enough to have standing. City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Under Idaho's declaratory judgment 
legislation, there must be a real and substantial controversy that allows for specific relief 
through a decree of a conclusive character. Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 5 13, 5 16, 
681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). Here, the specific relief sought by the Plaintiffs would have 
no effect on remedying the violations they allege: the purported violations have already 
been addressed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed an analogous mootness situation. In 
Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, P.3d , 2008 WL 4307445 (Sept. 23,2008 
Idaho), a development company challenged an ordinance and sought declaratory relief, 
but later complied with the challenged ordinance. Because the development company 
had complied with the ordinance, and its houses were permitted to remain standing, the 
Supreme Court held that the case was moot. The Court wrote: 
Here, Euclid essentially nullified its first set of applicatinns by submitting 
a second set of applications, which were eventually approved. Thus, no 
final action was either necessary or taken on the first set of applications. 
The parties essentially resolved any disputes regarding the applicable 
ordinance, based on the submission and approval of the second set of 
applications. The first three assignments of error are moot. 
Euclid Avenue Trust, 2008 WL 4307445 at * 5, 
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Aladdin cites the case of Frizzell v. SwafSord, 104 Idaho 823, 825-26,663 P.2d 
1125, 1127-78 (1983), for the proposition that declaratory relief "can be properly 
requested to enjoin unlawful court practices." Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs ' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. SwafSord does not stand for this proposition.3 
However, even assuming that declaratory relief is a proper vehicle for addressing 
unlawful court practices where a court is presented with a Plaintiff suffering ongoing or 
prospective harm that could be redressed by the relief sought, Plaintiffs have not 
presented the Court with that situation. 7/10/08 Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider and Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-9. Their claims are moot and 
declaratory relief is not proper. 
B. The Contracts Between Plaintiffs and the Fourth Judicial District Are 
Dispositive and Bar All Relief to Plaintiffs 
Defendants have consistently argued that the Fourth Judicial District has a 
contract with the individual bail agents who write bonds in that district, and that Plaintiffs 
are barred from bringing a declaratory judgment action to challenge the agreed-upon 
terms of the contract. 
This Court, in its December 17, 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order 
articulated this issue as follows: "Does the Bail Agents' acknowledgement, waiver, and 
certification in acceptance of the Guidelines form an enforceable contract between the 4th 
District Courts and the Bail Agent?" Order, p. 3. As Defendants have previously 
argued, it does. 
To date, Plaintiffs have not satisfactorily addressed this question, and, in their 
motion for summary judgment, they ignore this dispositive issue completely. Plaintiffs 
admonish Defendants that if "Defendants are concerned that those statutes regulating 
The appeal in Swafford challenged the constitutionality of a small claims system that required 
procurement of an appeal bond pursuant to statute. The statutes ($1-23 1 1  and $1-23 12) were 
found to be unconstitutional. Thus, it was not "unlawful court practices," but rather, the 
constitutionality of the underlying statutes which framed the declaratory judgment action in 
Swafford. 
sureties and bail agents are insufficient to provide adequate protection, their remedy is 
with the legislature." Memorandum in Support of PlaintiffsJ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 10. Plaintiffs' argument dodges the very essence of Defendants' position: 
Defendants do not need to "remedy" a result that they have validly contracted to obtain. 
Defendants have valid, enforceable contracts with the individual bail agents who 
write bonds in their district. According to those contracts, the bail agents writing bonds 
in the Fourth Judicial District have agreed to abide by the terms of the Guidelines. 
Two Jinn pretends that, because the Department of Insurance licenses bail agents 
who satisfy certain minimum requirements, the courts must do business with all bail 
agents licensed by the Department of Insurance. This is not the state of the law in Idaho. 
,4t best, a DO1 license grants an agent the right to apply to write bonds in a particular 
district. It does not, however, compel that district to grant the application. When the 
Fourth Judicial District grants that application with respect to a particular individual bail 
agent, and the bail agent also agrees to be bound by the terms of the Guidelines, a valid 
and binding contract is formed. Such contracts resolve any dispute in this action and 
summary judgment should be denied to the Plaintiffs on this basis. 
C. To Analyze the Merits of Plaintiffs' Due Process Claims, the Court Must 
Know Who Is Alleging a Violation, What Right They Allege Has Been 
Violated, and What Process Is Alleged to be Due I Lacking 
Plaintiffs allege due process violations arising from two portions of the 
Guidelines they find objectionable. (1) Plaintiffs' agreement for background checks as a 
prerequisite to being placed on the list: they allege that the requirement to submit to a 
criminal history check prior to being placed on the list abridges their "rights to 
occupational liberty and to have a license issued by the DO1 and an appointment by a 
certified surety considered presumptively sufficient qualification to execute bail bonds." 
&lemorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgnzent, p. 17. (2) 
Plaintiffs' agreement that they can be removed from the list: they allege that the 
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placement and removal provisions are arbitrary and capricious. Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1 8. 
Plaintiffs' due process analysis is faulty because it fails to address the three 
questions this Court must answer: (1) who is alleging the violation, (2) what right they 
allege is being violated, and (3) what process is duelallegedly lacking. Here, analysis 
reveals that no Plaintiff can establish a due process violation because no plaintiff can 
establish the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. 
At the outset, it is difficult to even pin down the answer to the first question, who 
is alleging a violation. The answer changes with each new filing. Initially, the three 
named Plaintiffs were Rebecca Salinas, James Garske and Two Jinn. Now, the three 
named Plaintiffs are Shantara Carlock, James Garske and Two Jinn. However, Plaintiffs 
do not limit themselves to alleging violations for the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege 
violations on behalf of Maria Galindo, John Robles, and others, asking the court to take 
judicial notice of the "various documents filed in Fourth Judicial District Cases that are 
cited in this and Plaintiffs' previous memorandums." Memorandum In Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, n. 1. 
The confusion regarding who is alleging particular violations is compounded by 
allegations such as: "[Rfemoval from the authorized list deprives Plaintiffs' Garske and 
Carlock of [the] right to pursue their occupations within the Fourth Judicial District." 
Memorandum in Support of Plainfiffs' 'lotion for Summary Judgment, p. 33. Plaintiff 
Garske has alleged that he was improperly removed from the list, but Plaintiff Carlock 
has never alleged that she was improperly removed from the list. Nevertheless, they are 
thrown together in the briefing, as if they were both alleging a violation resulting from 
improper removal. Factually, that is not the case. 
Defendants contend that the parties alleging violations are the named Plaintiffs: 
Shantara Carlock, James Garske, and Two Jim. Using these Plaintiffs, it is important to 
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clearly understand what constitutionally protected right they claim is being violated, and 
what process they allege is duellacking. 
Shantara Carlock alleges a due process violation resulting from not being placed 
on the list in the first place. She claims a protected property interest in pursuing her 
occupation in the Fourth Judicial District. Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin enforcement 
of the portion of the Guidelines that permits the Administrative District Judge to screen 
applicants and deny them placement on the list. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiji-' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23. Defendants respond that Ms. Carlock does not 
have a protected property interest in pursuing her occupation in a particular location, and 
that, even if she did have a property interest, due process is satisfied by the opportunity 
for a hearing, which Ms. Carlock received. First Amended Complaint, p. 7, at 7 32 
(noting that Ms. Carlock requested a hearing on December 12, 2007 and received a 
hearing on January 9,2008). 
James Garske alleges a due process violation resulting from being removed from 
the list. He claims a protected property interest in pursuing his occupation in the Fourth 
Judicial District. Plaintiffs argue that bail agents such as Carske are entitled to notice and 
an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any significant property interest. 
firnorandurn in Support of Plainfiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 33. Defendants 
respond that Mr. Garske does not have a protected property interest in pursuing his 
occupation in a particular location and that, even if he did have a property interest, he is 
not entitled to a hearing before being taken off the list. Even though he is not entitled to a 
hearing before being taken off the list, he nevertheless had an opportunit;f for a hearing 
before being taken off the list. Due process has been more than satisfied in his case. See 
Supplemental Affidavit of Diane Burrell 8/21/08 and attached exhibits. 
Summary judgment should be granted to Defendants on Plaintiffs' due process 
claims because no Plaintiff can show a deprivation of a constitutionally protected 
property right. 
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D. Plaintiffs Have No Due Process Claim Because They Have No Right to Work 
in the Fourth Judicial District 
To successfully allege a due process violation, Plaintiffs must claim a deprivation 
of a fwndarnental right. "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the 
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 
liberty and property." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 
(1 972). 
Plaintiffs propose three bases for their claimed "rights," none of which are 
supported in the law. First, they argue that the Department of Insurance statutes provide 
them with a right to do business in a particular judicial district. hfemorandum in Support 
of Plaint$s ' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-1 2. As discussed below, Plaintiffs' 
argument is misplaced, resting as it does on case law governing a surety's right to do 
business and not an individual bail agent's right to write bonds in a particular district. 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that they have a property interest created by the Guidelines 
themselves. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 32. 
This argument fails because the Guidelines, as a contract, do not create a property interest 
/ due process interest in anything more than what is reflected in the terms of the contract. 
Third, Plaintiffs contend that individual bail agents have a protected interest in pursuing 
their profession independent of the Department of Insurance statutes and Guidelines. 
&fernorandam in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 32. This 
argument fails because, while individual bail agents may have a protected interest in their 
license through the Department of Insurance, this interest is not the same as their interest 
in being on an approved list to write bonds in a particular district. The latter is not a 
constitutionally protected interest. 
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1. The Department of Insurance Statutes Do Not Provide Plaintiffs with a 
Protected Propertv Right in Forcing, Courts to Do Business with Them: the 
Case of American Druanists Does Not Support Plaintiffs' Position 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to find that the Department of Insurance is the only entity 
that may regulate bail agents and that the Department's regulation gives individual bail 
agents a property right to force every judicial district to write bonds with them. For the 
fourth time, Plaintiffs cite the case of American Druggists Ins. Co., Inc. v. Rogarf (1 lth 
Cir. 1983). Memorandum in Support of Plaint@' hhtion for Summary Judgment, p. 12." 
This time, Plaintiffs cite the case for the proposition that bail agents have some sort of 
property right based on Idaho's insurance statutes. Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs ' 
iblotionfor Summary Judgment, p. 12 ("The regulation provided in the insurance statutes 
creates a substantive interest in having compliance with that regulation be considered 
sufficient in the absence of specific reasons." Id.) American Druggists does not support 
this position. 
In Americirn Druggists, the 1 l th Circuit reviewed a federal district court's policy 
of disqualifying sureties from writing bonds in the district if the surety failed to pay a 
forfeited bond. The policy was unwritten. The appellate court remanded the case for the 
district court to determine whether the disqualification policy was necessary and, if so, 
for the district court to develop procedures to accommodate the basic due process rights 
of the sureties. Here, Plaintiffs ask this Court to review a written contract that 
disqualifies bail agents - not sureties - from writing bonds in a particular judicial district. 
4 Plaintiffs first cited this case in their 7110107 Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Motion 
to Dismiss / Summay Judgment, p. 17, quoting that: "regardless of the licensing status of an 
individual agent, it is within a judge's discretion to approve only those bonds he or she feels will 
result in the defendant's presence for criminal proceedings." Plaintiffs cited this case again in a 
contemporaneous filing, claiming the case rebutted Defendants' mootness argument. 7110107 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike, p. 13. Finally, Plaintiffs relied on this case at 
some length in their 7/10/07 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary injunction, p.9, 
arguing that the case supported the idea that a court's disqualification policy for sureties on bail 
bonds invaded an area reserved to the Secretary of Treasury. 
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Thus, the cases are completely different factually (unwritten policy vs. written contract; 
surety vs. bail agent); however, the differences do not end there. 
In American Druggists, the Court found that the Secretary of the Treasury 
regulated the field of corporate sureties because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
46(d) specifically exempted corporate sureties from regulation. Idaho's corresponding 
rule of criminal procedure is the not the same as the federal rule of criminal procedure 
upon which the court in American Druggists relied. Idaho's rule of criminal procedure 
addresses bail bonds being offered by corporate sureties and does not, unlike the federal 
rule, leave that regulation to the Legislature. I.C.R. 46(d). This distinction is critical for 
the result in American Druggists. 
In American Druggists, the Court found that the federal regulation of corporate 
sureties - which was the exclusive method for regulating corporate sureties - created a 
narrow constitutionally protected right to present bonds to the court for judicial approval. 
("The scope of the surety's protected interest arising from the federal regulatory scheme 
is indeed narrow.") Id. at 1235. No comparable exclusive regulation of corporate 
sureties is present in this case. However, even if Idaho's legislative regulation of sureties 
were comparable to Congressional regulation of sureties, it would not matter for this 
Court's purposes. This Court has not been presented with the question whether state 
regulation of corporate sureties gives corporate sureties some sort of constitutionally 
protected right. This case has nothing to do with corporate sureties. No corporate surety 
is named as a plaintiff or has articulated a grievance with the Guidelines. 
American Druggists is readily distinguished from this case. American Druggists 
does not support Plaintiffs' position that Department of Insurance regulation creates a 
property right for individual agents to write bonds in every single district in Idaho by 
doing nothing more than complying with the minimum statutory requirements. Certainly, 
Plaintiffs argue the opposite: "[SJureties and bail agents have a substantive interest in 
having the license issued by the DO1 and an appointment by a certified surety considered 
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presumptively sufficient qualification to execute bail bonds." Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9. Plaintiffs overstate their entitlement, 
however, mixing the question of sureties' rights (not before this court) with bail agents' 
It is important not to be led astray by arguments based on sureties. The question 
is whether licensed bail agents, as individuals, have a constitutionally protected right to 
write bonds to whatever district judge they choose based on the Department of Insurance 
legislation. They do not. 
2. The Guidelines Do Not Create Constitutionally Protected Property or 
Liberty Rights 
Plaintiffs point out that this Court has previously found that the Guidelines are 
sufficiently similar to a licensing procedure such that they create a protected property 
interest. Memorandum in Support oj'PlaintiffsJ Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 32. In 
so holding, this Court did not specify whether all licensed bail agents have a protected 
property interest in being on the list, or whether this property interest accrues only to 
those agents who have once been placed on the list. In their motion for summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs assume the property interest accrues to all agents, regardless of 
5 For example, Plaintiffs argue: 
Surety companies meeting DO1 requirements are authorized to become the sole 
surety on bail bonds. I.C. $ 41-2604. All courts and judges 'shall accept and 
treat such bond' as 'fully and completely complying' with the requirements of 
law. 1.C. 5 41-2604. 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintlfs ' Motion for Summav Judgment, p. 1 1.  
The full text of the cited statute presents a different picture. It recognizes that judges and 
courts have the authority to promulgate rules or regulations that would affect whether a bond, 
undertaking, obligation, recognizance or guaranty may be executed. 
This judicial control over the rights of sureties in the bail bond context is echoed in 
lCMR 13(c)(3): "a fidelity surety, guaranty, title or trust company authorized to do business in 
the state of Idaho and authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on undertakings and 
bonds may execute the written undertakings provided for in these rules, which may be accepted 
by the person receiving the bond without prior approval by a judge unless otherwise ordered by 
the administrative iudge of the iudicial district." ICMR 13(c)(3)(emphasis added). 
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whether they have ever been on the list. In other words, Plaintiffs assume that by 
creating Guidelines, Defendants vested every licensed bail agent with a constitutionally 
protected property right to do business with the Fourth Judicial District. Even bail agents 
v~ho have never set foot in the Fourth Judicial District have a constitutionally protected 
property right to do business there, according to Plaintiffs' line of argument. 
Defendants ask this Court to reconsider its position that the Guidelines create a 
constitutionally protected property right in light of the cases being presented for the first 
time in this memorandum. Defendants maintain that the Guidelines do not create a 
constitutionally protected property right for any bail agent to be placed on, or remain on, 
the list of approved agents. 
For the purpose of a due process analysis, courts differentiate between conduct 
that prevents an individual from offering the services of hisher chosen profession 
everywhere and conduct that prevents an individual from offering the services of hidher 
chosen profession in a particular location. To survive summary judgment on a due 
process violation, a plaintiff alleging a violation of their substantive right to offer the 
services of their chosen profession must show that they have been precluded from 
pursuing their profession with all employers. Boyett v. Troy State Univ. a t  Montgomery, 
971 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (granting summary judgment on substantive 
due process claim because "no evidence has been presented that the Plaintiff has been 
precluded from pursuing his profession with all employers"); Pirolo v. City o j  
Clearwater, 7 1 1 F.2d 1006, 101 1 (1 l th Cir. 1983) (Deprivation of the right to follow a 
chosen profession cannot be established unless the plaintiff has been banned from 
engaging in his profession with any employer); Moates v. Strength, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1305 
(M.D. Ala. 1999) (Individual did not have a fundamental right to work as a private 
detective in Chilton County, Alabama, or a protected liberty or property interest in the 
issuance of a business license). 
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The case of McInlosh v. LuBundy, 161 S.W.3d 413 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005), is 
analogous to this case. In that case, a licensed clinical social worker sought judicial 
review of a Department of Corrections decision denying him a place on the list of 
approved sex offender therapists, despite the fact that the social worker had met all the 
criteria for the DOC'S requirements. The court framed the issue as: ". . .[U]nder the facts 
plead in his petition, does McIntosh have a legal right to be placed on the approved 
providers list?" 161 S.W.3d at 416. The court answered that question in the negative 
after reviewing similar cases from other jurisdictions. The court reasoned: 
In order to prevail McIntosh must show that the agency action of 
refusing to place him upon the list of approved providers treads upon a 
legally protected right or privilege. The DOC'S refusal to place McIntosh 
on the Approved Providers List does not deny him to his right to work as a 
sex therapist in any general or particular sense, and he does not allege that 
he has been denied a license to practice in the field. McIntosh points to no 
rule, statute, or other authority creating a legal right or entitlement that he 
be placed on the list of approved providers. McIntosh points to no 
provision in state law or anywhere else that creates a property interest or 
privilege in placement on the approved list. In accordance with the above 
authorities, we find that McIntosh's petition failed to state a legal claim 
for relief because he had no legal right or privilege to be included on the 
list of approved sex therapists. 
16 1 S . W .3d 4 13 at 4 17. In reaching this conclusion, the Missouri court cited cases from 
Michigan, Georgia, and New York. 
In the Michigan case, an appellate court rejected a bio tech company's argument 
that, having qualified under the statute for placement on a list of approved underground 
storage tank contractors, the company had a vested right to inclusion on the list that could 
not be revoked without due process of law. Ba'o Tech, Inc. v. Department of ,Vafural 
Resources, 235 Mich. App. 77, 596 N.W.2d 633 (1999). The Michigan appellate court 
held that the statutoy language created no vested right and the company had no legally 
protected right to placement on the list. 
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In the Georgia case, an appellate court found that a contractor had no protected 
property interest in remaining on a pre-approved contractor list used for receiving bids on 
public works contracts. Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. Cobb C o u n ~ ,  237 Ga. App. 517, 515 
S.E.2d 187 (1 999). 
In the New York case, the court granted summary judgment against a vendor who 
claimed that inclusion on an approved vendor list for the city constituted a protected 
property right. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Ciiy of New York, No. 94 CIV. 8642 
(JFK), 1997 WL 80601 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court looked to the rules governing the 
approved vendor list and found that no provision created a property interest, such as a 
requirement to show just cause in order to keep an otherwise qualified vendor off the list. 
Id at *8. See also Morley S Auto Body, Inc. v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (no 
constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on county sheriffs wrecker 
rotation call list.) 
The Fourth Judicial District Guidelines do not contain a requirement to show just 
cause to keep an otherwise qualified bail agent off the list. It is ultimately up to the 
Administrative District Judge whether an applicant will be approved or not. 9/5/08 
Affidavit of Judge Williamson, at 1 4. ("In all cases, whether the bail agent is initially 
denied a place on the approved list, or removed from the approved list and requesting 
reinstatement, it is the Administrative District Judge that has the final authority to 
determine if a bail agent is on the list.") Nothing in the Guidelines creates a 
constitutionally protected property interest in writing bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District, Such a property interest does not exist. 
3. Plaintiffs Do Not Have an Independent Property Right to Compel the 
Fourth Judicial District to Do Business with Them 
Plaintiffs argue that, apart from any interest arising from the Department of 
Insurance statutes and the Guidelines, individual bail agents have an independent 
constitutionally protected property interest in pursuing their profession in the Fourth 
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Judicial District based on the fact that they pursue a useful and recognized profession.6 
iblemorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 12; 32. 
Defendants respond that, even if bail agents are pursuing a useful and recognized 
profession, which Defendants do not concede, pursuing a useful and recognized 
profession does not give Plaintiffs a constitutionally independent property right to pursue 
their profession in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Plaintiffs cite Berry v. Summers, 76 Idaho 446,451,283 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1955), 
a case dealing with dental mechanics with three to four years of apprenticeship training, 
for the proposition that the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is a right 
protected by the constitution. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 12. However, the case cited by Plaintiffs has been effectively 
ovemled, as recognized the Idaho Supreme Court: 
We deem it clear that the United States Supreme Court has departed from 
any consideration of the substantive aspects of due process as they were formerly 
applied in the early part of the century. Idaho has seen a like departure fiom the 
substantive utilization of the due process provisions of our constitution. A 
possible exception is contained in Berry v. Summers, 76 Idaho 446, 283 P.2d 
1093 (1 955) and Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d 10 10 (1 96 11, in which 
the Court continues to hold that the due process clause of our state constitution, 
Art. 1, tj 13, protects the right to pursue a useful occupation. Nevertheless, we 
deem the differences between the standard applied under Idaho's due process 
clause and the standard applied under the federal due process clause to be 
negligible. 
Jones v. Stute Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 865,555 P.2d 399,405 (1976). 
  his argument is undermined somewhat by the Plaintiffs' repeated claims in the 
briefing that they do nothing useful for the courts or the public. First, Plaintiffs expiained 
that bail agents are not useful to the court: "Bail agents provide no service to the Court, 
particularly in their capacities as individuals." Plaintiffs ' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants ' Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior Summary 
Judgment Ruling, p. 13. Next, Plaintiffs explained that bail agents are not useful to the 
person purchasing insurance: "Neither the bail agent nor the surety agree to assist the 
defendant in attending court at the proper time." Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16. 
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The current state of the law with respect to an individual's "right" to pursue an 
occupation is discussed in section 2, above. Plaintiffs do not have a protected right to 
pursue their chosen profession in a particular location. A protected property right is 
implicated only when there is a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a 
profession, and not when there is a geographic or temporal limitation on the right to 
engage in the profession. The US.  Supreme Court recognizes some "generalized due 
process right to choose one's field of private employment"; however, the cases 
recognizing that right "all deal with a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a 
calling, and not [a] sort of brief interruption." Conn. v. Gubbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92 
(1 999). 
Plaintiffs do not have an independent protected interest in forcing the Fourth 
Judicial District to do business with them. Plaintiffs may have an independent protected 
interest in their license with the Department of Insurance, although this question is not 
before the Court. Plaintiffs certainly do not have an independent constitutionally 
protected right to do business in a particular location, 
E. Summary Judgment Should Be Granted to Defendants on the Trial Court 
Administrator Claims Because the Trial Court Administrator Has Not 
Broken Any Laws or Violated Any Rights 
1. The AssistanUTrial Court Administrator Does Not Act as a Party by 
Dispensing Advice and Information 
Plaintiffs contend that there is "no issue of fact regarding the TCA's role, created 
by the Guidelines, as a party in exoneration proceedings." Memorandum in Szipport of 
Plaint@s' Motion Jur Sumtnury Judgment, p. 25. Defendants respectfully disagree. 
Defendants disagree that the AssistanUTrial Court Administrator acts as a party and 
further disagree that the Guidelines have created any such role. 
The Assistant/Trial Court Administrator does not act as a party because s/he 
reviews a motion to exonerate, provides information to the judges, and/or provides 
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information to the prosecutor on the case. Indeed, if the AssistantJTrial Court 
Administrator were a party, there would be no need for a prosecutor. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines party very specifically: 
"Party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal 
parlance; it refers to those by or whom a legal suit is brought, whether in 
law or in equity, the party plaintiff or defendant, whether composed of one 
or more individuals and whether natural or legal persons; all others who 
may be affected by the suit, indirectly or consequently, are persons 
interested but not parties. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (Abridged 6th ed. 1983). 
According to Black's definition, the AssistantlTrial Court Administrator may be 
an interested person, but is not a party. 
The Guidelines do not make the AssistantjTrial Court Administrator a party. The 
Guidelines permit the TCA to review a motion to exonerate. Guidelines, Section 14(D). 
This review does not make the AssistantiTrial Court Administrator a party any more than 
a law clerk, secretary, or deputy court clerk becomes a party when slhe reviews motions. 
There is nothing magical about the Guidelines in this respect. 
Defendants ask this Court to find that the AssistantlTrial Court Administrator 
does not act as a party on motions to exonerate. 
2. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Have Judges 
Rule in Their Favor 
Plaintiffs object to the Trial Court Administrator or the Assistant Trial Court 
Administrator writing on motions to exonerate or participating in proceedings on motions 
to exonerate, Plaintiffs argue that permitting the TCA to act as a party on these motions 
is unlawful as a matter of law, and that the TCA interferes with Aladdin's contractual 
rights. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 25-26. 
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs provide numerous examples of instances in which 
the TCA's assistance to judges in the form of providing information or caselaw has 
"interfered w i t h  Aladdin obtaining a favorable ruling. Id. pp. 26-3 1. 
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Aladdin's argument that the TCA interferes with its contractual rights is based 
upon the contract Aladdin has with its surety. Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 27. Under this contract, Aladdin is tasked with 
protecting the surety's financial interests, which includes litigating bond forfeitures 
because forfeitures cost the surety money. Id. According to Aladdin's argument, if the 
TCA provides a judge with information upon which the judge relies in denying Aladdin's 
motion for exoneration, the TCA has interfered with Aladdin's contractual rights. 
Following the logic of this argument, any witness who testifies against Aladdin, any law 
clerk who points to caselaw that disfavors Aladdin, or any secretary who uncovers a 
clerical error that is fatal to Aladdin's motion, is potentially interfering with Aladdin's 
contractual rights. 
Aladdin does not have a contractual right to have judges rule in its favor. If the 
Trial Court Administrator provides a judge with information upon which the judge relies 
in ruling against Aladdin, Aladdin's complaint is with the judge, not the Trial Court 
Administrator. If Aladdin believes that a judge ruled incorrectly, or improperly denied 
Aladdin the opportunity for a hearing, Aladdin's remedy is to appeal the judge's decision. 
Defendants agree that if the Assistant/Trial Court Administrator provided facts 
outside the record to judges and the judges relied on those facts with no notice to 
Aladdin, and no opportunity for Aladdin to rebut such facts, it would not be fair to 
Aladdin. However, that is not the case. See 9/5/08 Affidavit of Larry Reiner, at 7 3-4. 
(Trial Court Administrator and Assistant Trial Court Administrator do not engage in "ex 
parte" contact regarding the Guidelines and motions to exonerate.) 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with a law that the AssistantiTrial 
Court Administrator has allegedly broken, or a right that the Assistant/Trial Court 
Administrator has allegedly violated. Summary judgment should be granted to 
Defendants on this claim. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
All Plaintiffs lack standing and the case should be dismissed on that basis. 
Plaintiffs have received all the relief to which they are entitled, the case is moot, and 
should be dismissed on that basis. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs have signed contracts with the Fourth Judicial District 
which bar their claims and this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
If this case is not dismissed on one of the above grounds, summary judgment 
should be granted to the Defendants because Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence 
that the Fourth Judicial District Guidelines prevent them from writing bonds in every 
judicial district in Idaho. They do not have a constitutionally protected right to compel 
the Fourth Judicial District to do business with them. Similarly, with respect to the Trial 
Court Administrator's actions in assisting judges in reviewing motions to exonerate bond, 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have a constitutionally protected right to have the 
court rule in their favor, free from the "interference" of the Trial Court Administrator's 
office. Summary judgment should be granted to the defendants on this claim as well. 
Dated this 30th day of September 2008. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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nRIGlh lAl  
ALADDIN'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL 
BAIL AGENTS HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED BY IDAHO'S 
SUPREME COURT 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants ignore principles of agency law (Plaintiffs' 9/30/08 
Opposition, p. 9) because Defendants have a different view of the individual bail agent's role 
than that portrayed in Plaintiffs' briefing. Defendants do not ignore principles of agency law - 
they simply disagree with Plaintiffs about the individual bail agent's role in the court system. 
Plaintiffs argue that bail agents are not useful to the courts: "Bail agents provide no 
service to the Court, particularly in their capacities as individuals," Plaintiffs ' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants ' Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior 
Summary Judgment Ruling, p. 13, whereas Defendants believe that bail agents do provide a 
useful service to the courts. See Judge Williamson 8/14/07 affidavit at T/ 14. 
Plaintiffs also argue that bail agents are not useful to the person purchasing insurance: 
"Neither the bail agent nor the surety agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the proper 
time." Memorundum in Support of Plaintiffs ' kiotion for Summary Judgment, p. 16. The 
Defendants believe that bail agents are useful to the person purchasing insurance, and that bail 
agents do assist the defendant in attending court at the proper time. 
Interestingly, Defendants' understanding of the role of individual bail agents differs from 
the position taken by Plaintiffs in their briefing, but is consistent with the position taken by 
Plaintiffs in their public advertising.' 
In opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs rely on the position 
they have taken with respect to the role of the individual bail agent; namely, that the bail agent is 
1 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of Aladdin's internet advertising, which is available to the general 
public by accessing the website www.aladdinbailbonds.com. This advertising is directly at odds with the position 
taken by Aladdin in its briefing in this case. Aladdin's advertising explains that Aladdin views its mission "not only 
to help individuals get their friends and loved ones out of jail in the shortest time possible, but to help them through 
the process as well by helping to keep track of court appointments and other legal requirements." It also explains 
that "Aladdin will also assist the defendant through every step of the process and go to great lengths to guide them 
through the legal system to make their bail experience easy to understand and comply with." These statements are 
not hearsay because they are an admission of a party opponent. I.R.E. 801(d)(2). Printed copies of the internet 
advertisements are attached to this response as Exhibits 1 and 2. 
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only acting as an agent on behalf of the surety and has no individual 
responsibility/accountability, apart from their role as the surety's agent. See James Garske 
10/1/08 Affidavit at 7 5 ("Bail agents have no involvement in the case once the bond is posted.") 
Relying on their carefully crafted definition of the bail agent's role, Plaintiffs argue that it is 
improper to hold an individual bail agent accountable for failing to ensure that a forfeited bond is 
timely paid, especially in "situations where the bail agent has changed employment or has no 
authority to act on the surety's behalf." Plaintiffs ' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants ' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15. See also, Id., p. 12. 
The idea that an individual bail agent may escape traditional bail agent responsibilities by 
floating from one bail agency to another has been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. In 
Leader v. Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 151 P.3d 831 (2007), the Supreme Court squarely disagreed 
with the notion that individual bail agents may avoid their common law duties by going to work 
for a different insurance company. It was in Leader that an individual bail agent first attempted 
the "you can't regulate me because I don't do anything useful in your courts" argument. The 
argument did not succeed. 
In Leader, an individual bail agent asked the Supreme Court to look to his employing bail 
agency andor surety as the responsible parties, and not hold him individually responsible for a 
failure to pay a forfeited bond. The Supreme Court declined this invitation. 
The Court in Leader reviewed a case in which the Assistant Trial Court Administrator 
had sent a letter to an individual bail agent telling him that if a forfeited bond was not paid, the 
bail agent's name would be removed from the list of approved bail agents. The bail agent argued 
that he wasn't responsible for the forfeited bond because he had left employment with Acme Bail 
Bonds and it was someone else - the agency or the surety - that was responsible for paying the 
forfeited bond or arresting the defendant. The bail agent went so far as to argue that because "he 
was no longer an agent of the surety company that was liable on the bail bond . ..[he] therefore 
could not have arrested [the criminal defendant]." Leader, 143 Idaho at 639, 151 P.3d at 835. 
The Idaho Supreme Court was not persuaded by the argument that suretyship contracts are the 
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sole source of an individual bail agent's legal obligations to the courts. Rather, the Idaho 
Supreme Court looked to the law. According to the Idaho Supreme Court, both statutory and 
common law vest individual bail agents with the authority to arrest criminal defendants who do 
not appear for court. Leader, 143 Idaho at 339, 15 1 P.3d at 835. In other words, the individual 
bail agent was not released from his responsibilities to the criminal defendant and the court, 
simply because he had transferred employment to a new bail agency. 
Defendants do understand agency law. They simply object to Aladdin pretending that 
agency law absolves individual bail agents of personal accountability in the court system. In this 
position, the Defendants are aligned with the Idaho Supreme Court. 
' &tC DATED this 1 day of October 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
6 ,. , MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this li day of October 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO OPPOSIT~ON TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe U.S. Mail 
NEW, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP B a n d  Delivery 
P.O. Box 2772 [Zl Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
303 West Bannock C ]  Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701 Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 C ]  Statehouse Mail 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
B . s .  Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Overnight Mail 
[Z1 Facsimile: 
[Zl Statehouse Mail 
; . MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
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EXHIBIT 1 
REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Aladdin Bail Bonds Page 1 of 1 
and speak .to one of our *iendly agents. 
Ah + 3 * 4  J * f d *  
Click here to find ths location nearest yoti, 
My friend or loved one was 
arrested, what do I do now? 
Contact Aldddiii immedratrlyt 
Our professional staff ia well trained and can 
assst you in getting your loved one released 
from custody with d minimum amount of 
prperwork dnd time You will only need to pay 
Aladdin a fraction of what the total ball amount 
would he and we will work w ~ t h  you on making 
tinanc~ng arranycmentr if requ~red 
Aladdtn wil l  also asrtst the defendant through 
every step of the process arid go to great 
lengths to gutde rhl~rn through the isgal cystem 
to make their ball experience easy to urtderstand 
dnd comply with Don't wait any lonqer, let u% 
help you now' 
Aldddin provides you the lowest po~b ih l r  rte 
Ask us how' 
"Thrrt are 6 . 1  peepi. 
Irh In the world $hat 
"&I tlk* the t'rn. to 
lacen md (.ti lrrr 
people and thr $ttw 
twns shey may ba In, 
my fmr~ly and l are 
gf8d that Alrddm lr a 
WR d &la grovp " 
'WW. s%urr thwghf *re 
would need tbe 
r r ~ c u  of i bail bond 
company. but when 
we did, Ataddin 
d m 4  us the true 
moanmg af curtmsr 
N P ( I c ~  m d  comma 
man; la the# cwnpany 
pildg* " 
4 
tibin+ Lioa Ht.ip \ < x i  Vvh~ t r  Ydis Rre V4ho Wf' Arc E5pdriul Allorrit,y K.,ioiirccr Pr!,nc} ?:>!I<) C u i t o r r i  i S* I .  t < 
EXHIBIT 2 
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Aladdin Bail Bonds - Bail Page 1 of I 
Help - Bail 
After a person 1s arrested the jail or court w11I set a bail amount (the dollar amount vanes based on the 
dileqed offense involved dnd other conlrtbutiny factors) I[ is the court's way of making sure that a 
defendant appedrs d l  thew scheduled court dates once released from j d ~ l  
In order for an individual to "post bail," or to secure the release of your friendiloved one from jail. they 
must turn over to the court, the ful l amount of the assigned bail amount. Whtle the law demands that 
the ball be "non-excessive." these amounts can still be quite large and beyond the means of most 
people. That's where Aladdin can help. Aladdin will arrange to cover the financial obligation to the 
courts, so the defendal~t can be released. You will only owe Aladdln a small percentaye of the full 
amount (provided the detendant makes all required court appearances), whlch is called the premium. 
Aladdln will walk you through the entire process and even assist in helping the client make their 
scheduled court dates We will do all of thls In the fastest poss~ble time. so the defendant can return 
home to thelr fr~ends and loved ones r~gh t  away. 
I NEED BAIL NOW. 
1.866.51 2.2245 
Tell us about yourself 
What is your name? 
I 
What citv do vou live ~ n ?  
Tell us about the defendant 
Your relationship to the defendant? I'.- . -- . -. - . . 
Phat la11 or city IS the defendant In' 
! --  - 
How can we contact you? 
Phone 
We w ~ l l  attempt to contact you 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN BAIL) 
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL 1 
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND ) case NO. CV OC 07 0661 9 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 
ORDER SEALING EXHlBlT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
VS. ) ) 
DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) 
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,) 
in her official capacity as 1 
Administrative District Judge; 
LARRY D. REINER, in his official 1 
capacity as Trial Court 
Administrator; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as) 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator, ) 
Defendants. 
Two Jinn having moved to seal the Exhibit 1 attached to Brian Chess 
affidavit filed October 24, 2008 and the State Defendants having consented 
to such and the Court finding good cause, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1. Exhibit 1 to Brian Chess's October 24, 2008 Affidavit shall not be 
fl ORDER SEALING EXHIBIT Page 1 of 2 0 0 4  3b 
subject to examination, inspection or copying by the public; and 
2. The Clerk of the District Court shall seal Exhibit 1 to Mr. Chess's 
October 24, 2008 affidavit by placing Che same in a manila 
envelope marked "SealedJJ with a general description of the 
document, its filing date and the date it was sealed. The sealed 
exhibit shall be attached to the filed affidavit. 
DATED this 31 day of October, 2008 
CERTIF CATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 31 'tay of October, 2008 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via 
facsimile to: 
Fax Service I Fax / Service. David Z. Nevin Steven L. Olsen 
Scott McKay t Michael S. Gilmore 
Robyn Fyffe 345-8274 j Karl T. Klein 
6 
854-8073 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP I Melissa moody 
P.O. Box 2772 Deputy Attorneys General 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2772 I i P.O. Box 83720 
I Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 




STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
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KARL T. KLEIN, ISB # 5 156 
MELISSA MOODY, ISB # 6027 
Deputy Anomeys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 10 
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DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF PETER BOTZ 
FILED OCTOBER 27,2008- 1 ORIGINAL 
COME NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, and respond to 
the supplemental affidavit of Peter Botz filed October 27, 2008 as follows. 
Peter Botz is general counsel for Two Jinn, Inc., located in Carlsbad, California. 
9/5/08 Affidavit of Peter Botz, at 7 2. Mr. Botz filed a supplemental affidavit on October 
27,2008, after the cross-motions for summary judgment were heard. 
Although Defendants would move to strike Mr. Botz's supplemental testimony 
under IRE 702 if this case were being tried to a jury, the Defendants do not object to this 
Court considering Mr. Botz's supplemental affidavit. Defendants ask that the Court 
afford the affidavit the weight to which it is entitled: none. 
Mr. Botz's supplemental affidavit does nothing more than re-hash legal arguments 
contained in the briefing, claiming that "interference with the ability to obtain 
exoneration of forfeitures necessarily interferes with Two Jinn's ability to perform its 
obligations to its sureties." 10/27108 Supplemental Affidavit of Peter Botz, at 7 5. 
Mr. Botz's information, which is long on legal argument and short on actual facts, 
is at best useless to the Court; at worst, it reflects a misunderstanding of the state of the 
law. Mr. Botz attests to the general expenses associated with an appeal "when it becomes 
necessary to seek appellate review of a motion for exoneration denied as a result of a 
recommendation by the TCA's office." Id. at 7 6, 
To reiterate an important point: no motions to exonerate are denied as a result of 
the TCA's actions. Motions for exoneration are denied as a result of judicial action. It is 
the judge who denies the motion to exonerate, not the TCA. As an attorney, Mr. Botz is 
aware that it is the judge and not the TCA who denies motions to exonerate. His affidavit 
does not state otherwise. However, Mr. Botz's affidavit, perhaps inadvertently, 
mischaracterizes the process where it implies appellate review is necessitated by TCA 
action. Appellate review of a judicial decision is only necessitated by judicial action. 
Mr. Botz's affidavit does not contain a single specific example of harm or injury, 
but only general allegations that appeals are costly. Mr. Botz's affidavit does not allege 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL FFIDAVIT OF PETER BOTZ 
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specific facts, as required by Rule 56(e), that would support a finding that judges have - 
in any instance - abdicated their judicial role, but only general allegations that motions 
to exonerate are denied "as a result of a recommendation by the TCA's office." Id. 
Due to the above shortcomings, Mr. Botz's affidavit does not provide further 
evidentiary support for Plaintiffs' Complaint. Defendants respectfully request that the 
Court afford Peter Botz's supplemental affidavit its proper weight: none. 
DATED this 5th day of November 2008. 
By ~ 3 J a s  
MELISSA MO%Y 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of November 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Response to the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Peter Botz filed October 27, 2008 by the following method to: 
Scott McKay U.S. Mail 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT 17 Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
LLP Requested 
P.O. Box 2772 Overnight Mail 
303 West Bannock Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
Boise, ID 83701 Statehouse Mail 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
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AND BRIEF - 1 
At the October 17, 2008 hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
Court asked the parties whether the record was complete without the agreement between 
Two Jinn and its insurance companies. To provide the Court with information it 
requested, the Defendants supplemented the record with a Program Manager Agreement 
("Agreement") between National American Insurance Company of California and 
Danielson National Insurance Company and Two Jinn, Inc., which was attached as an 
exhibit to an affidavit. Brian Chess 10/24/08 Affidavit, Exhibit 1. 
Plaintiffs, in response to this supplementation of the evidentiary record, filed a 
legal argument in a "Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental Ajpdavit 
and ~ r i e ~ " '  This reply responds to Plaintiffs' Memorandum. 
I. 
DEFENDANTS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFS' 
CONTRACTS 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have no right to interfere with or enforce the terms 
of the Agreement between Two Jinn and its insurance companies. Memorandum in 
Response to defendants' Supplemental AfJidavit and Brie$, pp. 2-4. Plaintiffs point out 
that Danielson has appointed Two Jinn, not individual bail agent employees, to handle its 
claims by ensuring forfeitures are timely paid, and that Defendants have "no right to 
insist that claims be handled in a different manner." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Response to Defendants ' Supplemental Affidavit and BrieJ; p. 4. Contrary to Plaintiffs' 
assertions, Defendants do not interfere with or attempt to enforce the terms of Two Jinn's 
Agreement with its insurance companies, nor do Defendants insist that claims be handled 
in any particular manner. Plaintiffs' argument misses two important points. 
I Defendants note that while they did file a supplemental affidavit and exhibit, they did not file a brief, a fact which 
Plaintiffs themselves point out in their memorandum: "In submitting the Danielson Agreement, Defendants failed to 
specify how it supported their request for relief.. ." Plaint@s ' Memorandum in Response to Defendants' 
Suppleinental Af$davit and Brief; p.2. 
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First, Defendants do not insist that claims are handled in a different manner than 
that set forth in the Agreement. Defendants simply want to make sure that bond 
forfeitures are paid. Defendants have never required - let alone "insisted" - that 
individual bail agents pay forfeited bonds. If forfeited bonds are paid, Defendants do not 
care how that is accomplished. It is up to Two Jinn ensure that forfeited bonds are paid. 
If Two Jinn does not pay forfeited bonds, the Defendants must have some recourse, some 
way of collecting money owed pursuant to valid court judgments. Rather than deal with 
a faceless corporate entity, Defendants turn, quite expectedly, to the entity's agent; in 
Two Jinn's case, the Courts turn to individual bail agents. Judge Williamson's 8/14/08 
Affidavit at 7 14. 
Second, Plaintiffs' argument misses, or perhaps simply tries to exploit, the gap 
between theory and reality. Some examples serve to illustrate this point. Plaintiffs' 
argument is similar to insisting that Santa, and not his elves, is tasked with making toys 
year round; or that the CEO of the Girl Scouts, and not actual girl scouts, is responsible 
for delivering cookies door-to-door; or that the owner of a pharmacy, and not a 
pharmacist, is responsible for medication being dispensed on time. In any of these 
scenarios, the highest-ranking individual is ultimately responsible; however, the party 
who benefits from the goods or services would quite reasonably turn to (I)  the elves 
(where is my Barbie?); (2) the girl scout who sold the cookies (where are my thin 
mints?); or (3) the responsible pharmacist (where is my vicodin?). All of these examples 
can be easily distinguished on their facts, of course, but the point is a general one 
regarding how the world works, and the expected recourse when goods or services are 
not provided. It would be absurd to suggest that requiring pharmacists to be "morally 
responsible" for the delivery of medication interferes with the pharmacy owner's contract 
with the retail establishment in which the pharmacy is located. So, too, it is absurd to 
suggest that the Defendants requiring bail agents to be responsible for delivering payment 
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on forfeited bonds somehow interferes with Two Jinn's contracts with its insurance 
companies. There is simply no overlap whatsoever. 
11. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE TCA'S PARTICIPATION 
INCREASES LITIGATION COSTS 
Plaintiffs contend that any participation by the TCA on motions to exonerate bond, 
regardless of the judge's ultimate decision, injures Two Jinn's interests. This contention 
is unsupported by actual evidence. 
Plaintiffs write that by "advocating against Two Jinn's motions, the assistant 
TCA's conduct necessarily increases litigation costs regardless of the ultimate outcome." 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendants ' Supplemental AfJidavit and Brief, 
pp.6-7. Not only is this argument completely unsupported by evidence, the evidence 
before the Court actually suggests the opposite conclusion. 
The evidence in the record states that "[tlhe Trial Court Administrator's Office 
approves, without objection, the vast majority of motions to exonerate that it reviews. 
For example, in 2007, the Trial Court Administrator's Office reviewed a total, from all 
bail agencies combined, of 3,744 motions to exonerate bond. The Trial Court 
Administrator's Office approved 3,523 of those motions without objection." Brian Chess 
October 10, 2008 Affidavit at '1 3. 
Without the TCA's review of the motions to exonerate, it is possible that every 
motion filed would be set for hearing before a judge. This would increase litigation costs 
exponentially. 1t may be that the TCA's so-called "interference," far from injuring Two- 
Jinn financially, has actually saved Two Jinn thousands of dollars. The evidence before 
the court compels this conclusion. It certainly does not support Two Jinn's 
unsubstantiated claim that the TCA's involvement in motions to exonerate increases Two 
Jinn's litigation costs. 
DEFENDANTS DO NOT DERIVE THEIR AUTHORITY TO 
CONTRACT WITH INDIVIDUAL BAIL AGENTS FROM BEING A 
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY TO TWO JINN'S CONTRACT 
WITH ITS SURETIES 
Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have failed to specify any contractual 
provisions that make bail agents parties to the bail bond contract (Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants ' Supplemental Affidavit and Brie5 p. 3), or that 
make bail agents or the Court third-party beneficiaries to the Agreement (Plaintif/sJ 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental Afldavit and BrieJ p. 2) .  
Defendants do not derive their ability to contract with individual bail agents from 
( I )  being parties to any bail bond contract or (2) being named as third-party beneficiaries 
to the Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument on this point is a red-herring. 
DATED this 17th day of November 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
AND BRIEF - 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of November 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN




NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT 
LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
[Z1 Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
[Z1 Overnight Mail 








[Z1 Statehouse Mail 
MELISSA MOODY u 
Deputy Attorney General 
&PLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMOKANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' UPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
AND BRIEF - 6 
0 0 4  lar 5 
NO. A 
A.M 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN 1 BAIL BONDSand ANYTIME BAIL ) 
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; and case NO. CV OC 07 06619 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 1 
Plaintiffs, 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION 
1 AND 
vs . I ORDER 
1 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE 1 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S. 
WILLIAMSON, in her official 1 
capacity as Administrative ~ is t r i c t )  
Judge; LARRY D. REINER, in his 
official capacity as Trial Court 
Administrator; and DIANE 
BURRELL, in her official capacity 1 





State Defendants' Motion to Reconsider the courts denial of the 
State's Motion to Dismiss or alternatively for Summary 
in MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 00446 Page 'l of 45 
Judgment: Denied. Bail Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment: Granted in Part and Denied I n  Part. 
David Z Nevin, Scott McKay and Robyn Fyffe, Boise, 
Lawyers for Two Jinn, Inc., James Garske, and Shantara Carlock, 
Plaintiffs. 
Karl T. Klein and Melissa N. Moody, Deputy Attorneys 
General, Boise, Lawyers for District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District, Hon. Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge, 
Larry D. Reiner, Trial Court Administrator and Diane Burrell, 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator. 
........................................... 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs, Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail 
Bonds, James Garske and Shantara Carlock all hold 'insurance producer 
licenses" issued by the State of Idaho Department of Insurance pursuant to 
I.C. §fj 41-1001 et seq. and are qualified as "bail agents" pursuant to I.C. 55 
41-1037 through 41-1045. Hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be 
referred to as "Two Jinn," "Garske," and "Carlock" and they will be 
colledively be referred to as "Bail Plaintiffs." Two Jinn is a bail agent 
engaged in the bail bond agency business in Idaho. Garske is a bail agent 
employed by Two Jinn as a supervising bail agent. Carlock is a bail agent 
employed by Two Jinn as a bail agent. 
As relevant to this action, Bail Plaintiffs' business activities are in the 
courts of the Fourth Judicial District and are conducted pursuant to the Bail 
Bond Guidelines adopted by the Fourth Judicial District. Bail Plaintiffs 
believe that they have been wrongfully and adversely impacted by the 
Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines. Bail Plaintiffs brought this 
action for a judicial determination of the constitutionality, scope and 
application of the Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines. 
The named Defendants are the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
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District of the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as 
Administrative District Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial 
Court Administrator; and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator (hereinafter the defendants shall be collectively 
referred to as the 'State Defendants?. The District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District (herein after Fourth Judicial District) is a state judicial 
administrative district of the courts located in the counties of Ada, Boise and 
Elmore. Judge Darla S. Williamson is the duly acting Administrative District 
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District and as such is charged with the overall 
administration of the courts in the Fourth Judicial District. Judge Williamson 
will herein after be referred to as the "ADJ". Larry D. Reiner and Diane 
Burrell are employed respectively as the Trial Court Administrator and 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator of the Fourth Judicial District and 
hereinafter be referred to collectively as the 'TCA" and respectively as the 
Reiner and Burrell. 
The State Defendants have moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) or alternatively for reconsideration of the 
December 18, 2007 denial of their motion to dismiss and for summary 
judgment pursuant I.R.C.P. 56(b). Bail Plaintiffs have moved for summary 
judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b). The issues raised are intertwined and 
all motions were argued jointly. They will be addressed in this single 
opinion. 
STANDARD FOR SUBJECT MAl7ER JURISDICTION 
I n  considering an I.R.C.P. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss the Supreme 
Court discussed the nature of subject matter jurisdiction in Bach v, Mile4 
144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007) where in it held: 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases 
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over a general type or class of dispute. Boughton v. Price, 70 
Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950). Article V, 5 20 of 
the Idaho Constitution provides that the district court shall 
have original jurisdiction to hear all cases, both at law and in 
equity. Thus, the district court had the subject matter 
jurisdiction to determine the claims presented by the parties. 
STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION 
In considering a motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(Z)(B) the 
court should take into consideration any new facts presented by a party that 
are called to its attention. See Coeur dA/ene Min. Co. v. Firs Nat7 Bk, 1 18 
Idaho 812, 823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD I N  NON-JURY CASE 
The standard for summary judgment in a non-jury case was set forth 
in Watkins v, Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008) as 
"[Ilf the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" summary 
judgment is proper. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the 
moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of material 
fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 
168 (1997). However, "as the trier of fact, the district court is 
entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon 
the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the 
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences." Davis ' Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 
362, 365 (1999). 
STANDARD FOR INJUNCTION 
An injunction will be granted only in extreme cases and the party 
seeking an injunction has the burden of proof. See Harris Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 993 (1984). "The granting or 
refusal of an injunction is a matter resting largely in the trial court's 
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discretion." Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 272, 985 P.2d 1127, 
1135 (1999). 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
In dealing with the matter of motions for summary judgment the 
Notice of Trial Setting and Scheduling Order filed on March 28, 2008 
required: 
There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary 
judgment a separate concise statement, together with a 
reference to the record, of each of the material facts as to which 
the moving party contends there are no genuine issues of 
dispute. Any party opposing the motion shall with their 
response in opposition serve and file a separate concise 
statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth 
all material facts as to which it is contended there exist genuine 
issues necessary to be litigated. I n  determining any motion for 
summary judgment, the Court may assume that the facts as 
claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without 
controversy, except and to the extent that such facts are 
asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by a statement 
filed in opposition to the motion. 
Although no party filed any such "separate concise statement," the parties 
have submitted factual statements in their respective memoranda that in 
substance agreed that the factual evidence submitted in this matter is 
undisputed, although in some instances they draw conflicting inferences 
from the same facts. Pursuant to Watkins ' Peacock, supra, in reaching 
my conclusions in this matter, I have drawn the most probable inferences 
from that undisputed evidence. 
HISTORY OF BAIL BONDS 
The term "bail" has various meanings, i.e.: 
The term "bail" has been used to refer to the means of 
procuring the release from custody of one charged with an 
offense, while also ensuring his or her future attendance in 
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court and compelling him or her to remain within the 
jurisdiction of the court. Bail is a device which exists to ensure 
society's interest in having an accused answer to a criminal 
prosecution, without unduly restricting his liberty and without 
ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. The 
word "bail" may also be used to refer to the security or bond 
for a defendant's appearance in court and also to designate the 
person in whose custody the defendant is placed when 
released from jail and who acts as a surety for the appearance 
of the defendant or party under arrest. This person is also 
sometimes described as the "surety," or the "bailor." A person 
released on bail is generally referred to as the "principal." 
"Bail" has been used as a verb meaning the delivery of an 
accused to persons who by law become security for his 
appearance in court when it is required. 
* * *  
While released on bail prior to trial, a defendant is still 
considered to be within the constructive custody of the law. 
The fixing of bail and release from custody are matters 
traditionally within the discretion of the courts. 
Within the context of the issues before the court and in order to 
avoid confusion, the parties involved in a bail transaction will be 
characterized as follows: 
"Bail Bond" - A contract between the State, the principal/defendant 
and the surety. 
"Principal" - The individual charged as a criminal defendant who 
seeks a bail bond. 
"Surety" - The entity providing the bond," i.e. National American 
Insurance Company of California and its wholly-owned subsidiary 
Danielson National Insurance Company 
"Bail Bond Agency" - The insurance producer licensee 
representing the surety, in this case, Two Jinn. 
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"Bail Agents" - The individual insurance producer licensees (Garske 
and Carlock) employed by the bail bond agency (Two Jinn) to represent it 
and the surety in issuing bail bonds on the surety. 
"Supervising Bail Agent" - The individual bail agent designated as 
the managing agent (Garske) for a bail bond agency (Two Jinn). 
In  order to address the issues raised, it is important to clarify the 
purpose of bail, the traditional statutory methods of posting the same and 
the current use of surety insurance. 
It has been said that the purpose of bail is to ensure the 
presence or secure the attendance, of the accused at trial, that 
is, to guarantee the appearance of the accused before the 
court at such times as court may direct; 
* * * 
The purpose of bond is not to collect revenue. Nor, due 
to the presumption of innocence, is the object of bail to effect 
punishment in advance of conviction; bail is a device which 
exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer 
to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her 
liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed 
innocent. Nor is bail a method to punish sureties. 
* * * 
8A Am. Jur. 2d 5 2. 
The Supreme court reviewed the history of bail and the application of 
the Idaho bail statutes to bail bonds in Leader ' Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 
639-640, 151 P.3d 831, 835-836 (2007) where it provided: 
Many of the Appellant's arguments made below center 
upon applying specific provisions and words in Idaho's bail 
statutes to bail bonds. The problem with that approach is that 
most of the applicable statutes were enacted before there were 
bail bonds. The bail statutes provide that to be released from 
custody on bail, the defendant first had to have a judge set the 
dollar amount of bail. I.C. 19-2901 & 19-2902. The 
defendant then had hn/o statutory options. One option was to 
deposit cash with the clerk of the court in the amount that the 
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judge set for bail. I.C. 5 19-2922. The other option was to 
have two sufficient sureties execute and acknowledge before 
the judge the undertaking of sufficient bail. I.C. fj 19-2909. I n  
the undertaking, the sureties promised to pay the sum 
specified by the judge as bail if the defendant failed to appear 
or to hold himself amenable to the orders and process of the 
court. Id. The sureties each had to be a resident, 
householder, or freeholder in this state, and they each had to 
be worth the amount specified in the undertaking exclusive of 
property exempt from execution. I.C. 5 19-2910. The court 
could also require that they be residents of the county where 
the bail is offered. Id. The sureties had to sign affidavits 
showing that they possessed the statutory qualifications to be 
bail, and the court could examine them under oath regarding 
their sufficiency to pay the amount of the undertaking. I.C. 5 
19-2911. All of the statutes cited in this paragraph were 
adopted in 1864 by the territorial legislature. None of them 
have since been amended except Idaho Code 5 19-2909, and 
the amendments to that statute were not substantive. These 
statutes do not address bail bonds because bail bonds did not 
exist when they were enacted. Appellant is attempting to 
make them apply to the bail bond agents, supervising agents, 
and surety companies that exist today. Neither the bail bond 
agent nor the surety company fits the statutory qualifications of 
the two sufficient sureties set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-2910. 
Modifying the statutes to make them applicable to bail bond 
agents and surety companies is the province of the legislature. 
The use of bail surety bonds was approved by the Idaho Legislature 
when it enacted I.C. 341-2604 (S.L. 1961, ch. 330, 5557) which permitted 
surety insurers qualified under the Idaho Insurance statutes to become the 
sole surety on bonds. Only surety insurance companies licensed by the 
Idaho Department of Insurance may lawfully issue bail bonds. I.C. 59 41- 
103, 41-305, 41-308, 41-507 and 41-2604. When it adopted the Idaho 
Criminal Rules and the Misdemeanor Criminal Rules in 1979, effective July 
1, 1980, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the posting of bail by use 
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of a surety bond. I.C.R. 46(d) and M.C.R. 13(c)(3). 
I n  State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 952 P.2d 
1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998), Idaho clearly established that: 
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between 
the state on one side and an accused and his or her surety on 
the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearance 
of an accused. . . . The extent of the surety's undertaking is 
determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules 
of contract law and suretyship. 
. . . (Citations omitted). 
The absence of legislation or Supreme Court rules relating to bail 
surety bonds has led to the adoption of guidelines such as those in question 
in this action. 
BAIL AGENT'S RELATIONSHIP vrs-A-V~STHE SURETY 
The relationship of a bail bond agency to the surety and the 
relationship of a bail agent to the bail bond agency and to the surety are all 
grounded in agency law and are each that of an agent to a disclosed 
principal. See the bail bond exemplar, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
A copy of Two Jinn's general agency agreement with one of the 
sureties it represents (National American Insurance Company of California 
and its wholly-owned subsidiary Danielson National Insurance Company) 
was attached to the Affidavit of Brian Chess, Administrative Secretary to 
Trial Court Administrator filed on October 24, 2008. As the parties have 
not included any other agency agreements between Two Jinn and other 
sureties, it is a reasonable assumption that this general agency agreement 
is representative of all other such general agency agreements between 
Two Jinn and its sureties. This agreement will hereinafter be referred to 
as the 'general agency agreement." 
The general agency agreement establishes the relationship between 
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Two Jinn and this surety. In  substance, it provides that the bail bond 
premiums charged by Two Jinn for bail bonds issued on the surety are 
distributed as follows: 
To the Surety 3 O/O 
To a Contingent Reserve Account owned by 7 O/O 
Two Jinn but held in trust for Two Jinn by 
the Surety 
To Two Jinn 90 O/O 
Total Premiums -- 100 % 
Thus Two Jinn receives ninety-seven per cent (97 %) of the premiums on 
the bail bonds it sells. Under the terms of the general agency agreement 
Two Jinn is required to pay any premium taxes (I.C. fj 41-402) charged by 
the State on its share of the premiums. 
The general agency agreement further provides that Two Jinn is 
responsible for paying all claims on the bail bonds. The general agency 
agreement defines claims as 
[all1 costs and expenses associated with claims processing and 
loss payments on Bonds, including but not limited to court 
costs, fees, investigative costs, court judgments on Bond 
forfeitures and attorneys fees. 
Additionally, Two Jinn has agreed to indemnify the surety for any claims 
paid by the surety. The net effect of this agreement is that Two Jinn is a 
real party in interest on the bail bonds it sells. See I.R.C.P. 17(a) and 
State v. Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111 P.3d 621 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The General Agency Agreement also incorporates a Retail 
Underwriting Policy of Manager and a Retail Branch Policy of Manager. 
The General Agency Agreement exhibits containing these policies were not 
included in the copy of the General Agency Agreement filed with the court 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
00455 
Page 10 of 45 
and are therefore assumed to have no bearing on the issues raised by the 
parties. 
Individual bail agents are employed by Two Jinn on an oral, salaried at 
will contract basis. As the parties have provided no specific information 
regarding the terms of Garske's employment as supervisory bail agent, it is 
a reasonable assumption that Garske is employed on the same basis as 
other bail agents: on an oral, salaried at will contract basis. At Two Jinn's 
request, the surety appoints Two Jinn's qualified employees as its appointed 
agents pursuant to I.C. 3 41-1018. 
Absent provisions in other agreements between 1) the surety and the 
bail bond agency; 2) the surety and the bail agent; 3) the bail bond agency 
and the bail agent; 4) the principal (the accused) and the bail bond agency; 
5) the principal and the surety; and/or 6) the principal and the bail agent, 
neither the bail bond agency (Two Jinn) nor the bail agent (Garske or 
Carlock) is a party to the suretyship contract between the state on one side 
and the principal and his or her surety on the other side. See General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. vv. Turner Ins, Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 696- 
697, 535 P.2d 664, 669-670 (1975). 
Sureties are given wide latitude in dealing with bonded defendants 
who default in making a court appearance. The common law scope of this 
authority has been stated in Taylor ' Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-372, 21 
L.M. 287 (1872) as: 
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the 
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the 
original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they 
may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that 
cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be 
done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. 
They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on 
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the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house 
for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new 
process. None is needed. I t  is likened to the rearrest by the 
sheriff of an escaping prisoner. * * *. [I]t is said: 'The bail 
have their principal on a string, and may pull the string 
whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.' 
Given the corporate nature of the surety insurance companies authorized to 
issue bail bonds, they must of necessity act through agents, i.e. bail 
agencies and bail agents. The October 27, 2008 affidavit of Peter Botz 
establishes that on behalf its sureties, Two Jinn's claims handling services 
encompass the common law rights of a "bail" including "hiring 
investigators to locate and apprehend bail fugitives." 
ADOPTION OF THE GUIDELINES 
The Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines were initially adopted 
by the ADJ on April 16, 2004. The ADJ subsequently modified the 
Guidelines in part on July 16, 2004, August 25, 2004, October 1, 2004, 
December 9, 2005, October 17, 2006, and November 13, 2006. On August 
22, 2008, while this action was pending, the ADJ adopted revised and 
restated Bail Bond Guidelines. The judges of the Fourth Judicial District 
involved in the handling of criminal and juvenile matters approved the 
adoption of the Guidelines. A complete copy of the Guidelines as adopted 
on August 22, 2008 has been filed as part of the Stipulation Re Revised Bail 
Bond Guidelines filed on September 18, 2008. Although there are some 
differences between the guidelines as they existed when this action was 
commenced, the parties have agreed that all references to the Guidelines 
will be to the August 22, 2008 Guidelines as filed on September 18, 2008. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS AND INFERENCES 
Although additional facts and inferences may be necessary to reach 
my conclusions in this matter, they will be recited in the Analysis section of 
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this opinion. 
11. ISSUES 
The foci of the Bail Plaintiffs' complaints are the provisions of the 
Guidelines that in large part deal with establishment of a list of approved 
bail agents, the process of being placed on or removed from the list of 
authorized bail agents, the requirement that only bail bonds filed by 
authorized bail agents are to be accepted as bail in the Fourth Judicial 
District, and the authority for and scope of the actions taken by the TCA. 
The parties have identified various issues including: 
1. Are the issues raised in the Amended Complaint moot? 
2. Do Two Jinn, Garske and Carlock each lack standing to maintain 
this action? 
3. Does the Administrative District Judge have the authority to 
adopt bail bond guidelines? 
4. Do the Guidelines as adopted impermissibly conflict with the 
insurance statutes regulating Bail Agents? 
5. Do the Guidelines as adopted exceed the ADJ's authority? 
6. Does a Bail Agent's acknowledgement, waiver, and certification 
in acceptance of the Guidelines form an enforceable contract 
between the 4m District Courts and the Bail Agent? 
7. Do the Guidelines' procedures for the addition and removal of 
Bail Agents provide due process? 
8. Are the actions of the TCA in commenting on or assisting the 
Prosecuting Attorney on various motions relating to bail 
constitute a denial of the right to due process of any of the Bail 
Plaintiffs? 
These issues will be addressed below, but not necessarily in the order listed. 
The matters presented to this court relate to the authority to adopt 
Guidelines and their operation. Questions as to the necessity or wisdom of 
the Guidelines adopted are not within the scope of this action. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
00458 
Page 13 of 45 
111. Analysis 
I. Are the issues raised in the Amended Complaint moot? 
The Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of mootness and its 
exceptions in Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 
Idaho 849, 851-852, 119 P.3d 624, 626-627 (2005), as: 
An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and 
substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded 
through judicial decree of specific relief. State v. Rogers, 140 
Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004). There are three recognized 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine: ( I )  when there is the 
possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the 
person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is 
likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; 
and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of 
substantial public interest. Id. 
While it is true that the Amended Complaint in this matter does not deal 
with a current bail bond issue between the parties, it is clear from the 
record that there continue to be and will continue to be repetition of many 
of the past disputes delineated in the record that may evade judicial review 
of the issues addressed in this proceeding. See Leader ' Reiner, supra, 
Exhibit H, McKay Affidavit filed August 21, 2008 and Exhibits 1 and 3, Burrell 
Affidavit filed July 10, 2008. The Bail Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief. 
Injunctions are issued to prevent the commission or continuance of 
some particular act that would cause "great or irreparable injury" to the 
moving party. Injunctions are prospective in nature. Wi/son v. Cily of 
Boise,7 Idaho 69, 60 P. 84 (1900); Harris v. Preston-Whitney Irr. Co,, 92 
Idaho 398,443 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1968). 
The Bail Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are not based upon any 
current or present actions or threatened actions under the Bail Guidelines. 
They are based solely upon the history of past actions under the Bail 
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Guidelines as identified in the record. 
There is evidence that the State Defendants intend to continue to 
enforce and interpret the Bail Guidelines in a similar manner to the 
complained of past actions. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court 
held that: 
It is true that injunctions should issue only where irreparable 
injury is actually threatened. Where the conduct causing injury 
has been discontinued, the dispute is moot and the injundion 
should be denied. However, as the United States Supreme 
Court observed, the trial court must be convinced that "there is 
no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated." 
OBoskey v. Brst Federal Savings & Loan Association, 112 Idaho 1002, 
1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306 (1987) (citations omitted). I n  OBoskey the trial 
court found that despite First Federal Saving's protestations, it had 
continued the complained of conduct and that the entry of the injunction 
was appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
Like the trial court in OBoskey, I find evidence to support the Bail 
Plaintiffs position that the State Defendants are likely to engage in actions 
similar to those identified in the record. I f  portions of the Bail Guidelines or 
their enforcement are unlawful, there would be a basis for granting 
injunctive relief. As there may be a basis for granting injunctive relief, the 
issues raised by Bail Plaintiffs in this action are not moot. See Harris v. 
Cass.3 County, 106 Idaho 513 at 516-517,681 P.2d 988 at 991-992 (1984). 
To the extent the State Defendants are raising an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) 
issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, I find that the issues raised in 
this action are the type of issues often presented to trial courts. I have 
subject matter jurisdiction to decide these issues. See Bach V, Mile4 supra. 
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2. Do Two Jinn, Garske and Carlock each lack standing to 
maintain this action? 
Standing is not concerned with the merits of the issues to be 
litigated; rather it is focused upon the parties seeking relief. I n  order to 
possess standing a party must face a distinct, palpable injury, not one that 
may be suffered by all citizens in the jurisdiction. See Selkirk-Priest Basin 
Assh, I'c. v. State ex re/, Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 833-834, 919 P.2d 1032, 
1034-1035 (1996) and Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 
In  this action the Bail Plaintiffs are seeking declaratory injunctive relief 
from some of the provisions of the Bail Guidelines they allege to unlawful. 
Declaratory judgments are used to determine the rights of parties based 
upon real, actual and concrete controversy. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Harris K Cassia County, supra 106 Idaho at 516, 681 P.2d at 991 held that 
It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of 
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be 
upon a hypothetical state of facts. 
Garske and Carlock are bail agents on the Fourth District's approved 
list of bail agents and are currently subject to the terms of the Bail 
Guidelines. They each have standing. 
Two Jinn is a bail agency employing several bail agents who are 
subject to the Bail Guidelines, including, among others, Garske and Carlock. 
The net effect of Two Jinn's contractual relationship to its sureties as 
outlined above is that Two Jinn is a real party in interest on the bail bonds it 
sells. See I.R.C.P. 17(a) and State v, Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111 P.3d 621 
(Ct. App. 2005). Although not directly regulated by the Bail Guidelines, Two 
Jinn is a party to a real and substantial controversy relating to the 
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enforcement of the Bail Guidelines. Two Jinn has standing. 
3. Does the Administrative District Judge have the authority to 
adopt bail bond guidelines? 
Judicial rule making power is inherently vested in the "Supreme Court, 
district courts, and such other courts . . . ." Art. V 55 2 and 13 Idaho 
Constitution. Also see I.C. 33 1-212 and 1-213. Inherent and specific rule 
making authority has been vested in administrative district judges by (1) I.C. 
5 1-907, which provides in part: 
The administrative judge or acting administrative judge in each 
judicial district, subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, shall 
have administrative supervision and authority over the 
operation of the district courts and magistrates in the district.; 
by (2) I.C.A.R. 42(e), which provides: 
"The powers and duties of the administrative judge include all 
those powers and duties as established by the Supreme Court," 
and by (3) the August 4, 2005 Idaho Supreme Court Order regarding the 
job description, power and duties of an administrative district judge which 
provides in pertinent part: 
(17) delegate powers and duties to judges and court personnel 
as necessary and appropriate;. 
(18) establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, 
forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters; 
The scope of this rule making authority relates to procedural matters 
as opposed to substantive ones. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 
828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992). In  trying to distinguish procedural matters from 
substantive ones, the Supreme Court in State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 
541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1983, quoting State ' Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 
527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1974), established the following guidance: 
Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be 
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delineated between what is substantive and what is procedural, 
the following general guidelines provide a useful framework for 
analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct 
and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, 
defines, and regulates primary rights. I n  contrast, practice and 
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of 
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated. 
The ADJ had and has the authority to adopt procedural bail bond 
guidelines. 
4. Do the Guidelines as adopted impermissibly conflict with 
insurance statutes regulating Bail Agents? 
The dispute between the parties on this issue can be characterized 
as a dispute over the separation of powers. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
discussing the separation of powers doctrine stated: 
The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive 
laws in the Legislature. Idaho Const. art. 111, fj 1; see also 
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410, 414 (1990) 
("[Olf Idaho's three branches of government, only the 
legislature has the power to make 'law.' "). This power is not 
restricted by the Court's authority to enact rules of procedure 
to be followed in the district courts. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 
862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992) ("Flhis Court's rule 
making power goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, 
rules."). This Court has adopted the standard for delineating 
substantive laws from procedural rules promulgated by the 
Washington Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 
527 P.2d 674 (1974). In  Smith, the Washington Supreme 
Court observed that substantive law "creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights. I n  contrast, practice and procedure 
pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts 
by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated." Id. at 501, 527 P.2d at 677, quoted in Beam, 121 
Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93. 
Just as Article I1 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the 
Legislature from usurping powers properly belonging to the 
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judicial department, so does that provision prohibit the 
judiciary from improperly invading the province of the 
Legislature. As this Court noted in Idaho State AFL-CIO v. 
Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 696, 718 P.2d 1129, 1134 (1986), "[wle 
are bound to respect the reasonable exercise by the legislature 
of powers expressly delegated to it by the constitution of this 
state, and in the absence of other constitutional offense cannot 
interfere with it." Thus, to the extent that the 1994 legislation 
is a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact 
substantive law, that legislation is to be given due deference 
and respect. Id. at 698, 718 P.2d at 1136 ("In the absence of 
a legislative invasion of constitutionally protected rights, the 
judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the 
legislature's exclusive policy decisions."). 
In re: SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 
(1995). 
Bail Plaintiffs urge that the Guidelines requirement that bail agents 
submit to a more detailed character and fitness evaluation prior to 
placement on the Fourth Districts' authorized list constitutes a regulation of 
bail agents in violation of I.C. fjfj 1-907, 1-213 and the Idaho Constitution. 
The Bail Plaintiffs argue that the authority and power to regulate 
define substantive rights, including the police power to regulate the right 
to pursue an occupation for the protection of the public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare is vested in the legislature. See Jones v. State 
Bd of  Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 868, 555 P.2d 399, 408 (1976). 
Pursuant to the authority of Idaho Code Chapter 10, Title 41 the Idaho 
Department of Insurance (DOI) regulates the licensing of insurance 
producers, including bail agents as specified in I.C. fjfj 41-1037 through 41- 
1045. This regulation includes among its requirements that an applicant be 
subjected to a background or character evaluation. This evaluation is based 
upon a criminal history records fingerprint check and the applicant's 
responses to the background information questionnaire on the National 
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Association of Insurance Commissioners' Uniform Application for Individual 
Insurance Producer License required by the DOI. 
Bail Plaintiffs contend that such state licensure vest bail agents with 
rights that cannot be superseded by the Guidelines adopted by the ADJ. 
See Wilshire hs. Co. v Carrington, 570 P2d 30 1 (Mont. 1977). 
The State Defendants take the position that it is the long recognized 
general rule that the "[flixing of bail and release from custody are matters 
traditionally within the discretion of the courts. We believe that these 
matters are most wisely left to the trial judge," State v. F/y, 128 Idaho 50, 
53, 910 P.2d 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 
539, 541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985); State v. Kerrign, 98 Idaho 701, 571 
P.2d 762 (1977); State v. Jiminez, 93 Idaho 140, 456 P.2d 784 (1969); 
State ' Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 434 P.2d 88 (1967) and that this discretion 
also extends to the approval of the bail agents who post bail bonds as 
agents of the surety. It should be noted that the Guidelines make no 
attempt to approve sureties or bail bond agencies. The scope of the 
Guidelines is strictly limited to the regulation of bail agents and supervising 
bail agents. 
The State Defendants correctly point out that the DO1 does not 
investigate whether a bail agent applicant is related by blood, marriage or 
adoption to any judge or person employed in a court-related position. Once 
an individual is licensed, the DO1 does not require as part of its renewal 
process any additional criminal history records fingerprint checks.' See 
Affidavit of Lisa Tordjman, filed August 25, 2008. 
The Guidelines Section 11 and the APPUUnON TO BECOME AM 
1 I.C. § 41-1021 requires producer licensees to report final administrative actions or commencement of 
criminal prosecutions against the producer within thirty (30) days. 
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AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENT WITHIN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
STATE OF IDAHO require that in addition to being a current DO1 insurance 
producer licensee, the applicant must submit to a criminal history records 
fingerprint check and not be subject to any of the grounds for 
disqualification listed in Section 11, Part I11 Disqualification of the Guidelines, 
to-wit: 
Grounds for disqualification of an applicant from offering for 
acceptance bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District include the 
following: 
A. The criminal history check reveals: 
(1) any felony crime for which the applicant or the 
applicant's proposed insurance company has been 
convicted, pled guilty, received a with held 
judgment, or otherwise sentenced. 
(2) any misdemeanor crime involving theft, fraud, or 
any other crime of dishonesty for which the 
applicant or the applicant's proposed insurance 
company has been convicted, pled guilty, received 
a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced within 
the last ten (10) years, including crimes committed 
before age 18 years. 
(3) three or more misdemeanor crimes for which the 
applicant or the applicant's proposed insurance 
company has been convicted, pled guilty, received 
a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced within 
the last five (5) years, including crimes committed 
before age 18 years. 
(4) any combination of three or more of the following 
in which the applicant has been convicted. pled 
guilty, received a withheld judgment, or otherwise 
sentenced: failure to appear, contempt of court, or 
probation violation within the last five (5) years 
B. The applicant failed to disclose information as requested 
on the Application form. 
C. The applicant or the applicant's insurance company is not 
licensed by The Department of Insurance of the State of 
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Idaho. 
D. The applicant has four or more prior violations of these 
Guidelines and/or previous Fourth Judicial District policies 
or guidelines for bail agents which have not been 
excused by the Administrative District Judge following a 
hearing. 
E. The applicant is currently employed by the state or 
county in a court-related position. 
F. The applicant was denied the ability to offer bail bonds 
for acceptance or was removed from the list of 
authorized bail agents in this or another jurisdiction. 
G. The application processing reveals the applicant has 
previously had a license suspension or revocation 
imposed by the department of insurance of any state of 
the United States. 
H. The applicant or his/her insurance company has 
previously failed to have paid a forfeited bond. 
I. The applicant is related by blood, marriage, or adoption 
to a Fourth District judge. 
3. Financial insolvency of the applicant or his/her insurance 
company. 
K. The applicant has not satisfied all obligations to any court 
incurred while working with another bail agency. 
L. The applicant was previously removed from the list of 
authorized agents. 
The State Defendants attempt to support the requirement that the 
AD3 must determine that the bail agent be of good moral character as 
required by the Guidelines as being necessitated by statements in the ADJ's 
August 14, 2007 affidavit, to-wit: 
6. The critical factor in assuring that the accused returns to 
court at the appointed time is the bail agent to whom the 
accused is being released. It is the bail agent who makes 
contact with the accused and determines the risks of writing 
the bonds on his or her behalf. By writing the bond, the bail 
agent undertakes to assure the accused's appearance, and the 
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corollaries of that obligation are the duty to monitor and 
supervise the accused after release on bail and to recapture 
should he or she fail to appear. 
* * * 
14. The character of the bailjbond agent is a critical factor for 
the courts in releasing an accused into his or her care. I f  the 
bailjbond agent engages in criminal activity, such as writing a 
check with insufficient funds, then that person's character, 
ethics, and veracity is called into question. The very 
characteristics considered when releasing an accused into his 
or her care. I f  the bail/bond agent cannot be trusted to ensure 
that the accused returns to court at the appointed time, then 
the judicial system, along with the public's welfare is affected. 
* * * 
. . 
In  evaluating these assertions we should consider how bail is set and 
posted. Usually the amount of bail is initially set by the bail schedules 
established by I.M.C.R. 13 or is set by a judge on the arrest warrant or at 
the time of a defendant's first appearance. See I.C.R. Rules 4 and 5. As 
indicated in Leader v. Reiner, supra, I.C.R. 46(b) and I.C. 55 19-2909 and 
19-2910 there are three methods of posting bail once the amount of bail is 
set. 
1. Private Sureties: After the amount of bail was set by the court, 
two sufficient sureties could execute and acknowledge before the 
judge the undertaking of sufficient bail. I.C. 5 19-2909. In  the 
undertaking, the sureties promised to pay the sum specified by 
the judge as bail if the defendant failed to appear or to hold 
himself amenable to the orders and process of the court. Ibid. 
The sureties each had to be a resident, householder, or freeholder 
in this state, and they each had to be worth the amount specified 
in the undertaking exclusive of property exempt from execution. 
I.C. 5 19-2910. The court could also require that they be 
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residents of the county where the bail is offered. Id. The sureties 
had to sign affidavits showing that they possessed the statutory 
qualifications to be bail, and the court could examine them under 
oath regarding their sufficiency to pay the amount of the 
undertaking. I.C. 5 19-291 1. 
2. Cash: Anyone could deposit the amount of the bail set by the 
court in cash with the Clerk of the Court. I.C. 5 19-2922. 
3. Bail Surety Bond. I.C. 541-2604, I.C.R. 46(d) and M.C.R. 
13(c)(3). A corporate surety bond in the amount of the bail set 
by the court can be filed by a bail agent with the Court. 
The first method requires the appearance of the sureties before the 
court and their specific approval by the court. 
The second method only requires that the amount of bail be posted 
in cash. The person posting could be of the highest moral character such 
as Cecil Andrus or Phil Batt or of the worst moral character such as Joseph 
Duncan or Osama bin Laden. It could even be the criminal defendant 
himself. It would make no difference to the Court as long as the bail was 
deposited in cash, 
The State Defendants fail to even suggest why the third method, a 
surety bond posted by a corporation specifically authorized by law to be 
the sole surety on a bail bond, requires that the agent of the corporate 
surety be of good moral character, as determined by the ADJ, but that 
there is no good character determination for the criminal defendant or 
other individuals posting a cash bail under the second method. 
While the rationales tendered by the AD3 might be aspirational for 
any poster of bail, whether private surety, cash or surety bond, there is 
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nothing in the record,* the guidelines, or the statutory and case law that 
requires a bail agent 'to assure the accused's appearance, and * * * the 
duty to monitor and supervise the accused after release on bail and to 
recapture should he or she fail to appear." Absent some special 
agreement, the only obligation of private sureties or corporate sureties is 
to pay into court the amount of the bail. For circumstances involving cash 
bail, there is no obligation, just the loss of the monies posted. 
The Guidelines create an additional substantive licensure procedure 
that more than duplicates the licensure procedure provided by the DOI. 
While some of the Guidelines requirements to be placed on the Fourth 
Judicial District's Approved List are not violative of the separation of powers, 
i.e. Guidelines Section 11, Part III(1) regarding relationship to a Fourth 
District judge, the bulk of the licensure procedure "creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights" of bail agents in violation of Idaho Const. art. 111, 
I Whether specific provisions are matters that are properly within the 
ambit of the court's rule making powers will be addressed in later sections 
of this opinion. 
5. Do the Guidelines as adopted exceed the ADJ's authority? 
Some provisions of the Guidelines are substantive in nature; that is, 
they create, define and regulate primary rights in excess of the ADJfs 
authority. Before discussing specific provisions, the question of whether 
those provisions should cause the Guidelines to be stricken in their entirety 
or whether the provisions are severable should be determined. 
TWO Jinn's web site representations attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Reply to Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion Summary Judgment might raise a question concerning its obligation to defendants, 
however the Guidelines do not examine Two Jinn's qualifications. 
3 Some states spell out conditions of release that include obligations of the surety. See New Jersey 
Directive 13-04 prescribing the form and conditions of recognizance. 
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While the Guidelines do not contain a severability clause, the Idaho 
Supreme Court when considering a municipal ordinance gave applicable 
guidance in Voyles K Cily of Nampa, 97 Idaho 597, 600, 548 P.2d 1217, 
1220 (1976), to-wit: 
When part of a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional and yet 
is not an integral or indispensable part of the measure, the 
invalid portion may be stricken without affecting the remainder 
of the statute or ordinance. State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 315 
P.2d 529 (1957); Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n Inc. v. Robison, 65 
Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944). The principle of striking a 
dispensable, unconstitutional part of a statute or ordinance 
permits the striking of a single word. State v. Reese, 222 
So.2d 732 (Fla.1969); Ex parte Frye, 143 Tex. Cr.R. 9, 156 
S.W.2d 531 (1941). 
The same rationale should apply to the Guidelines. 
Cases from other iurisdictions 
Both sides in this litigation have cited cases from a variety of 
jurisdictions in support or opposition to the authority of the AD3 to adopt 
Guidelines for the regulation bail agents. In  order to determine whether 
the rationale of any of these cases applies to the case at bar, they each 
should be considered in light of the above definitions and Idaho's law of 
agency. 
Concord CasuaItv & Suretv Co. v. United States, 69 F.2d 78 (2d 
Cir. 1934). 
The court of appeals held that the district court was without 
jurisdiction to restrain Concord from issuing bail bonds for three years as a 
consequence of its agents improper conduct. However the court of 
appeals further stated at 69 F.2d 81 that 
The court is not without protection if the surety company is 
deemed a poor moral or unsafe risk. I f  the surety company 
should so conduct its business as to lose the confidence of the 
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court or a judge thereof, the judge to whom an undertaking is 
submitted in any case for approval could refuse to approve it. 
The court or the judge may direct the clerk or clerks to do 
likewise in such instance, under the provisions of title 6 
U.S.C.A. 6. The District Court might by rule refuse to accept 
bonds of any named surety company. Like any other financial 
risk in giving an undertaking or guaranty, a moral risk as well 
as the material risk is involved. It is the personal 
responsibility- the presence of the prisoner- that a bail bond 
requires. When a defendant is called upon to pay his 
obligation to society, it is not the sum of the bail bond that 
society asks for, but rather the presence of the defendant for 
imprisonment. The court's judicial act of approval of a bond is 
not mandatory under section 6, but the statute calls for the 
exercise of a wise judicial discretion. 
American Drua~ists Ins. Co., Inc., v. Boaart, 707 F.2d 1229, 1238 
(11" Cir. 19831. 
American Druggists stands for the proposition that if a court is to 
disallow a surety from filing bonds, it must follow one of three alternatives: 
1) Notify the Secretary of Treasury to commence an investigation. 31 
C.F.R. §223.21(1982); 2) Wait until the surety has failed to pay a final 
judgment for thirty days. 31 U.S.C.S. §9305(e); or 3) After providing the 
surety due process, enter its order declining to accept future bonds offered 
by the surety. 
Calvett v. Lapeer Circuit Judges. 442 M ich. 409, 502 N. W. 2d 293 
(1993') 
Calvert considered the question of a trial court's right to remove or 
suspend an individual from a mandated list of persons engaged in the 
business of becoming sureties on bonds for compensation in criminal cases 
for charging fees and engaging in other conduct violative of the provisions 
of the Penal Code concerning the writing of bail bonds. The opinion is 
unclear as to Calvert's status as bail agent, bail agency, or surety. In  any 
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event, the court held that despite licensing by the Insurance Code, Calvert 
could be removed from the mandated list for his violations of the Penal 
Code by the judges. Calvert establishes at 442 Mich. 412, 502 N.W. 2d 
294 that although 
the Insurance Code, in providing that the commissioner may 
suspend or revoke the license of an agent, [it] does not bar 
judges from refusing to accept bonds written or provided by a 
person who violates the provisions of the Penal Code 
concerning the writing of bonds. 
Calvert does not address the question of judicial power to license or 
determine the character or fitness of a bail agent. 
In  the Matter oflohnson. 217 S.E. 2d 85 IN.C. 19751 
Johnson involves judicial regulation of a "professional bondsman." I n  
this case a professional bondsman is a surety and was limited by court rule 
to writing bail bonds not to exceed four times the security deposit with the 
clerk of court. I f  anything, this case would support a court regulating the 
person or entity liable on the bail bond, i.e, the surety, not a bail agent. 
In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15.16 (D.C. Cir. 19511 
The court of appeals held that under statutes directing district court 
to provide rules and regulations governing the business of becoming 
surety for compensation upon bonds, that once a person has been 
approved, that person has a property right, "the deprivation of that right, 
once granted, is a judicial act, requiring due process of law." 
Carison v. Mesioh. 932 P.2d 18 iOkl.Cr.. 19961 
Oklahoma's comprehensive statutory regulation of the bail bond 
business, The Bail Bondsman Act, 59 0kl.St.Ann. 91301 et seq, prevents a 
court from enforcing local rules regulating bail bond business that are 
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more restrictive than statutory scheme. Oklahoma recognizes several 
types of bail bondsmen, some of whom are sureties on the bail bonds they 
write. As to default in payment on a bond posted by a "surety bondsman," 
i.e. a bail agent for an insurer, it is the insurer's license that is cancelled. 
See 59 0kl.St.Ann. 51330. 
Taylor v. Wadde-v. 334 S.W.2d 733 [Tenn. 19601 
One of several Tennessee cases cited by the State Defendants as 
supporting the proposition that courts have the inherent power to regulate 
professional bail bondsmen who provide bail bonds in their courts. The 
application of the Tennessee cases to the status of those individuals that 
under Idaho law are bail agents is of little help. Tennessee, contrary to 
Idaho, by statute makes such bail agents sureties on the bail bonds they 
issue. See Tennessee Code Annotated 5 40- 11-301(4). 
In re Preclusion of Brice, 841 A.2d 927 [N.J.SUD~~. 20041 
I n  Brice the court, held that a bail agent was personally liable on a 
bail bond. This decision was based upon three alternative grounds: 
1. The approved court instructions for preparation of 
the bail recognizance defined a bail bond and provided that 
if the defendant failed to appear, "the signers of the bond" 
will pay the amount of the bond to the court. The courts 
rationale was that the agent signed the bail bond, ergo he 
is a signer and liable to make payment. 
2.Alternatively the court held that the bail agent's 
agreement with the surety that he would pay any forfeiture 
on bail bonds written by him made him personally liable on 
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the bail bond.4 
3. Lastly the court relied upon New Jersey's recent 
enactment of comprehensive legislation regulating the bail 
bond business. N.J.S.A. 17:31-10 through 15. 
The second rationale is the most compelling as it avoids any separation of 
powers issues raised by the first. The third rationale is confirming of the 
second as the statutory provisions, N.J.S.A. 17:31-13(b), distinguish 
between bail agents who have provided the surety with a guarantee to 
satisfy forfeited bail or a bail forfeiture judgment (such as Two Jinn) and 
bail agents (Garske and Carlock) who have not. Although it has not 
modified its position with respect to the first rationale, the New Jersey 
court has since modified its court rules to align with the statutes. See N.J. 
Rules of Court, R. 1:13-3 and NJ Directives Dir. 13-04. 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that 
upon a close reading they primarily deal with sureties and statutory or rule 
schemes that differ from Idaho. They are informative. They all recognize 
that a bail bond is a contract between the State, the defendant and a 
surety. It is in the determination of who is a surety that these cases can 
and should be distinguished from Idaho law. 
Idaho as a matter of public policy has determined that compensated 
bail bond sureties are limited to corporations authorized to conduct a 
surety business. I.C. 55 41-103, 41-305, 41-308, 41-507, and 41-2604. It 
is the ADJ's use of the Guidelines to place the obligations of a surety on 
bail agents that runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. 
Guidelines Sections I, 17, 
The term "bail" has a settled legal meaning. Black's Law Dictionary 
4 Brice's agreement was very similar to Two Jinn's agreement with its surety. 
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4th Ed. Defines the term "Bail," when used as a noun, as: 
The surety or sureties who procure the release of a person 
under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at 
the time and place designated. Those persons who become 
sureties for the appearance of the defendant in court. 
The Guidelines define the bail agent as the "bail." This definitional 
change creates a substantive obligation on the bail agent and attempts to 
vest the bail agent with the common law rights and obligations of a surety. 
See 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bail, 3 1 and Taylor v. Taintor, supra. This is not a 
procedural rule but a substantive rule. The general rule under agency law 
as applied to bail bonds is stated in U S  Bail fj 254 that 
A party will not be personally liable on a bail bond where he or 
she executes bond documents for the surety in a representative 
capacity. 
This is in accord with Idaho agency law. See Genera/ Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., supra. 
The substantive change of the bail agent's status from that of an 
agent of a disclosed principal to that of a principal has led to most of the 
problems facing the parties in this litigation. 
For example, the Section 1 of the Guidelines require the salaried bail 
agent to assume responsibility to 
ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid, notwithstanding the 
right of the state or county to pursue collection of a forfeited 
bond from the insurance company, and notwithstanding any 
agreement between the bail agent and the insurance company." 
This requirement is enforced by 517 of the Guidelines that requires 
that when a notice of forfeiture is mailed to the bail agent, the bail agent 
within one hundred eighty (180) days of a bond forfeiture to do one of the 
following: 
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(1) Surrender the defendant; or 
(2) Pay to the Clerk of the Court the full amount of the 
forfeited bond; or 
(3) File with the court a sufficient motion for exoneration or to 
set aside the forfeiture . . . . 
At the discretion of the TCA's Office the consequence for a bail agent who 
fails to comply with 517 or whose current or former bail agency or surety 
fails to comply with 517 is removal from the list of authorized bail agents as 
provided in 514 of the Guidelines. This requirement in effect conditions the 
salaried bail agent's ability to continue to post surety bonds in the Fourth 
Judicial District upon his or her ability to apprehend and deliver an 
absconded defendant or to pay a forfeited surety bond to which the agent is 
not a principal or some how to compel the agent's employer, the bail 
agency, or the corporate surety to pay the forfeited surety bond, or to 
commence a court proceeding on behalf of a bail agency or a corporate 
surety which may not have consented to the bail agents representation. In 
effect this requirement makes the bail agent a co-surety and, unless 
licensed as a surety, in violation of the provisions of I.C. fjfj 41-305, 41-507 
and 41-2604. 
The State Defendants attempt to modify the plain language of Section 
1 by the ADJ's statement in fl 5 of her June 25, 2008 affidavit filed on July 
10, 2008 that 
The language referring to the bail agent as "the responsible 
party to ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid," is not 
intended to make the individual bail agent financially responsible 
for the payment of the bond. It means that the bail agent is the 
individual whose job is to facilitate the payment of the bond 
from the surety or other responsible entity. 
is belied by the arguments of their counsel in the Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental Affidavit and Brief 
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filed November 5, 2008 wherein it was argued that 
Defendants simply want to make sure that bond forfeitures are 
paid. Defendants have never required - let alone "insisted" - 
that individual bail agents pay forfeited bonds. If forfeited 
bonds are paid, Defendants do not care how that is 
accomplished. It is up to Two Jinn (sic) ensure that forfeited 
bonds are paid. I f  Two Jinn does not pay forfeited bonds, the 
Defendants must have some recourse, some way of collecting 
money owed pursuant to valid court judgments. Rather than 
deal with a faceless corporate entity, Defendants turn, quite 
expectedly, to the entity's agent; in Two Jinn's case, the courts 
turn to individual bail agents. 
It seems clear that the purpose of holding the "individual bail agentff 
accountable for the non-payment of forfeited bonds is to enforce the 
payment of the bond by holding the livelihood of the lowest level of the food 
chain (bail agent) hostage to the actions or non-actions of the persons or 
entities liable on the bail bond, be. Two Jinn or the surety. That the State 
Defendants could design Guidelines and rules that in the event of non- 
payment of bonds would prevent Two Jinn and the surety from filing new 
bonds is beyond question. See Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United 
States, 69 F.2d 78, 8 1 (2d Cir. 1934); American Druggists Ins. Co., Inc., v. 
BogaG 707 F.2d 1229, 1238 (llth Cir. 1983); and Calvert v. Lapeer Circuit 
Judges, 442 Mich. 409, 502 N.W. 2d 293 (1993). 
It should be pointed out that in Idaho, unlike in some states,' a bail 
bond forfeiture does not result in an enforceable court judgment; a separate 
collection adion against the surety must be commenced in district court. 
See I.C. 55 6-601 and 19-2928 and State K Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 
5 Some states, such as Washington, RCW § 10.19.090; Oklahoma, 59 0kl.St.Ann. 5 1333; California, 
Penal Code fj  1306; New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 17:31-11, R. 1:13-3 and R. 3:26-6; and Montana, MCA $9 46-9- 
51 1 and 46-30-305, appear to permit the trial court forfeiting bail to have a summary procedure to enforce 
the bond against the sureties. 
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Idaho 113,952 P.2d 1249 (1998). 
The provisions of the Guidelines that ignore the agency relationship 
between the bail agent and the surety are substantive in nature and 
constitute an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. I.C. 51-213. The 
Guidelines placement of responsibility for payment of a forfeited bail bond 
upon the bail agent rather than Two Jinn or the surety is beyond the 
authority of the ADJ. 
Section 10 - List Of Authorized Bail Aqents 
All parties concede that the maintenance of a list of authorized bail 
agents is an administrative efficiency. Thus each trial judge could establish 
and maintain a list of authorized bail agents. However with 31 trial judges 
in the Fourth Judicial District, the maintenance of individual lists would be 
cumbersome and inefficient. Additionally, the establishment of the amount 
of bail for certain offenses is established by Supreme Court rule and for 
offenses not listed in the approved bail bond schedule, a bail schedule may 
be established by individual judges. See M.C.R. 13(a) and (b). Support for 
such a district wide list, at least in misdemeanor cases, is found in the 
provision of M .C. R. 13(c)(3) that provides: 
(3) Surety bail bond. By depositing, in lieu of cash, a bond or 
bond certificate which guarantees payment of the amount of 
the bail bond in the event the person charged fails to appear 
when required by the court. A fidelity, surety, guaranty, title or 
trust company authorized to do business in the state of Idaho 
and authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on 
undertakings and bonds may execute the written undertakings 
provided for in these rules, which may be accepted by the 
person receiving the bond without prior approval by a judge 
unless otherwise ordered by the administrative judge of 
the judicial district. (emphasis added). 
The establishment of a district wide list of authorized bail agents is an 
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appropriate exercise of the ADJ's authority. 
Section I1 Addinq Bail Aqents to the List of Authorized Bail Agents 
Section 11 of the Guidelines outlines the procedure to be followed for 
placement on such list. As discussed above, some of the provisions of this 
section supplement the licensure requirements of the DO1 and to the extent 
they do not duplicate the character and fitness evaluations conducted by the 
DO1 they are not violative of the separation of powers doctrine and are 
within the authority of the ADJ. Some of the provisions are mixed, that is a 
portion of a provision is within the authority of the ADJ and a portion is not. 
I t  is not the function of the court in this proceeding to re-write the 
Guidelines, so to the extent some provisions are found to be mixed, they will 
be held to be outside the authority of the ADJ. 
Section 11 Provisions Outside the Authority of the ADJ: 
Sect. 11, 111, A, F, G, K and L. 
Section 11 Provisions that are mixed and thus Outside the authority of 
the ADJ: 
Sect. 11, I, B. - while this provision would be proper for an 
individual who was applying based upon a renewed producer 
license issued by the DO1 it is not proper for an initial producer 
licensee; 
Sect. 11, 111, D. - is not appropriate for violations of Guidelines 
outside of the authority of the ADJ; 
Sect. 11, 111, H. - would be proper as it relates to surety's failure 
to pay a forfeited bond and the surety was prevented from 
issuing bonds; and 
Sect. 11, 111, J. - would be proper as it relates to insolvency of 
the surety and the surety was prevented from issuing bonds. 
Section 12 Criminal History Checks 
Section 12 of the Guidelines outlines the procedure to be followed for 
obtaining criminal history record finger print checks. To the extent this 
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section requires criminal history record finger print checks upon an 
individual's initial application to be on the Authorized List of Bail Agents 
within the first year of their DO1 licensure as a producer it is outside the 
authority of the ADJ. As the DO1 relies upon self reporting of problems, I.C. 
5 41-1021, the criminal history record fingerprint check for an individual's 
initial application to be on the list after the first year of their DO1 licensure 
as a producer or for renewal placement on the list of authorized bail agents 
is within the authority of the ADJ. 
Section 14 Removina a Bail Aaent from the List of Authorized Bail 
Aclents 
Section 14 of the Guidelines outlines the basis and the procedure to 
be followed for removing a bail agent from the list of authorized bail agents. 
To the extent this section identifies grounds for removal that have been 
determined to be outside the authority of the ADJ, they are unenforceable. 
Forfeiture, Re-instatement & Exoneration 
The Guidelines as adopted mandate that certain procedures be used 
in the processing of forfeitures, bond re-instatements and exoneration of 
bonds. To the extent these procedures are procedural they are within the 
authority of the ADJ. Certain of the procedures appear to cross-over into 
substantive provisions, i.e. Sections 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, dictate results 
only based upon mandated information. To the extent that these sections 
dictate a result that is legally committed to the trial judge's discretion they 
are outside the authority of the ADJ. State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 54, 910 
P.2d 164, 168 (App. 1994). To the extent that these sections require that 
only the bail agent who posted the bond sign or take some specific action 
they ignore the agency relationship of the bail agent to the surety and are 
substantive and outside the authority of the ADJ. 
0048% 
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Forms 
The Guidelines include a variety of forms that must be used in 
dealing with bail issues in the Fourth Judicial District. To the extent that 
these forms include information and requirements that have been found in 
this opinion to be substantive rather than procedural they are outside the 
authority of the ADJ. 
6. Does a Bail Agent's acknowledgement, waiver, and 
certification in acceptance of the Guidelines form an 
enforceable contract between the 4m District Courts and the 
Bail Agent? 
The State Defendants contend that Garske and Carlock have 
contracted with the Fourth Judicial District and as part of that contract are 
bound to the terms of the Guidelines. This contention is based upon the 
language contained in the Agreement, Acknowledgement, Waiver and 
Certification on Page 7 of the Application to Become an Authorized Bail 
Agent within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, to-wit: 
I further acknowledge that I have read the Bail Bond Guidelines 
for the Fourth Judicial District and I agree to be bound by and to 
comply with these Guidelines and any amendments thereto, and 
that my offering of bail bonds for acceptance within the Fourth 
judicial District shall be done in conformity with these 
Guidelines. 
The State Defendants assert that bail agents contract with the Fourth 
Judicial District to provide services to the courts, by writing bail bonds. 
These services are to defendants, not to the courts, any more than the 
posting of a cash bail is a service to the court. 
Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 5 19 and IDJI 6.01.1 provide that there are four 
elements to a valid contract: competent parties; a lawful purpose; valid 
consideration; and mutual agreement by all parties. As found above, the 
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ADJ does not have the authority to lawfully make the bail agent responsible 
for payment of forfeited bail bonds. Such a contract is beyond the ADJ's 
authority and a contract for that purpose is unlawful and unenforceable. 
Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 440, 445 
(2004). 
The State Defendants cite with approval various cases that stand for 
the proposition that a bail bond is a contract between the government, the 
defendant and the surety and should be strictly construed in accordance 
with its terms. See State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 
952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998); In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15, 19 (1927); 
US. v. Vaccai 51 F.3d 189, 193 (gth cir. 1995); State v. Ericksons, 746 
P.2d 1099, 1100, (N.M. 1987). In  making this argument, the State 
Defendants fail to identify just who "the government" is that is a party to 
the bail bond. This failure leaves open the possibility that "the governmentf' 
party is the Fourth Judicial District or perhaps the court or judge that 
accepts the bond. The bail bond itself provides guidance. The obligation on 
the bail bond runs from the surety to the 'State of Idaho" not to the court, 
the judge or the judicial district. See Exhibits A and B to Bail Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint. The "government" that is a party to the bail bond is 
the same party that is the plaintiff in the criminal action against the 
defendant, that is "The State of Idaho" pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. V, fj 1. 
This is borne out by the fact that at the trial level, generally the lawyer 
bringing the criminal action and any subsequent enforcement of a bail 
forfeiture is the county prosecuting attorney not the attorney general. I.C. fj 
19-2928. The payment of forfeitures as regulated by I.C. 5 19-4705 also 
supports the proposition that the judge, court or judicial district is not the 
"government" party to the bail bond. It should also be noted that if the 
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judge, court or judicial district was the "government" party to the bail bond 
there would be significant appearance of impropriety issues with the AD3 or 
another judge in the district presiding over the forfeiture proceedings. 
Canons 2 and 3, Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. 
The Guidelines as adopted do not form a contract rather they are a 
form of regulation. 
7. Do the Guidelines' procedures for the addition and removal of 
Bail Agents provide due process? 
While I have found that the adoption of the Guidelines is within the 
discretion and authority of the ADJ, the procedure followed is sufficiently 
similar to a licensing scheme that I deem that a property right attaches to a 
bail agents authorization to file bonds under the Guidelines. Thus the bail 
agent is entitled to due process in any proceeding to add or remove him or 
her from the list of authorized bail agents. 
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the nature of due process in 
Aberdeen-SpringfieJd Canal Co. v. Pe@er, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 
926 (1999) holding: 
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some 
process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived 
of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. 
This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard." * * * The opportunity 
to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due process 
requirement. * * * Due process "is not a concept to be 
applied rigidly in every matter. Rather, it 'is a flexible concept 
calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the 
particular situation.' * * * (Internal citations omitted) 
The provisions of 55 11 and 14 of the Guidelines provide due process 
procedures regarding individuals being added or removed from the List of 
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Authorized Bail Agents. The standards for testing alleged due process 
violations were recently discussed in American Falls Reservoir Disk No. 2 v, 
Idaho Depf. of  Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870-871, 154 P.3d 433, 
A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional "on its 
face" or "as applied" to the party's conduct. * * * A facial 
challenge to a statute or rule is "purely a question of law." * * 
* Generally, a facial challenge is mutually exclusive from an as 
applied challenge. * * * For a facial constitutional challenge 
to succeed, the party must demonstrate that the law is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications. Id. I n  other words, 
"the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the [law] would be valid." Id. I n  contrast, 
to prove a statute is unconstitutional "as applied", the party 
must only show that, as applied to the defendant's conduct, 
the statute is unconstitutional. * * * 
* * *  
An "on its face" constitutional analysis may not be combined 
with an "as applied" constitutional analysis. * * * I n  other 
words, a court may hear both types of challenges to a rule's 
constitutional validity; however, it may not do a "hybridized" 
form of either test, in which the two tests are combined into a 
single analysis. * * * 
The record reflects some problems with an 'as applied" analysis of the 
due process provisions. I n  a few instances, Judge McKee found that the 
Assistant T W s  commenting on petitions or motions without notice to the 
bail agent or his or her counsel might implicate a violation of due process. 
The matters in question were decided on other due process grounds. See 
Ada County cases H 0700165 and H 0601174. 
To the extent that the basis either for rejecting an application to be 
placed on the Authorized List of Bail Agents or for removal from such list 
have been found within the authority of the ADJ, the provisions if properly 
followed meet minimal standards for constitutional due process, that is 
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notice and a timely opportunity to be heard. See Aberdeen-Springfidd 
Canal Company supra. 
8. Are the actions of the TCA in commenting on or assisting the 
Prosecuting Attorney on various motions relating to bail 
constitute a denial of the right to due process of any of the 
Bail Plaintiffs? 
Bail Plaintiffs' assert that their rights are violated by the ADJ's 
delegation of power to the TCA to 
1. Initially determine whether an applicant should be placed 
upon the approved list of bail agents. Guidelines Section 11. 
2. Initially review motions for exoneration before referring to 
the presiding judge. Guidelines Section 14(I)(D). 
3. Determine that named defendant is deceased. Guidelines 
Section 19. 
Bail Plaintiffs' further assert that the TCA participates as an adverse party in 
various motions involving forfeitures and exonerations. 
The State Defendants assert the TCA has done nothing improper and 
that the TCA does not act as a party or proponent of a particular position. 
The record establishes that 1) the TCA has on occasions, perhaps 
inadvertently, annotated bail bond motions without providing copies to the 
moving party, 2) sat at counsel table with the county attorney on disputed 
bail bond motions, and 3) has advised the county attorney on strategies and 
authorities regarding bail bond motions. 
The TCA is a part of the judicial branch of government. The position 
of TCA was created Idaho Administrative Rule 43 which provides in part 
that: 
A district trial court administrator may be appointed by the 
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Supreme Court in each judicial district, to carry out the 
Supreme Court's constitutional responsibility to administer and 
supervise the state court system and to carry out those 
administrative duties of the District Court that may be 
delegated to the trial court Administrator by the Administrative 
Judge. The authority to hire a district trial court administrator 
rests in the Supreme Court, and has been delegated to the 
Administrative Director of the Courts. *** A district trial court 
administrator performs work under the general direction and 
supervision of the Administrative Judge, and assists the 
Supreme Court, through the Administrative Director of the 
Courts, in the Court's constitutional duties to administer and 
supervise a unified and integrated judicial system and to carry 
out those administrative duties of the District Court that may 
be established by statute or inherent power of the court. 
Generally efforts to improve efficiency and judicial economy by 
providing standardized forms and initial screening of filings are an 
appropriate use of the TCA. 
The use of the TCA to administer the placement of applicants on the 
List of Authorized Bail Agents pursuant to Guidelines Section 11 is 
appropriate subject to the previous determination that some of the 
requirements of that section are outside the authority of the AD3 and 
unlawful. The review procedures available to an applicant found to be 
disqualified by the TCA meet the minimum standards of due process. 
Motions for exoneration and/or to set aside a forfeiture based upon 
specific statutory provisions are generally determined on a pro forma basis 
and without a hearing. The use of the TCA to initially screen such motions 
is appropriate to confirm the applicable timeline and supporting information 
and provide such information to the presiding judge. See Idaho Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 38(7)(c). That it is improper for the TCA to 
annotate or comment upon such a motion without providing the information 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
00487 
Page 42 of 45 
to Bail Plaintiffs is recognized by the Affidavit of Reiner filed on September 
5,2008 and the TCA policy adopted on November 4, 2008. 
None of the State Defendants are parties to the bail bond. It is 
inappropriate for any of them to be a party or be perceived as a party or an 
advocate for or against exoneration or forfeiture. As discussed above, the 
government party to the bail bond is the State of Idaho as represented by 
the county prosecutor. It is improper for the TCA to give pointers or 
assistance to any party to the bail bond, the State, the defendant or the 
surety. 
To the extent that some of forms provided as part of the Guidelines 
require approval by the TCA or a stipulation by the TCA they constitute a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine, an improper delegation of 
judicial discretion and the unauthorized practice of law. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction of the issues raised in this 
action. 
2. The claims raised by the Bail Plaintiffs are not moot. 
3. Two Jinn, Garske and Carlock have standing to bring the claims raised 
in this action. 
4. The AD3 has the authority to adopt procedural Guidelines regulating 
the bail bond business in the Fourth Judicial District. 
5. To the extent the Guidelines ignore the agency relationship between a 
bail agent and the surety or bail agency they are unlawful and 
unenforceable. 
6. The ADJ does not have the authority to adopt bail agent qualification 
standards greater than those imposed by the DOI, except as they may 
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relate to a bail agents family relationship to a Fourth District judge or a bail 
agents simultaneous employment as an employee in a court-related 
position. 
7. The provisions of the Guidelines that require a bail agent "to ensure" 
that a forfeited bond is paid and provide sanctions for not paying a forfeited 
bond are unlawful. 
8. The Guidelines provide constitutional due process to Bail Plaintiffs. 
9. The Guidelines may properly require a criminal history records finger 
print check for an individual's initial application to be on the list of 
authorized bail agents after the first year of their DO1 licensure as a 
producer or for renewal placement on the list of authorized bail agents. 
10. A bail agent's acceptance of the Guidelines does not form a contract. 
11. The TCA may initially screen bail bond motions to confirm the 
applicable timeline and supporting information. 
12. The TCA may not annotate or comment upon bail bond motions 
without providing the information to all parties to the motion. 
13. None of the State Defendants are parties to the bail bond or to any 
proceedings on the bail bond. 
14. The TCA may not give pointers or assistance to any party to the bail 
bond. 
15. The bail bond forms attached to the Guidelines may not require 
approval or stipulation by the TU\. 
ORDER 
1. The State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Bail Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in Part 
and Denied in part. 
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3. Bail Plaintiffs shall prepare a form of judgment incorporating the 
terms of this opinion. The proposed form of judgment shall be 
submitted to the State Defendants for approval as to its form. 
Approving the form of Judgment shall not be considered any 
agreement as to the correctness of its terms. I f  the form of 
judgment can not be agreed to by the parties, they may either 
submit the proposed form of judgment and their positions 
concerning it to the court or they may request a hearing on the 
form of proposed judgment. 
Jil ENTERED this 6 -- day of February, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
cy- 
I hereby certify that on the b day of February, 2009 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax 
service block is checked, sent a copy via facsimile to: 
Fax Service 





NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARlL fT  LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772 
Fax Service 
Steven L. OIsen kS M 4 l L  
Michael S. Gilmore w' 
Karl T. Klein 854-8073 
Melissa Moody 
Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Clerk of the District Court 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
00490 
Page 45 of 45 
NO. e 
A.M 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 
TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN ) 
BAIL BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL ) 




) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
AND 
) PERMANENT INJUNCTION 1 
DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 1 
STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S. 1 
WILLIAMSON, in her official 1 
capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge; LARRY D. REINER, in his 
off~cial capacity as Trial Court 
Administrator; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, in her official capacity 





On February 6,2009, the Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and 
Order denying the motions of Defendants: the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho (herein after "Fourth Judicial District"); 
Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
(herein after "ADJ"); Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial Court 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION Page 1 of 8 
1)(3ia Ql' 
. Administrator (herein after "TCA"); and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator (herein after "Assistant TCA") (hereinafter 
the defendants shall be collectively referred to as the 'State Defendants") and 
granting in part and denying in part the motions of Plaintiffs: Two Jinn, Inc., 
dba Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds, James Garske and Shantara 
Carlock (hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be referred to as "Two Jinn," 
"Garske," and "Carlock" and they will be collectively be referred to as "Bail 
Plaintiffs")). Based upon the holdings in said Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
I T  I S  DECLARED, ENJOINED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
1. The State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion 
for Dismissal are denied. 
2. To the extent any of Bail Plaintiffs' claims are not addressed in this 
judgment they are denied. 
3. The ADJ has the authority to adopt procedural Bail Bond 
Guidelines regulating the bail bond business in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Pursuant to this authority and as an administrative efficiency, the AD3 may 
direct the office of the TCA to maintain a list of bail agents who are authorized 
to post bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District (hereinafter the "authorized 
list"). 
4. The Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District 
(hereinafter "Bail Bond Guidelines") exceed the authority of the ADJ to adopt 
procedural guidelines by: ignoring the agency relationship between a bail 
agent and the surety or bail agency; imposing bail agent qualification 
standards greater than those imposed by the Idaho Department of Insurance 
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(hereinafter 'DOI"), except as they relate to a bail agent's family relationship 
to a Fourth Judicial District judge or a bail agent's simultaneous employment 
in a court-related position; requiring bail agents to ensure that a forfeited 
bond is paid; and providing sanctions for a bail agent's failure to pay a 
forfeited bond. Therefore, the State Defendants have no right or power to 
implement, apply or enforce within the Fourth Judicial District, Bail Bond 
Guidelines that: 
a. Define 'bail agents" as the responsible party to ensure that a 
forfeited bond is timely paid, as set forth in Section 1 of the 
Guidelines; 
b. Reject a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized 
list based on the results of a criminal history check as set forth in 
Section 1 l.III(A) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
c. Reject a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized 
list where that agent is not employed in a state or county court 
related position; does not have a family relationship with a Fourth 
Judicial District judge; has disclosed required information on the 
application form; is licensed by the DOI; and is authorized to post 
bonds for a DO1 certified insurance company, as set forth in 
Section ll.III(D), (F), (G), (H), (J), (K) & (L) of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines; 
d. Require bail agents to provide information on the application to 
become an authorized agent that does not form a lawful basis for 
rejecting such an application, including Questions 2 to 10 of the 
Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent within the Fourth 
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Judicial District, found as an appendix to the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
e. Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the 
authorized list based on disciplinary measures other than 
suspension or revocation of a producer license issued by the DO1 
as set forth in Section 14.I.A(1) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
f. Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the 
authorized list based on criminal history as set forth in Section 
14.I.A(3) to (6) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
g. Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the 
authorized list on bases that would justify suspension or 
revocation of the DO1 license as set forth in Section 14.I.A(8), (9), 
and (10) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
h. Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the 
authorized list based on violations of the Guidelines as set forth in 
Section 14.I.A(ll), (14), and (17) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, 
where the bail agent allegedly violated guidelines for which the 
AD1 lacked the authority to enforce; 
i. Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the 
authorized list on the basis that the bail agent has not satisfied all 
obligations incurred while working for another bail agency as set 
forth in Section 14.I.A(16) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
j. Permit the TCA to remove a bail agent for nonpayment of a 
forfeited bond and permit the TCA to issue "violations" of the 
Guidelines for such nonpayment as set forth in Section 14.I.B(1) & 
(2) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
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k. Permit the TCA to remove a bail agent from the authorized list 
because a financial institution has failed to pay a check written by 
that bail agent for a forfeited bond as set forth in Section 
14.I.C(2) of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
I. Require bail agents to surrender the defendant, pay a forfeited 
bond or file a sufficient motion for exoneration within 180 days 
following forfeiture as set forth in Section 17 of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines; and 
m. Require that only the individual bail agent who offered the bail 
bond for acceptance, the supervising agent or an attorney acting 
on the individual agent's behalf sign bail-related documents that 
are filed with the Court as set forth in Section 22 of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines. 
5. The Bail Bond Guidelines may require a bail agent to submit the 
results of a criminal history records finger print check with that agent's initial 
application for placement on the authorized list if the bail agent has held a 
producer license issued by the DO1 for more than one year. The Bail Bond 
Guidelines may also require a bail agent to submit the results of such a 
criminal history check with the bail agent's renewal application. Consistent 
with Section 2(b) and 2(9 above, State Defendants may neither reject a bail 
agent's application for placement on the authorized list nor seek his or her 
removal there from based on the results of such a criminal history check. 
State Defendants may forward the results of the criminal history check to the 
DO1 for appropriate action against the bail agent's producer license. 
6. State Defendants may implement Bail Bond Guidelines that permit 
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them to refuse a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized list 
and to seek the bail agent's removal from the list if the bail agent has four or 
more past violations of Guidelines, provided that those Guidelines were 
procedural and within the ADJ's authority to impose. The State Defendants 
may also implement Guidelines that permit them to refuse a bail agent's 
application for placement on the authorized list and to seek the bail agent's 
removal from the list where the surety on whose behalf the bail agent is 
currently seeking to post bonds has an outstanding forfeiture, is precluded 
from issuing bonds or is financially insolvent. 
7. State Defendants have no right or power to create guidelines that 
dictate the outcome of a decision on a motion to exonerate or set aside 
forfeiture that is legally committed to the trial court's discretion. Accordingly, 
Sections 18 to 20 of the Bail Bond Guidelines may not be interpreted or 
enforced in a manner that dictates the result of such a motion based upon the 
mandated information. 
8. The Fourth Judicial District is not a party to the bail bond contract 
between the State of Idaho, the criminal defendant and his or her surety. It is 
thus inappropriate for the TCA or other representative of the Fourth Judicial 
District to act as a party, be perceived as a party or advocate for or against 
exoneration or forfeiture. Therefore, the State Defendants have no right or 
power to: 
a. Implement, apply or enforce a policy, guideline or practice 
whereby any State Defendant participates as a party or provides 
assistance or pointers to the State of Idaho, the criminal 
defendant or the surety concerning proceedings on motions to 
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exonerate or set aside forfeiture or other bail bond related 
litigation; 
b. Condition a request for exoneration following the death of a 
criminal defendant upon the TCA's satisfaction that the defendant 
is deceased as set forth in Section 19 of the Bail Bond Guidelines; 
c. Utilize or require bail agents to utilize form motions, stipulations 
and orders that in their present format require the approval or 
stipulation of the TCA, including the forms presently attached as 
appendixes to the Bail Bond Guidelines set forth below: 
i. 
. . 
Motion for Exoneration of Bail After Forfeiture; 
11.  Order of Exoneration of Bail Bond After Forfeiture; 
iii. Motion for Exoneration of Bail Bond Prior to Forfeiture; 
iv, Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond; 
v. Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Reinstate Bond; 
vi. Stipulation to Exonerate Bail Bond Due to Death of 
Defendant; 
vii. Order Exonerating Bail Bond Due to Death of Defendant; 
and 
d. Apply or enforce Section 14.1.D of the Bail Bond Guidelines, which 
provides that the TCA will review motions for exoneration or to set aside 
forfeiture prior to submission to the presiding judge, in a manner that 
permits the TCA to offer comments that go beyond confirming the 
applicable time line and supporting information. 
9. The State Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from 
further implementation, application or enforcement of Bail Bond Guidelines 
within the Fourth Judicial District as specified above and consistent with this 
Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order filed February 6,2009. Accordingly, 
the State Defendants shall no longer utilize in their present format the 
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Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent within the Fourth Judicial 
District or the forms listed above at 8(c) and the Defendants shall no longer 
enforce the following Sections of the Bail Bond Guidelines: 1; 11 .I.B; 1 l.III(A), 
(161, & (17); 14.I.B(1) & (2); 14.I.C(2); 17; 19; and 22. 
10. State Defendants are also hereby permanently enjoined from 
implementing, applying or enforcing a policy, guideline or practice whereby 
any State Defendant participates as a party during or advocates an outcome 
of proceedings on motions to exonerate or set aside forfeiture or other bail 
bond related litigation and from providing assistance or pointers to the State 
of Idaho, the criminal defendant or the surety concerning such proceedings. 
ENTERED this 3i6 day of March, 2009 
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LL4RRY D. EfI\rTER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION - 1 
Come now Defendants, by and through their attorneys, Melissa Moody and Karl 
Klein, Deputy Attorneys General, and move this Court for an Order of Clarification on its 
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Paragraph 8. 
The State Defendants seek clarification regarding Paragraph 8 of this Court's 
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction. Paragraph 8 provides, in relevant part: 
It is thus inappropriate for the TCA or other representative of the Fourth 
Judicial District to act as a party, be perceived as a party or advocate for or 
against exoneration or forfeiture. Therefore, the State Defendants have no 
right or power to: 
a. Implement, apply or enforce a policy, guidelines or practice whereby 
any State Defendant participates as a party or provides assistance or 
pointers to the State of Idaho, the criminal defendant or the surety 
concerning proceedings on motions to exonerate or set aside forfeiture or 
other bail bond related litigation. 
The Trial Court Administrator's Oftice had previously provided the attached 
checklist, Exhibit A, to both parties on a motion to exonerate bond. The checklist is sent 
to the prosecuting attorney and the bail agenubail agent's counsel. The checklist may be 
provided to the Court also. The checklist is entirely factual, and the TCA's office does 
not believe that providing this information is tantamount to being "perceived as a party or 
advocate for or against exoneration or forfeiture." However, the State Defendants would 
like clarification from this Court so as not to run afoul of the Court's order. Specifically, 
State Defendants would like clarification whether providing information to both sides 
constitutes prohibited "assistance" as set forth in this Court's Declaratory Judgment and 
Permanent Injunction. 
State Defendants are not requesting oral argument on this motion for clarification, 
unless the Court deems oral argument necessary. 
REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION - 2 
DATED this 6th day of April 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KARL T. KLEN 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorneys General 
REQUEST FOK CLARIFICATION - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of April 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT 
LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
~ u . s .  Mail 
[7 Hand Delivery 
C] Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
[7 Overnight Mail 
C[1 ~acsimile: (208) 746-0753 
[7 Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
[7 Hand Delivery 
[7 Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Reauested 




Deputy Attorney General 
REQUEST FOR CLARIF~CATION - 4 
FILED AT fvl 
J DAVID NAVARRO. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
Pla~ntiff, ) Case No. CR 
) 
VS. ) TCA REVIEW 
) 
7 ) Power No. 
) Bond Amt. $ 
Defendant. ) Agency: 
) Hear~ng Date: 
In the matter of the motion to set aside and/or exonerate the above-referenced bond, the Trial Court 
Administrator's review of the court file indicates as follows: 
C] 1. Bond posted on 
Cj  2. Minute entry date for failure to appear 
C] 3. Warrant issued on 
C] 4. Defendant arrested by law enforcement on in County in the above-referenced 
case and on the above-referenced warrant 
C] 5. Defendant surrendered to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff by the above-referenced bail 
agency on in the above-referenced case and on the above-referenced warrant 
C] 6. Defendant posted a new bond on from County 
7. Defendant made a bond-out clerk appearance on 
8. Defendant appeared before the Court on 
[Z1 9. Motion to set aside and/or exonerate bond filed on 
C] lo .  Bail agent has not surrendered defendant to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff within 180 
days from the date of the forfeiture 
C] 11. Defendant was transported to the Ada County Jail or Courthouse from 
C] 12. A discrepancy exists between the court file and the information contained on the proof of 
incarceration 
C] 13. The warrant remains outstanding 
14. The 180th day from the date of the forfeiture islwas 
C] 15. The record does not indicate defendant has provided sufficient excuse for the failure to 
appear 
C] 16. Other: 
TCA REVIEW - Page I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April , 2009, the foregoing TCA Review and copies of relevant 
documents from the court file were served on the following: 
C] Ada County Prosecutor by fax 
C] Ada County Prosecutor by email 
C] Boise City Prosecutor by fax 
Boise City Prosecutor by email 
C] Garden C~ty Prosecutor by fax 
0 Garden City Prosecutor by email 
[I Bail agency by fax 
[7 Bail agency by U.S. mail, prepaid 
Administrative Secretary 
Trial Court Administrator's Office 
TCA REVIEW - Page 2 
David Z. Nevin (ISB# 2280) 
Scott McKay (ISB# 4309) 
Robyn Fyffe (ISB# 7063) 
-- 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343- 1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) CASE NO. CV OC 070661 0 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; ) 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) PLAINTIFFS' WSPON SE TO 
1 DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
VS. 1 CLARIFICATION 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her ) 
official capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth ) 
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in ) 
his official capacity as Trial Court ) 
Administrator for the District Court of the ) 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as 1 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
1 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION 
I 00505 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 2009, Defendants requested clarification as to whether the "TCA Review," 
which is a checklist prepared by the Trial Court Administrator's office (hereinafter "TCA) 
following review of a bail agency's motion for exoneration or to set aside forfeiture, "runs afoul" 
of the Court's March 3 1, 2009 Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction (hereinafter 
"Judgnient"). According to Defendants, the checklist is "entirely factual" but they seek guidance 
as to whether use of the TCA Review constitutes assistance that is prohibited by Paragraph 8(a) 
of the Judgment, given their practice of providing the completed checklist to the bail agency 
filing the motion and the State. 
The TCA Review is not "entirely factual," limits judicial discretion and ignores the 
agency relationship between the bail agent and his or her bail agency. Therefore, the TCA 
Review is inconsistent with this Court's judgment and its continued use is enjoined. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. The Information Set Forth in the TCA Review Is Not "Entirely Factual" 
Comments offered by the TCA on motions to exonerate must not go beyolid confin~liilg 
the applicable time line and supporting information. Judgment, 7 8(d). Item 15 on the TCA 
Review provides "the record does not indicate defendant has provided sufficient excuse for the 
failure to appear." Whether the defendant has offered sufficient excuse for purposes of I.C. 5 19- 
2927 constitutes a legal opinion and is not '"entirely factual." Similarly, by permitting the TCA 
to identify whether a discrepancy exists between the court file and the informatioil contained on 
the proof of incarceration, Item 12 allows the TCA to comment on the weight of the supporting 
information, rather than simply confirming its presence. Item 16, simply titled "other," permits 
2 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION 
the TCA to comment on the motion without limitation, including going beyond confirming the 
time line and supporting information. Therefore, Items 12, 15 and 16 are outside the permissible 
scope of the TCA's screening of exoneration motions as set forth in Paragraph 8(d) of the 
Judgment. 
B. The TCA Review Limits the Exercise of Judicial Discretion 
Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Judgment, the "Defendants have no right or power to 
create guidelines that dictate the outcome of a decision on a motion to exonerate or set aside 
forfeiture that is legally committed to the trial court's discretion." Contrary to this provision, the 
TCA Review fails to include information relevant to the trial court's exercise of discretion in 
determining whether to set aside a forfeiture and exonerate bond, thereby suggesting that the 
presence or absence of the enumerated information is determinative of whether the bail agency's 
motion should be granted. 
For instance, Item 5 provides: "Defendant surrendered to tlie custody of the Ada County 
Sheriff by the above-referenced bail agency on -- in the above-referenced case and on the 
above-referenced warrant." By including the language "in the above-referenced case and on the 
above-referenced warrant," this Item implies that even if the bail agency surrenders the defendant 
to the Ada County Jail, the motion to exonerate should be denied unless the surrender was on the 
applicable warrant. Thus, if a defendant failed to appear in three cases and the bail agency 
surrendered the defendant to the Ada County Jail on warrants issued in two of the cases but 
before the third warrant was received by the jail, Item 5 would not apply. This interpretation is 
3 PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION 
contrary to 1.C. 5 19-2927,' which does not require that the surrender be on a particular warrant 
and, instead provides that "if within one hundred eighty (1 80) days of the date of forfeiture, a 
person, other than the defendant, who has provided bail for the defendant, surrenders the 
defendant to the jail facility of the county which issued the warrant, the undertaking of bail or 
deposits are thereby exonerated." Moreover, pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2925, a bail agency can 
surrender the defendant at any time before final discharge - with or without a warrant. 
The TCA Review also does not set forth other circumstances relevant to exoneration, 
including where the defendant has been deported or where the bail agency has surrendered the 
defendant to law enforcement in another county. For instance, in the circumstance where a 
defendant has outstanding warrants in more than one county, a bail agency might surrender the 
defendant to a county other than Ada and cause the Ada County warrant to be served. The bail 
agency ~vould then argue that the bond should be exonerated, minus transportation costs,2 
because justice does not require enforcement of the forfeiture under 1CR 46(e)(4). Similarly, the 
defendant's deportation or incarceration ill  another county or state would also be relevant to 
Section 19-2927, along with the rest of Chapter 29 of Title 19, was repealed by tlouse 
Bill 184. House Bill 184 enacted the "Idaho Bail Act," which was signed by the Governor on 
April 1,2009 and will become effective of July 1,2009. Rather than make the defendant's 
surrender the operative event, the newly enacted I.C. 5 19-2922(4) provides that "the court shall 
order the bail exonerated" if "the defendant has appeared before the court within one hundred 
eighty (1 80) days of the court's order of forfeiture." 
Where the defendant is brought before the court within 180 days of forfeiture, the new 
Bail Act accounts for this scenario by providing that "in those cases where the defendant was not 
returned by the person posting bail to the sheriff of the county where the action is pending, the 
court may condition the exoneration of bail and the setting aside of the forfeiture on payment by 
the person posting bail of any costs incurred by state or local authorities arising fiom the 
transport of the defendant to the jail facility of the county where the charges are pending." I.C. tj 
19-2922(4). 
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whether justice required the forfeiture's enforcement. 
By listing some circumstances that might justify exoneration or setting aside the forfeiture 
and omitting others, the TCA Review suggests a resolution of the motion based solely on the 
enumerated factors. Accordingly, the TCA Review establishes guidelines that dictate the 
outcome of a decision on a motion to exonerate or set aside forfeiture that is legally committed to 
the trial court's discretion, contrary to Paragraph 8 of the Judgment. Because it sets forth 
impemlissible guideli 
to comment on exoneration motions as set forth in Paragraph 8(d) of the Judgment. 
C. The TCA Review Ignores the Agency Relationship Between the Bail Agent and Bail 
Agency 
Item 10, which indicates "the bail crgerzt has not surrendered defendant to the custody of 
the Ada Cot~ilty Sheriff within 180 days from the date of forfeiture" (emphasis supplied), 
requires action by the individual bail agent, rather than the bail agency. This Section ignores the 
agency relationship between the bail agent and his or her bail agency and, thus, is contrary to 
Paragraph 4 of the Judgment. 
111. CONCLUSION 
The TCA Review is not entirely factual and permits the TCA to offer comments that go 
beyond confirming the applicable time line and supporting information. Additionally, by setting 
forth information that purports to be detem~inative of whether a motion to exonerate or set aside 
forfeiture should be granted, the TCA Review establishes guidelines that limit the trial court's 
exercise of discretion in ruling on such motions. The TCA Review also ignores the agency 
relationships by requiring action by the individual bail agent. Therefore, the TCA Review is 
contrary to the Judgment and its utilization is enjoined. 
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% 
DATED this & day of April, 2009. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CkK I'IFTCATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on April ~ " - b  2 09, 1caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be 
to: Honorable James F. Judd, 6498 N. Antler Place, Boise, ID 83703; and 
Mr. Karl T. Klein and Ms. Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorneys General, Len B. Jordan 
Bldg, Lower Level, 954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor, PO Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
- 
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business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 




DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
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MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
Come now, Melissa Moody and Karl Klein, Deputy Attorneys General, and move 
this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d) to take judicial notice of the court documents that 
are attached to Diane Burrell's affidavit as Exhibits 1-6. Judicial notice may be taken at 
any stage of the proceeding. I.R.E. 201(f). As stated in Diane Burrell's affidavit, these 
court documents are on file in cases with the Fourth Judicial district. 
It is requested that the Court take judicial notice of these documents because: (1) 
the Fourth Judicial District Defendants intend to appeal the Court's decision in the above- 
entitled case to the Idaho Supreme Court; (2) the Court's decision in the above-entitled 
case affects all bail agencies and not only Aladdin (the Plaintiff in this case); therefore, to 
review the entire scope of the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court needs 
information with respect to other bail agencies' bail bond contracts; and (3) these 
documents are all on file with the Fourth Judicial District and capable of being verified 
by quick reference to the courts' files. 
DATED this / 7 day of April 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KARL T. KLMN 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorneys General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of April 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Scott McKay U.S. Mail 
Robyn Fyffe [7 Hand Delivery 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
LLP Requested 
P.O. Box 2772 [7 Overnight Mail 
303 West Bannock [7 Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
Boise, ID 83701 [ZI Statehouse Mail 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
U.S. Mail 
[7 Hand Delivery 




[7 Statehouse Mail 
Deputy Attorney General 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 
TWO JINN, INC. dba ALADDIN ) 
BAIL BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL ) 
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; and ) case NO. CV OC 07 06619 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 1 
P/aintifs, 1 1 ORDER ON MOTION 
1 TO TAKE JUDICIAL VS. 
1 NOTICE PURUSANT 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH) TO I.R.E. 201 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 1 
STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S. 1 
WILMAMSON, in her official 1 
capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge; LARRY D. REINER, in his 
official capacity as Trial Court 1 
Administrator; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, in her official capacity 





On March 31,2009, the Court entered its Judgment against Defendants: 
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial Distrlct of the State of Idaho (herein 
ORDER ON MOTlON TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE PURUSANT TO I.R.E. 201 Page 1 of 3 
00,514 
after "Fourth Judicial District"); Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as 
Administrative District Judge (herein after "AD]"); Larry D. Reiner, in his oficial 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator (herein after "TCA"); and Diane Burrell, in 
her oficial capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator (herein after 
"Assistant TCA") (hereinafter the defendants shall be collectively referred to as 
the 'State Defendants'? and in favor of Plaintiffs: Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin 
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds, James Garske and Shantara Carlock 
(hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be referred to as'\Two Jinn,""Garske," 
and "Carlock" and they will be collectively be referred to as "Bail Plaintiffs"). 
The State Defendants have requested that the court take judicial notice of 
certain bail bond contracts attached to the Affidavit of Diane Burrell dated April 
17,2009. The State Defendants claim that such post-judgment judicial notice 
should be taken so that on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court can properly review 
the scope of this court's March 31,2009 Declaratory Judgment and Permanent 
Injunction. 
None of the bail bond contracts were presented to the court or considered 
by the court prior to the entry of judgment. The form of some of the bail bond 
contracts appear to vary to some degree from the form of the bail bond 
contracts presented to the court prior to entry of judgment. The State 
Defendants' request for judicial notice does not accompany a motion to 
reconsider pursuant to I.R.C.P. Il(a)(Z) which would require the court to 
consider additional facts submitted in support of such a motion. See Cieur 
dWlene Mining Co. K First Nat7 Bank, 118 Idaho 812,800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
Although the documents attached to the Burrell Affidavit are of the type 
susceptible to judicial notice, I believe it would be inappropriate for the trial 
ORDER ON MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE PURUSANT TO I.R.E. 201 Page 2 of 3 
court to take judicial of them solely because one of the parties, who did not 
present them prior to judgment, wants the Supreme Court may want to 
consider them. The motion to take judicial notice is denied. 
IT I S  SO ORDERED this 2 0% day of April, 2009 
CERTIFI TE OF SERVICE & 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 2009 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via 
facsimile to: 
FaxServla! f Fax Service 
David Z. Nevin 
w,{ Steven L. Olsen Scott McKay Michael S. Gilmore Robyn Fyffe I Karl T. Klein 
N M N ,  BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEn. LLP 345-8274 / Melissa Mwdy 
P.O. Box 2772 j Deputy Attorneys General 854-8073 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772 I P.O. Box 83720 
f Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Clerk of the District Court 
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 1 
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capacity as Administrative District) 
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On March 31,2009, the Court entered its Judgment against Defendants: 
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho (herein 
M ORDER ON REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION Page 1 of 3 00517 
after "Fourth Judicial District"); Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as 
Administrative District Judge (herein after 'ADJf'); Larry 0. Reiner, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator (herein after "TCA'9; and Diane Burrell, in 
her official capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator (herein after 
"Assistant TCA") (hereinafter the defendants shall be collectively referred to as 
the "State Defendants") and in favor of Plaintiffs: Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin 
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds, James Garske and Shantara Carlock 
(hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be referred to as"Two Jinn,"'Garske," 
and "Carlock" and they will be collectively be referred to as 'Bail Plaintiffs"). 
The State Defendants have request clarification of said judgment as it 
relates to the State Defendant's continued use of the "TCA Review Form" 
attached as Exhibit A to their Request for Clarification. Bail Plaintiffs have 
responded with detailed objections to the State Defendants' request. 
The TCA Review Form was not a form that was included in the forms 
covered by and adopted by the Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines that 
were at the center of this litigation. I do not recall and have been able to find 
that a copy of the TCA Review Form either referred to or offered as an exhibit 
during the course of the hearings leading up to the Judgment. 
The request for this court to conduct a post-judgment evaluation of the 
TCA Review Form is akin to requesting the court to offer an advisory opinion. 
While such an evaluation might answer the questions posed by the State 
Defendants, it would be improper. See MDSInvestments, L.L.C. v. State, 138 
Idaho 456, 65 P.3d 197 (2003) and Country Ins. Co. v. Agricultural 
Development, Jnc., 107 Idaho 961, 695 P.2d 346, (1984). 
The provisions of the March 31, 2009 Declaratory Judgment and 
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION Page 2 of 3 
Permanent Injunction provide sufficient guidance for the State Defendants in 
determining whether or to what extent to use the TCA Review Form. 
v es F. Judd, Sw Judge 
I hereby certify that on the a true and correct copy of the 
facsimile to: 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via 
FaxSenrice 1 Fax Senrice 
David Z. Nevin even L. Olsen 
Scott McKay 
. Michael S, Gilmore 
Robyn Fyffe dI Karl T. Klein 
NMN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLElT LLP 345-8274 1 Melissa Moody 
P.O. Box 2772 I Deputy Attorneys General 854-8073 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772 I P.O. Box 83720 ! Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Come now State Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Michael Gilmore, 
Karl Klein and Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorneys General, and hereby provide notice to the 
District Court that State Defendants have promulgated new Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth 
Judicial District (Attachment 1) to conform with the District Court's March 3 1,2009 Declaratory 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction. These Guidelines were promulgated and became effective 
April 29, 2009. 
After the District Court issued its judgment in this case, State Defendants created a form 
for use by the Trial Court Administrator and his assistant (Attachment 2) to conform with the 
District Court's March 31, 2009 Declaratory Judgment & Permanent Injunction. State 
Defendants believe this form, which was created solely for the purpose of conforming with the 
District Court's judgment in this case, and was the subject of Defendants' April 6 ,  2009 Request 
for Clarification, does in fact conform with the District Court's judgment. 
DATED this 30th day of April 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFF~CE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MICHAEL S. GILES~~RE 
KARL T. KLEIN 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH COURT'S MARCH 3 1,2009 PERMANENT INJUNCTION - 2 00521 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of April 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
RE: Bail Bond Guidelines for the 
Fourth JudiciaI District 
) ADMlNISTRATIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, pursuant to I.C. 9 1-907 and I.C.A.R. 42(e), the Administrative Judge in each 
judicial district has been granted administrative supervision and authority over the courts in their 
respective districts; and 
WHEREAS, the admission of bail is part of the operation of the trial courts and the 
acceptance of bail bonds is a judicial function of the courts over which courts have inherent 
power to administer their affairs; and 
WHEREAS, the posting of bail bonds relates to public safety and welfare and it is 
therefore in the best interest of the courts and the general public to ensure the appearance of the 
accused at the trial and other hearings as required by the courts and to provide for the consistent 
and prompt payment of forfeited bail bonds; and 
WHEREAS, it is in the best interest of the general public and the court to ensure that 
persons or entities who are permitted to present for acceptance of bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District possess qualifications of good character and conduct their business in an ethical, prompt 
and law-abiding manner; and 
WHEREAS, the judges of the Fourth Judicial District collectively handle approximately 
3,700 motions annually involving bail bond matters, and the judges need the help of the court's 
staff in reviewing these motions in order to address them thoroughly and timely; 
WHEREAS, the Fourth Judicial District desires to make fair, reasonable, and consistent 
rules applying to all persons offering bonds for acceptance in its district, and 
WHEREAS, the Fourth Judicial District provided a draft of the Bail Bond Guidelines to 
the judges, all bail agencies within the Fourth Judicial District and to their attorney if represented, 
the Department of Insurance, and the Ada County Prosecutor for their review and comment. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this court adopts the attached Bail Bond 
Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District, and these guidelines shall be followed by all persons 
or entities desiring to offer bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District, and by the Trial Court 
Administrator, clerks, and sheriffs of the Fourth Judicial District, and, 
Administrative Order re: Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order supersedes and replaces any previous order 
or orders relating to the issues addressed herein, and these guidelines shall be effective 
immediately, and the Trial Court Administrator shall immediately mail a copy of this order with 
attached guidelines to all such currently authorized persons. 
DATED: April 29,2009. 
Administrative Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
The judges of the Fourth Judicial District approve the adoption of these Bail Bond 
Guidelines. 
District Judges: 
Hon. Deborah Bail 
Hon. Cheri Copsey 
Hon. Thomas F. Neville 
Hon. Patrick Owen 
Hon. Richard Greenwood Hon. Michael Wetherell 
Hon. Timothy Hansen Won. Ronald Wilper 
Hon. Michael McLaugNin 
Criminal and Juvenile Magistrate Judges, Ada County: 
Hon. Lamont Berecz Hon. Cathleen MacGregor Irby 
Hon. James Gawth~n HOD. David Manweiier 
Hon. Theresa Gardunia Won. Michael Oths 
Hon. William Harrigfeld Hon. Daniel Steckel 
Hon. John Hawley Hon. Kevin Swain 
Adntinistratillr: Order re: Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District 
Hon. Thomas Watkins 
Boise County Magistrate: 
Hon. Roger Cockerille 
Elmore County Magistrates: 
Hon. David Epis Hon. George Hicks 
Valley County Magistrate: 
Hon. Henry Boomer 
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BAIL BOND GUIDELINES FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SECTION 1. 
APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES 





DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
The Trial Court Administrator's Office will not disclose information from the bail agent's 





REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF BAIL BONDS 
No bail bonds shall be accepted by any sheriff or Clerk of the District Court within the 
Fourth Judicial District from any person who is not on the list of authorized bail agents 
maintained by the Trial Court Administrator as stated in Section 10 of these Guidelines. 
The Trial Court Administrator shall be responsible for providing all sheriffs within the 
Fourth Judicial District an updated list of those bail agents whose bail bonds may be 
accepted as security for a defendant's future appearance in court, including any recent 





PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE BAIL AGENT'S LICENSE 
Before the expiration date of the license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance 
pursuant to ldaho Code $41-1039, the bail agent shall, in order to remain on the List of 
Authorized Bail Agents following the expiration date: 
(1) Have a criminal history records fingerprint check completed by the ldaho State 
Police Bureau of Criminal Identification (see section entitled "Criminal History 
Checks"). The results of this criminal history records check must be received by 
the Trial Court Administrator's Office from the ldaho State Police prior to the 
expiration of the bail agent's Resident Producer license; 
(2) Complete and submit to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, Ada County 
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, an updated Application to Become an Authorized Bail 
Agent Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. A copy of the renewed 
license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance must accompany the 
Application; 
(3) Provide to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a current copy of the contract 
between the bail agent and the represented insurance company or, if one does not 
exist, a current copy of the contract(s) between the bail agent's agency and the 
represented insurance company or companies, if such contract has changed since 
it was last provided to the Trial Court Administrator's Office. The copy of the 
contract shall accompany the renewal application. 
All paragraphs of the Section entitled "Adding Agents to the List of Authorized Bail Bond 




BOND AND POWER OF ATTORNEY FORMS 
All bail bonds and power of attorney forms used in the Fourth Judicial District shall: 
(1) Be on forms provided by the insurance company; 
(2) Not be altered in any way; 
(3) Bear the original signature of the person posting the bond; no power of attorney 
may be used more than once or photocopied to be submitted as the original; 
(4) Bear the typed or pre-printed current name, address, and telephone number of the 
person posting the bond. This information must match the information that is on 
record with the Trial Court Administrator's Office. 
(5) Bear the typed or pre-printed current name, address, and telephone number of the 
insurance company underwriting the bond; 
(6) Be accurately and completely filled out; 
(7) Not be submitted after the expiration date, if any, on the face of the Power of 
Attorney. 
The sheriffs or any person within the Fourth Judicial District having legal custody of any 
person shall have no authority to accept any bail bond that does not comply with this 
Section, and no bail agent shall attempt to submit a bail bond which does not comply 





STACKING BONDS - PROHIBITED 
Only one Power of Attorney shall be submitted with each bond, and the face value or 
face amount of the Power shall be equal to or greater than the amount of the bail or 
bond set by the Court in the case for which the bond and Power are being submitted. A 
bail agent shall not attempt to "stack" bonds or Powers by submitting more than one 
Power of Attorney for any single bond. 
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SECTION 7. 
SOLICITING IN THE COURTHOUSE - PROHIBITED 
All bail agents shall refrain from soliciting clients in any court facility in the Fourth Judicial 
District. Also prohibited is the distribution of all non-governmental posters, banners, 
signs, flyers, pamphlets, or the like in the foyers, lobbies, and corridor spaces of any 




TAKING CUSTODY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE COURTHOUSE 
Any bail agent or any person acting on behalf of a bail agent must obtain the approval 
and assistance of the court security officer before attempting to take custody of any 
individual andlor attempting to remove any individual from within a FouFth Judicial 





LIST OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS 
It shall be the responsibility of the Trial Court Administrator's Office of the Fourth Judicial 
District to maintain a list of bail agents who are authorized to present for acceptance a 
bail bond in the Fourth Judicial District. Persons authorized to accept bail bonds shall 
not accept a bail bond from a bail agent who is not on this list. The list will be provided to 
the Sheriff's Department and to the Clerk of the Court for each of the four counties 
comprising the Fourth Judicial District. The purpose of the list is only to provide notice to 
the counties as to those bail agents who are authorized to present bonds for acceptance 
within the district and not for advertising or any other purpose not specifically authorized 
by the Administrative District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District. A copy of the list of 





ADDING BAlL AGENTS TO THE LIST 
OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS 
The policies contained in this document will be those that are followed when an 
individual makes application to be added to the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the 
Fourth Judicial District. 
I. REQUIREMENTS 
All individuals desiring to offer for acceptance bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial 
District must: 
A. Possess and maintain a current Resident Producer - General Lines or Resident 
Producer - Surety Lines license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance. 
B. After the first year of licensing, have a criminal history records fingerprint check 
completed by the ldaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification (see section 
entitled "Criminal History Checksn). 
C. Complete and submit to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, Ada County 
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, an Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent 
Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. A copy of the license from the 
ldaho Department of lnsurance must accompany the Application. 
D. Provide to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a current copy of the contract(s) 
between the bail agent and the represented insurance company or companies, or if 
one does not exist, a current copy of the contract between the bail agent's agency 
and the insurance company. 
E. Be appointed by the ldaho Department of Insurance to post bonds on behalf of the 
insurance company listed on the Application. Proof of appointment must 
accompany the application. 
11. APPLICATION 
A. All requested information and questions on the Application must be answered fully 
and truthfully. The applicant shall sign the Acknowledgement, Waiver, and 
Certification at the end of the Application. The supervising agent shall also sign 
the Acknowledgement of Supervising Agent. 
B. The applicant may submit the Application by delivering or mailing it to the Trial 
Court Administrator's Office, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, ID 83702, or the applicant 
may submit the Application by faxing it to the Trial Court Administrator's Office at 
fax number (208)287-7509. 
C. Processing can not be completed until all information, including a typed or legibly 
printed application and the results of the criminal history records check, has been 





Grounds for disqualification of an applicant from offering for acceptance bail bonds in the 
Fourth Judicial District include the following: 
A. The applicant failed to disclose information as requested on the Application form. 
B. The applicant or the applicant's insurance company is not licensed by The 
Department of Insurance of the State of Idaho. 
C. The applicant is currently employed by the state or county in a court-related 
position. 
D. The applicant is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to a Fourth District judge. 
If an applicant is disqualified, the Trial Court Administrator's Office will so notify the 
applicant in writing. If the applicant disagrees with the disqualification, he or she may, 
within thirty (30) days of the date of the disqualification determination notice, file a 
petition with the Clerk of the Court requesting a hearing before the Fourth District 
Administrative District Judge to show why the applicant should be allowed to offer for 
acceptance bail bonds in this district. 
If an applicant is deemed to be qualified, the Trial Court Administrator's Office will notify 
the applicant in writing that his or her name has been added to the list of authorized bail 
agents. 
IV. COPIES OF COMPLETED APPLICATIONS 
Upon written request signed by the applicant, copies of a completed Application will be 
provided only to the applicant at a cost of $1.00 per page or will be faxed to the fax 




SECTION I 1  
CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS 
Below are the procedures for obtaining criminal history checks in the Fourth District for 
new bail agents offering for acceptance bail bonds or bail agents who are submitting an 
Application with a renewed license: 
(1) When a bail agent is renewing his or her license with the Department of Insurance, 
the applicant must have a criminal history records fingerprint check completed by 
the ldaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
(2) Applicants who reside in Ada County must have their fingerprints taken at the 
ldaho State Police headquarters, 700 S. Stratford Drive in Meridian. 
(3) Depending upon the policies of the local Sheriff's Office, applicants who reside 
outside of Ada County may have the option of having their fingerprints taken at the 
ldaho State Police headquarters in Meridian or by having the fingerprints taken at 
their local Sheriff's Office. 
(4) The results of the fingerprint check will be mailed from the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification directly to the Trial Court Administrator's Office. Criminal history 
checks received from any other address will not be accepted. Bail agents should 
allow a minimum of 10 working days for completion of the criminal history checks. 
(5 )  When a bail agent's license is being renewed, it is the responsibility of the baii 
agent to ensure that the Trial Court Administrator's Office receives the criminal 
history check before the license expires. 
Once criminal history check results have been received from the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, Applications to post bail bonds in the Fourth District will be processed in 





APPLICATION TO BECOME AN AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENT 
WITHIN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
The Application included in the Forms Appendix section of these Guidelines is to be 
completed by all individuals seeking to be added to the List of Authorized Bail Agents in 
the Fourth Judicial District. It is also to be completed when a bail agent is renewing his 
or her request to be on the list of authorized bail agents or when changes are made as 
described in these Guidelines. Bail bonds offered by a bail agent on this list may be 






REMOVING A BAIL AGENT FROM THE LIST OF 
AUTHORIZED BAlL AGENTS 
The policies contained in this document will be followed when an individual's name is 
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the Fourth Judicial District. 
I. VIOLATIONS ALLOWING REMOVAL OF BAlL AGENT 
A. The Trial Court Administrator's Office may petition the Administrative District Judge 
for the removal of a bail agent from the list of authorized bail agents for the Fourth 
Judicial District for violations listed below. A notice of hearing indicating the date and 
time of the hearing will be mailed to the bail agent's last-known mailing address. 
(1) The bail agent did not provide complete and truthful information on the Application 
(2) The bail agent is employed by the state or county in a court-related position. 
(3) The bail agent is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to a Fourth District judge. 
(4) If the bail agent has only one surety for the purpose of writing bonds and the 
insurance company is financially insolvent. 
Following the hearing, the Administrative District Judge will make a determination as to 
whether or not the bail agent's name will be removed from the List of Authorized Bail 
Agents and the period of time, if any, during which the bail agent's name will be 
removed. 
B. For violations listed in (I),  (2), and (3) below the bail agent shall be immediately 
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents without prior additional notice. 
(1) The bail agent has not provided to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a 
photocopy of the ldaho Resident Producer - General Lines license or Resident 
Producer - Surety Lines license as of the expiration date of the temporary license 
or has not provided a renewal Application and followed all requirements for 
renewal prior to the expiration date of the agent's license. 
(2) The bail agent license has expired or has been suspended or revoked by the ldaho 
Department of lnsurance since the date of issuance and the Trial Court 
Administrator's Office has confirmed this with the ldaho Department of Insurance. 
Upon reinstatement by the ldaho Department of lnsurance and upon notice 
received by the Trial Court Administrator's Office, the bail agent shall be 
automatically added back to the List of Authorized Bail Agents. 
(3) The bail agent's insurance company or the bail agent's supervising agent requests 
in writing the removal of the bail agent's name from the list for the reason the bail 




supervising agent, or the Department of Insurance has indicated the bail agent is 
no longer affiliated with its insurance company. 
The bail agent may, at any time during the removal period, file a petition with the Clerk of 
the Court requesting a timely hearing before the Administrative District Judge for review 
of the removal. 
C. The Trial Court Administrator's Office reviews motions for exoneration andlor to set 





CHANGE OF ADDRESS OR OTHER STATUS 
All bail agents authorized to present for acceptance bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial 
District shall immediately notify the Trial Court Administrator of any: 
(1) Change of bail agent's name; 
(2) Change of bail agent's business or residential address; 
(3) Change of bail agent's business or personal phone number; 
(4) Change of name or address of the bail agent's insurance company; 
(5)  Cancellation by the insurance company of the bail agent's authority to write bonds 
for that company; 
(6) Any change of the bail agent's insurance company; 
(7) Change of supervising agent of the bail agent, or change of employeeslagents 
whom the bail agent supervises; 
(8) Change of bail agent's status on the records of the ldaho Department of Insurance; 
(9) Cancellation of a bail agent's affiliation with a bail agency; (10) Affiliation with or opening a new bail agency. 
(1 1) Filing of any criminal charges against the bail agent or hidher supervising agent. 
(12) Filing of or initiation of any civil, criminal or administrative action by the ldaho 
Department of Insurance against the bail agent or the bail agent's insurance 
company. 
Notification of any such change must be done by completing, dating, and signing pages 
one and two of the Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the Fourth 
Judicial District and delivering the same to the Trial Court Administrator's office within 
five (5) business days from the date of the change. For clarification purposes, the bail 
agent may provide a supplemental letter of explanation with the Application pages. If the 
bail agent has met all other requirements of these Guidelines, the change will be 
effective within five (5) business days after the Trial Court Administrator's Office receives 
notification. 
In the event the bail agent did not provide notice, the supervising agent shall notify the 






POSTING BAIL BONDS UNDER MORE THAN ONE BAIL AGENCY 
For bail agents who offer for acceptance bail bonds under more than one bail agency 
andlor insurance company, the following policies will apply: 
(1) To ensure that court documents and correspondence are mailed correctly, only the 
name of the surety or the surety's designated agent will be placed on notices of 
forfeiture and other court documents and correspondence. 
(2) Regardless of the number of bail agencies a bail agent is offering bail bonds for 
acceptance, all correspondence from the Trial Court Administrator's office will be 
mailed to the one address provided in writing on the bail agent's application form. 
(3) Applications submitted with more than one mailing address will be returned as 
"unable to process." 
(4) Each bail agent will be assigned an Ada County 3-digit number as a computer 
system identifier for each bail agency for which the bail agent offers bonds. 
(5) For the purpose of providing a list of authorized bail agents to the Sheriffs Office, 
the name of the bail agency that is entered into the computer system will be the 





PROOF OF INCARCERATION 
This section provides information only. 
I. Surrenders of the defendant before and after forfeiture should be done in the 
following manner: 
A. IDAHO CODE 519-2924 SURRENDERS PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 519-2924 at "anytime before the forfeiture of their undertaking, 
the bail may surrender the defendant in their exoneration, or he may surrender himself to 
the officer in whose custody he was committed at the time of giving bail, or to the county 
sheriff where the action is pending". The defendant is surrendered in the following 
manner: 
(1) "A certificate of surrender, executed by the bail, must be delivered to the officer, 
who must also attach thereto his signature, the month, day, year, and time of day as 
evidence of surrender and detain the defendant in his custody thereon as upon a 
commitment. The certificate of surrender shall contain the legal caption of the action in 
which the undertaking was given, including the name of the defendant, case number, 
name and address of the bail, and shall clearly state that the bond is being revoked by 
the bailn. 
(2) The bail agent "shall, the next judicial day, file with the court in which the action 
or appeal is pending the certificate of surrender, and shall deliver a copy of the same to 
the county prosecuting attorneyJ'. 
8. IDAHO CODE 619-2927 SURRENDERS AFTER FORFEITURE 
For the purpose of assisting the court in determining whether or not to exonerate a bond 
after forfeiture, the bail agent should file proof of incarceration containing the following 
information with the bail agent's motion for exoneration: 
(1) A certificate of surrender as required above (2) Power number 
(3) Name of incarcerating facility 
(4) Date of incarceration of the defendant 
(5)  The law enforcement number of the officer in whose custody the defendant was 
surrendered 
(6) The name and phone number of the incarcerating facility 
(7) A statement indicating that the purpose of surrendering custody of the defendant 
is because the posted bond was forfeited by the court. 
II. INCARCERATION IN A PENITENTIARY 
In the event a defendant is being held in a penitentiary, the proof of incarceration should 
contain the following information: 
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The legal caption of the action in which the undertaking was given, including the 
name of the defendant, case number, name and address of the bail 
Power number 
Defendant's date of birth 
Defendant's social security number 
Incarceration date and hour 
Parole eligibility date 
Full-term release date 
Name, location, and phone number of the facility 
Signature and title of the person authorized by the facility to sign the document 
Date the document was signed 
For defendants incarcerated in an ldaho correctional facility, the incarceration 
information on the "Proof of Incarceration of Defendant in a Penal Institution" form 





LIST OF APPROVED SURETIES FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
To be valid in the Fourth Judicial District, a bail bond must be underwritten by a surety 
that is on the approved list of sureties for the Fourth Judicial District. A surety must 
comply with the requirements of the ldaho Department of lnsurance and remit payments 
on bond forfeitures in a timely manner. 
Failure to comply with the requirements of the ldaho Department of Insurance or remit 
payment on a bond forfeiture will constitute grounds for removing a surety from the 
approved list of sureties. If a surety has not remitted payment on a forfeited bond to the 
Fourth Judicial District within 194 days after the notice of forfeiture and no stay of 
forfeiturejjudgment has been entered by the trial judge, the surety will automatically be 
removed from the list of approved sureties without additional notice. Upon providing 
proof of payment of the forfeited bond to the Trial Court Administrator's office, the surety 
will be automatically reinstated to the list. 






Application to Become an Authorized Agent Within the Fourth Judicial District, 
State of Idaho 
Motion for Exoneration of Bail After Forfeiture 
Order of Exoneration of Bail Bond After Forfeiture 
Motion for Exoneration of Bail Bond Prior to Forfeiture 
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Prior to Forfeiture 
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond 
Order Setting Aside Forfeiture and Exonerating Bond 
Certificate of Surrender of Defendant 
Proof of Incarceration of Defendant in a Penal Institution 
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Reinstate Bond 
Order Setting Aside Forfeiture and Reinstating Bond 
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Due to Death of Defendant 
Motion for Substitution of Bond 
Order for Substitution of Bond 
Petition to Add Agent's Name 
Petition to Reinstate Agent's Name 




J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR 
VS. 
1 
) TCA REVIEW 
) 
1 Power No. 
) Bond Amt. $ 
Defendant. 1 Agency: 
) Hearing Date: 
In the matter of the motion to set aside and/or exonerate the above-referenced bond, the Trial Court 
Administrator's review of the court file indicates as follows: 
1. Bond posted on 
C] 2. Minute entry date for failure to appear 
0 3. Warrant issued on 
4. Defendant arrested by law enforcement on in County in the above-referenced 
case and on the above-referenced warrant 
0 5. Defendant surrendered to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff by the above-referenced bail 
agency on in the above-referenced case and on the above-referenced warrant 
6. Defendant posted a new bond on from County 
7. Defendant made a bond-out clerk appearance on 
8. Defendant appeared before the Court on 
C] 9. Motion to set aside andlor exonerate bond filed on 
10. Bail agent has not surrendered defendant to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff within 180 
days from the date of the forfeiture 
11. Defendant was transported to the Ada County Jail or Courthouse from 
C] 12. A discrepancy exists between the court file and the information contained on the proof of 
incarceration 
C] 13. The warrant remains outstanding 
C] 14. The 180th day from the date of the forfeiture islwas 
61 15. The record does not indicate defendant has provided sufficient excuse for the failure to 
appear 
C] 16. Other: 
TCA REVIEW - Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April , 2009, the foregoing TCA Review and copies of relevant 
documents from the court file were served on the following: 
Ada County Prosecutor by fax 
Ada County Prosecutor by email 
0 Boise City Prosecutor by fax 
0 Boise City Prosecutor by email 
0 Garden City Prosecutor by fax 
0 Garden City Prosecutor by email 
Bail agency by fax 
0 Bail agency by U.S. mail, prepaid 
Administrative Secretary 
Trial Court Administrator's Office 
TCA REVIEW - Page 2 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
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MICHAEL S. GILMORE, ISB # 1625 
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Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 




Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 




DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. RESNER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS TWO JINN, INC., JAMES GARSKE, 
AND SHANTARA CARLOCK, AND THE RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS, SCOTT 
McKAY AND ROBYN FYFFE, NEVIN BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP,. 303 
WEST BANNOCK, P.O. BOX 2772, BOISE, ID 83701, AND TE-EE CLERK OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO, IN 
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA. 
1. The above named appellants, District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as Administrative District 
Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial Court Administrator; and Diane 
Burrell, in her official capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator, appeal against the 
above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Declaratory Judgment and 
Permanent Injunction, entered in the above entitled action on the 31St day of March, 2009, 
Honorable Judge James F. Judd, Senior District Judge, presiding. 
2. The parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction described in paragraph 1 above are 
appealable orders under and pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l). 
3. The following are preliminary statements of the issues on appeal which 
appellant intends to assert in the appeal: 
a. Do the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District exceed the 
authority of the Administrative District Judge? 
b. Do the Bail Bond Guidelines violate the Idaho Constitution; 
specifically, the separation of powers doctrine? 
c. Do the Bail Bond Guidelines create a licensing scheme that is beyond 
the authority of the judiciary? 
d. May the Trial Court Administrator and his employees provide 
information to judges andor parties on bail bond matters? 
4. No order has been entered sealing the record on appeal. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
5.  A reporter's transcript is not requested, 
6 .  The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. Affidavit of Brian Chess, 10124108 
b. Supplemental Affidavit of Peter Botz, 10127108 
c. Defendants' response to the supplemental affidavit of Peter Botz filed 
October 27,2008 
d. Supplemental Affidavit of James Garske, 1 111 0108 
e. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental 
Affidavit and Brief, 1 1110108 
f. Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendants' 
Supplemental Affidavit and Brief, 11/17/08 
g. Memorandum and Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary 
Judgment, 2/6/09 
h. Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, 313 1 109 
i. Affidavit of Susan Campbell, 9130108 
j. Affidavit of Heather Bedal with CD of ExhibitslAttachments, 9130108 
k. Affidavit of Scott McKay, 9130108 
1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Allegations Regarding Trial Court Administrator's Actions on Motions to 
Exonerate and Alleged Interference with Right to Appeal, 9130109 
m. Affidavit of James Garske, 1011108 
n. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 101 10108 
o. Reply to Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
1011 0108 
p. Reply to Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Allegations Regarding Trial Court Administrator, 101 10108 
q. Affidavit of Brian Chess, 10/10/08 
r. Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
Support, 9/5/08 
S. Amended Affidavit of Darla Williamson with revised Bail Bond 
Guidelines and Administrative Order, 9/8/08 
t. Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/30/08 
u. Affidavit of Diane Burrell, 9/30/08 
v. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss/Motion for Reconsideration, 8/25/09 
w. Affidavit of Lisa Tordjman, 8/25/08 
x. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
Support, 9/5/08 
y. Affidavit of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, 9/5/08 
z. Affidavit of Larry Reiner, Trial Court Administrator, 9/5/08 
aa. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Allegations Regarding Trial Court 
Administrator's Actions on Motions to Exonerate and Alleged Interference with Right 
to Appeal and Memorandum in Support, 9/5/08 
bb. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, Alternatively, for 
Reconsideration of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, 711 0108 
cc. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider and Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 711 0108 
dd. Affidavit of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, 711 0108 
ee. Affidavit of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator, 711 0/08 
ff. Supplemental Affidavit of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court 
Administrator, 812 1/08 
gg. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior 
Summary Judgment Ruling, 812 1/09 
hh. Affidavit of Scott McKay in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, 812 1/08 
. . 
11. Affidavit of James Garske, 812 1/08 
j .  Affidavit of Heather Bedal, 812 1/08 
kk. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12/19/07 
11. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 2/1/08 
mm. Answer to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 211 1/08 
nn. Affidavit of Darla Williamson in Support of State Defendants' 
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 8/14/07 
00. Affidavit of Diane Burrell in Support of State Defendants' Opposition 
to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 8/14/07 
pp. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Alternative Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 51 14/07 
qq. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss1 
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, 5/14/07 
n. Defendants' Motion to Strike, 5/14/07 
ss. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike, 5/14/07 
tt. Motion for Consolidation of Case NO. CV OT 07 1072 1 with Case No. 
CV OC 070662 19, 6/25/07 
uu. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Consolidation, 6/25/07 
vv. Affidavit of Diane Burrell, 6/25/07 
ww. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss/Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, 711 0107 
xx. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Strike, 7110107 
yy. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 71 10107 
zz. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, 711 0107 
aaa. Affidavit of Scott McKay, 711 0107 
bbb. Defendants' Request for Clarification, 4/6/09, including attached TCA 
form, 4/6/09 
ccc. Order denying Request for Clarification, 4/20/09 
ddd. Defendants' Motion to Take Judicial Notice Pursuant to I.R.E. 201, 
4/ 17/09 
eee. Order denying Motion to Take Judicial Notice, 4120109 
fff. Notice of Compliance with Court's March 31, 2009 Order including 
both attachments: 
1. Current Bail Bond Guidelines, promulgated April 29, 2009; 
2. TCA form for reviewing files (also attached to Defendants' 4/6/09 
Request for Clarification); 
3. Amendment to the Bail Bond Guidelines, Section 17 
7. I certify: 
(a) No transcript has been requested and no certificate of service on a 
reporter is necessary. 
(b) No transcript has been requested and no payment of fees for 
preparation of a transcript is necessary. 
( c )  The appellants are exempt fkom paying fees for preparation of the 
clerk's record because they are agencies or officers of the State of Idaho. See LC. 
3 3 1-3212(2). 
(d) The appellants are exempt from paying appellate filing fees because 
they are agencies or officers of the State of Idaho. See I.C. 5 67-2301. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 5th day of May 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KARL T. KLEIN 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAM~N, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
CHAMBERS COPE 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
C1 Overnight Mail 









Deputy Attorney General 
David 2. Nevin (ISB# 2280) 
Scott McKay (ISB# 4309) 
Robyn Fyffe (ISB# 7063) 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343- 1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUI)ICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) CASE NO. CV OC 070661 9 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; ) 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross ) NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
Appellants, ) 
V S .  ) 
) 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TJ!E STATE OF ) 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her ) 
official capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth ) 
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in ) 
his official capacity as Trial Court. ) 
Administrator for the District Court of the ) 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as ) 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the ) 
Distrlct Court of the Fourth Judicial District, ) 
Defendants-Appellants- 
Cross-Respondents. 1 
1 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as 
Administrative District Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial Court 
Administrator; and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator, 
AND THE PARTES' ATTORNEYS, Steven L. Olsen, Michael S. Gilmore, Karl T. Klein and 
Melissa Moody, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720, AND THE CLERK OF T E  ABOVE- 
ENTITLED CO 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named cross-appellants, Two Jinn, Inc., James Garske and Shantara Carlock 
appeal against the above-named cross-respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunct~on entered in the above-entitled action proceeding 
on the 3 1" day of March, Honorable Judge James F. Judd, Sentor Distnct Judge, presrdtng. 
2. That the parties have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment descnbed In paragraph 1 above 1s an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule I l(a)(l). 
3. The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the cross-appellants intend to 
assert are: 
(a) whether the district court erred in concluding that the Defendants have the 
authority to require bail agents to submit to a criminal history and background; 
and 
(b) whether the Defendants have the authority to implement Guidelines that 
permit them to refuse a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized 
2 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
list and to seek the bail agent's removal from the list where the surety on whose 
behalf the bail agent is currently seelung to post bonds has an outstanding 
forfeiture. 
4. (a) Is an additional reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
(b) The cross-appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: 
i. Transcript of the hearing on cross motions for summary judgment, held 
on October 17,2008. 
ii. Transcript of status conference held on December 1,2008. 
5. The cross-appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by 
the appellants in the initial notice of appeal: 
(a) Affidavit of James Garske, filed July 10, 2007; 
(b) Affidavit of Judy Charney, filed July 10, 2007; 
(c) Affidavit of Dennis Charney, filed July 10, 2007; 
(d) Affidavit of Rebecca Salinas, filed July 10, 2007; 
(e) Reply to Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed July 27, 2007; 
(0 Stipulation Re: Bail bond Guidelines, filed August 1,2007; 
(g) State Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
filed August 14,2007; 
(h) Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, filed August 22,2007; 
3 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
(i) Plaintiffs7 Motion for Leave to Augment the Record Re Pending Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16, 2007; 
(j) Affidavit of Scott McKay In Support of Motion for Leave to Augment the 
Record Re Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16,2007; 
(k) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Augment the 
Record Re Pendlng Motion for Prelimnary Injunction, filed November 16, 2007; 
(1) Order Penni ttlng Augmentation of the Record and Setting Time for any 
Response by State Defendants, filed November 19,2007; 
(m) State Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Augment the 
Record Re: Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed November 28, 2007; 
(n) Plaintiffs' Memorandum 111 Reply to Defendants' Response to Order 
Permitting Augmentation of the Record, filed December 4, 2007; 
(0 )  Affidavit of Heather Bedal, filed September 5 ,  2008; 
(p) Affidavit of Susan Campbell, filed September 5 ,  2008; 
(q) Affidavit of James Garske, filed September 5 ,  2008; 
(r) Affidavit of Scott McKay, filed September 5 ,  2008; 
(s) Affidavit of Peter Botz, filed September 5 ,  2008; 
(t) Stipulation Re Revised Bail Bond Guidelines, filed September 18,2008; 
(u) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed September 30,2008; 
(v) Affidavit of Scott McKay, filed October 10, 2008; 
(x) Affidavit of Heather Bedal, filed October 10,2008; 
4 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
(y) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Request for Clarification, April 13, 2009; 
(2 )  The transcript of the hearing held August 24, 2007 on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, previously prepared by Jeanne Hinner, Accurate Court 
Reporting on September 4,2007. 
6. 1 certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional transcript 
have been served on each reporter of whom an additional transcript has been requested as named 
below at the address set out below: 
i. Janet French, 8601 Ustick Road, Boise ID 83704 
(b) That the clerk of the dlstrict court has been pald the est~mated fee for preparat~on of 
the reporter's transciipt and any additional documents requested in the cross-appeal. 
(c) That servlce has been made upon all pasties required to be served pursuant to 1.A.K 
20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to 67-1401(1), Idaho Code. 
DATED this &day of May, 2009. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, klcKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Robyn ~ ~ f f e  
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
5 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on May z, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be 
__ hand delivered 
faxed 
to: Mr. Karl T. Klein and Ms. Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorneys General, Len B. Jordan 
Bldg, Lower Level, 954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor, PO Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010 
6 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE, 1SB # 1625 
KARL T. KLEIN, ISB # 5 156 
MELISSA MOODY, ISB # 6027 
Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 10 
Telephone: (208) 3 34-2400 
michael.giImore@air,.idaho.~ov 
karl.kleinu)ag.idaho.gov - . 
melissa.moody@,ag.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 




DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
1 
) DC Case No. CV OC 07066 19 
) 
) MOTION TO INCLUDE 
) ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
) IN THE CLERK'S RECORD 










capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and ) 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant ) 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court ) 
of the Fourth Judicial District, ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
MOTION TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN 'THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 0RIr:rnr~ I 
Comes now, Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney for Defendants, 
and moves this Court to include the following documents in the Clerk's record on appeal: 
1. June 2, 2009 Affidavit of Melissa Moody, including exhibit 1, a copy of the 
"Administrative Order Reinstating Bail Bond Guidelines Adopted August 22, 
2008." 
2. June 3, 2009 Diane Rurrell Affidavit, including exhibit 1, a copy of the current 
"checklist" being used by the Trial Court Administrator in the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
These documents are necessary for the appellate court's review of this case. 
The appellate court needs to be aware of the Trial Court Administrator's current 
procedure for bail bond matters. This information is contained in the June 3, 2009 Diane 
Bunell Affidavit and exhibit. In addition, the appellate court needs to know which Bail 
Bond Guidelines are currently in effect in the Fourth Judicial District. This inforination 
is contained in the exhibit attached to the June 2,2009 Affidavit of Melissa Moody. 
DATED this loth day of June 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFF~CE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
MOrlON TO 1NCLUDt ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 
K % f l P - O -  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of June 2009,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Include Additional Documents in the Clerk's 
Record on Appeal by the following rnethod to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT 
LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
- Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
C] Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
C] Hand Delivery 
C] Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Reauested 
C] overnight Mail 
C] Facsimile: 
C] Statehouse Mail 
Deputy Attorney General 
MOTION TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - 3 
flfl5G'Y 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT . - 
45 1 WEST STATE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TWO JINN, INC., a California ) Supreme 
corporation duly qualified to ) 
do business in Idaho and doing) 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds) 
and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES ) Case No 
GARSKE; and SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) 
Court No. 36476 





V S .  ) 
) 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE) 
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,) 
in her official capacity as ) 
Administrative District Judge ) 
for the District Court of the ) 
Fourth Judicial District; ) 
LARRY D. REINER, in his ) 
official capacity as Trial ) 
Court Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth ) 
Judicial District; and DIANE ) 
BURRELL, in her official 1 
capacity as Assistant Trial ) 
Court Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth ) 




NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on July 8,2009, I lodged a transcript 66 pages of 
length for the above-referenced appeal with theDistrict Court Cbrk of the 
County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Date 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JTNN, INC., a California corporation duly qualified 
to do business in Idaho and doing business as Aladdin 
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
VS. 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S. 
WILLZAMSON, in her officlal capacity as Admmistrative 
District Judge for the District Court of the Fourth Juhcial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his offlcial capacity as 
Trial Court Ahmistrator for the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her 
capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 36476 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Affidavit Of Brian Chess, Administrative Secretary To Trial Court Administrator, filed 
October 24,2008. 
1 FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss / Alternative Motion For 
Summary Judgment, filed May 14,2007. 
2. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Strike, filed May 14,2007. 
3. Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Consolidation, filed June 25,2007. 
4. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, filed June 25,2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
5. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendantsy Motion To Strike, filed 
July 10,2007. 
6. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss I Alternative 
Motion For Summary Judgment, filed July 10,2007. 
7. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed 
July 10,2007. 
8. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed July 10,2007 
9. Affidavit Of Judy Charney, filed July 10,2007. 
10. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed July 10,2007. 
11. Affidavit Of Dennis Charney, filed July 10,2007. 
12. Affidavit Of Rebecca Salinas, filed July 10,2007. 
13. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell In Support Of State Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs' 
Motion For Summary Judgment, filed August 14,2007. 
14. Affidavit Of Darla S. Williamson In Support Of State Defendants' Opposition To 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed August 14,2007. 
15. Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed 
August 22,2007. 
16. Affidavit Of Scott McKay In Support Of Plaintiffs7 Motion For Leave To Augment The 
Record Re: Pending Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16,2007. 
17. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To Augment The Record Re: 
Pending Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16,2007. 
18. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Reply To Defendants' Response To Order Permitting 
Augmentation Of The Record, filed December 4,2007. 
19. Affidavit Of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, filed July 10,2008. 
20. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Adminstrator, filed July 10,2008. 
2 1. Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider And Motion For Summary 
Judgment, filed July 10,2008. 
22. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of 
Jurisdiction Or, Alternatively, For Reconsideration Of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, 
filed August 21,2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
23. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed August 21,2008. 
24. Affidavit Of Heather Bedal, filed August 21,2008. 
25. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed August 21,2008. 
26. Supplemental Affidavit Of Diane Bunell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator, filed 
August 2 1,2008. 
27. Affidavit Of Lisa Tordjman, filed August 25,2008. 
28. Affidavit Of Heather Bedal, filed September 5,2008. 
29. Affidavit Of Susan Campbell, filed September 5,2008. 
30. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed September 5,2008. 
3 1. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed September 5,2008. 
32. Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, filed September 5,2008. 
33. Affidavit Of Lany D. Reiner, Trial Court Administrator, filed September 5,2008. 
34. Affidavit Of Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge Of The Fourth Judicial 
District, filed September 5,2008. 
35. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Allegations Regarding 
Trial Court Administrator's Actions On Motions To Exonerate And Alleged Interference 
with Right To Appeal, filed September 5,2008. 
36. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed 
September 5,2008. 
37. Affidavit Of Peter Botz, filed September 5,2008. 
38. Amended Affidavit Of Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge Of The Fourth 
Judicial District, filed September 8, 2008. 
39. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Adminstrator, filed September 30,2008. 
40. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Allegations 
Regarding Trial Court Administrator's Actions On Motions To Exonerate And Alleged 
Interference With Right To Appeal, filed September 30,2008. 
41. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition TO Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
filed September 30,2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
42. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed September 30,2008. 
43. Affidavit of Heather Bedal, filed September 30,2008. 
44. Affidavit Of Susan Campbell, filed September 30,2008. 
45. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed October 1,2008. 
46. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed October 10,2008. 
47. Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed 
October 10,2008. 
48. Affidavit Of Heather Bedal, filed October 1 0,2008. 
49. Affidavit Of Brian Chess, Administrative Secretary To Trial Court Administrator, filed 
October 10,2008. 
50. Reply To Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Allegations 
Regarding Trial Court Administrator, filed October 10,2008. 
5 1. Supplemental Affidavit Of Peter Botz, filed October 3 1,2008. 
52. Supplemental Affidavit Of James Garske, filed November 10,2008. 
53. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Response To Defendants' Supplemental Affidavit And Brief, 
filed November 10,2008. 
54. Affidavit Of Melissa Moody, filed June 2,2009. 
55. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator, filed June 3,2009. 
IN WTNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 22nd day of July, 2009. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Judqe Judd/Cindv Leoni 
Judge Clerk 
DATE: Auqust 24,2007 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Page 1 of 1 Pages 
CASE NO. CVOC 0706619 
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1 Attorney at Law 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly qualified 
to do business in Idaho and doing business as Aladdin 
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, 
vs. 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S. 
WILLIAMSON, in her official capacity as Administrative 
District Judge for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official capacity as 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her 
capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 36476 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ROBYN FYFFE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
: i i r a  q . ~i--..-$ 
" ,  . , " -  JuL k <- .- , 
Date of Service: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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; TWO JINN, INC., a California ) Case No. CV OC 0708619 1 3 THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY IN3UNCTION 
1 tN M E  DISTRICT COURTOF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2 OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
corporation duly qualified to ) 
5 do business in Idaho and doing ) Motion for Preliminw 
business as Aladdii Bail Bonds ) Injunction 




1 BOISE, IDAHO, FRIDAY, AUGUST 24,2007,12:55 P.M. 
8 vs. 
s DISTRICT COURT OF WE FOURTH, j 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) 
10 OF IDAHO; et al., 
4 in the case of Two Jinn, Inc., versus the District Court of 
5 the Fourth Judicial District. I'm Judge Judd. l have 
6 been assigned to this case by the ldaho Supreme Court 
7 Mr. McKay, we'll go ahead and have you 
8 introduce yourself and your co-counsel. You're 
8 representing the plaintiffs in this matter? 
MR. McKAY: 1 am. Good afternoon. Your Honor 
THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
2 MR. McKAY: Scott McKay appearing for the 
11 Defendants. 3 plaintiffs. I'm here with Robyn Fyffe, who is a lawyer 
$2 4 with our law firm, and also with James Garske, who is a 
5 named plaintiff in this adion. 
15 BE IT RMBERED,  that the above-entitled matter 
16 came on regutariy for hearing on August 24,2007, before 
17 the Honorable James F Judd, Senior District Jwlge, In a 
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( 2 0 8 )  938-0213 E'AX (208) 938-1843 
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Kang. 
17 MR. WVJG: Soo Kang, with the Attorney 
18 General's Office, representing all the defendants in this 
I 9  case. 
20 THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing a 
21 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. There have been several 
22 Affidavits filed. Do we antidpate any live testimony, or 
23 are we going to rely on the Affidavits for the record in 
24 this particular matter? 
25 MR. McKAY: It is our intention. Your Honor. 
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1 to rely on the Affidavits. We do have Mr. Garske 
2 available, but I anticipate not calling him as a witness 
3 here today. 
4 THE COURT: Wow about the State? I say, "the 
5 State," but I recognize that -the Fourth Judicial 
6 District, how does it take a position on this? 
7 MR. KANG: We also will be relying on our 
8 Affidavits, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: I've got a few issues 1 want to 
10 talk to you about before you start on your arguments. 
11 First of all, I'm a little concerned that - at the last 
12 hearing we talked about it, and the Fourth Judicial 
13 District said it wasn't going to amend the Guidelines while 
14 this action is pendirig. And that seemed real nice and fair 
16 to me, until I started getting into this and I saw that we 
16 had some Juty 2007 amendments to the bail statutes that 
17 clearly make the Guidelines in violation of the statutes. 
18 Particularly as to the time lines it's clearly in 
1s violation. 
20 And I recognize that this case is brought 
21 structured lo meet the objections that Justice Eismann 
22 raised in the Leader case, and to make sure that we raise 
23 the issues in the triil court so you can get the Supreme 
24 Court to look at them, which I think that's really a good 
25 idea. But I'm concerned that if we're o~eratina based u ~ o n  
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I the staMes that were in effect prior to July 1, is that 
2 somehow you're going to have some problems on doing that 
1 Guidelines, I think, by stipulation, we could present that 
2 change to the Gourt so that that's reflected in the court 
1 3  And In addiiw to that I note - specifically 1 3 record. And I think that that might possibly address the / ( 4 in going through some of the materials that have been 1 4 concerns that Your Honor has identified here this I 
5 provided, particularly in the Guidelines and the Guideline 5 afternoon. 
6 revisions - that one of the big issues that was raised in MR KANG: I would also agree with Mr. McUay's 
7 the Guidelines - or by the bail bond industry -was the 1 7 statements. I believe the issues in this case really 
I 8 question of who receives the Notioe of Forfeiture. And I I 8 rewlve around whethw or not the Guidelines could be 9 note in Judge Wdliamson's letter of December Qth, 2005, 9 promulgated by the Administrative Distrlct Judge, In the I 
I 10 .she addresses, well, gee, the statute says we have to send 10 first place. And any subsequent changes would be a 11 it to the person who posts the bond. She quotes the I 11 reflection of that authority. If this case goes up to I 1 12 statute. 1 12 appeal, as I think Mr. McKay stated, we can stipulate to I 
1 17 has on this litigation, but I'm a little concerned that I 17 change the statutes that are in control over those anyway. ( 
13 Now, one of your July 2007 amendments is to 
14 change that language in the statute so it m, in the case 
15 of a surety bond, go either lo the surety or to its 
76 designated agent. Now, I'm not sure what impact that all 
1 18 we've stopped, then, the Fourth Judicial District from 1 18 And also, the Supreme Court rules have been changed on that I 
13 the changes if that beco 
i 4  
16 me -- it wasn't the time lines. I don't think those are 
16 really a big issue, because I think they will have to 
1 22 and all of a sudden you're going to have a whde new 1 22 the guts of this discipline issue available on agents - 1 I 
19 considering those issues in amending their Guidelines. 
20 . We're going to go through this process and Pm 
21 going to decide them based upon the pre-2007 Guidelines, 
1 23 ballgame when they amend those. So I guess I wwld like 1 23 and it's more of a practical Issue, I guess, than a legal I 
19 same - Rule 46 has been changed to reflect that tlrne line 
20 change. 
21 The thing that concerns me, when I looked at 
24 your thoughts on those th i is .  If that's something of 
25 importance should we stay this proceeding briefly with a 
Page 5 
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24 one, but it seems a lot of those issues turn around this 
25 idea that the p e r m  who posts the bail is the agent, and, 
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1 5 certainty identifiid some valid concerns, but they are I 6 Because the new language says spedfimllly - 1 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1 time line, or what's involved here? 
2 MR. M c W :  Your Honor, should I address that? 
3 THE COURT: That's great. 
4 MR. McKAY: I think that the Court has 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJWNCTION 
1 therefore, that's the only person we can deal with under 
2 the statute. Well, that's changed now, and that might 
3 change the whole tenor and context of your bail bond 
4 Guidelines. 
6 concerns that don't really get at the issues that we are 
7 litigating here surrounding the licensing and discipline of 
8 bail agents. And l know that counsel, Mr. Chamey, 
9 represented at our very initial hearing that the Court 
14 statute that I think the Court refem to is dealing with 
15 the change from 90 days to surrender a defendant to 180 
16 days. And I think it would be appropriate, $ken that 
17 we're presently working under these Guidelines, to have a 
18 Guideline that refiects - or to amend the Guideline to 
19 reflect that change in the law. And l don't think that 
6 and I'm hoking at 192927,R says that the derk will 
7 sand it to the last known address of the person posting or 
8 undertaking the bail. Or if the bail consists of a surety 
S bond, to the surety or its designated agent. 
10 would not be amending these Guidelines whih this 
11 litigation was panding. 
12 And as the Court correctly points out, there 
13 have been some changes in the law. And particularly the 
20 that's necessarily an action that warrants a stay of this 
21 liiation. 
22 If this case is appealed, to make sure that we 
23 go up on a meet record - I Udnk that the parties have 
24 worked together well so far in agreeing on the Guidelines 
25 that are at issue. If &re Q a change In those 
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10 Now, it seems to me that when you read that, 
11 that language may be critical in interpretation of whether 
12 a bail bond prodwr agent is the designated agent of the 
13 surety for purposes of reoelvlng thls notice or not. And 
14 I'm wncemed, because I think that's been the big part of 
16 the nub on this issue. I may be wrong. Maybe I'm trying 
16 to put the lawsuit - and you guys, or the issues, are 
I 7  different. And I'm not trying to inject that. I'm just 
18 saying it seems lo me that% an issue that may change some 
19 of the standings of this litigation. 
20 Now, as far as the issue of authority to issue 
21 bal bond Guidelines and approve agents and all those 
22 things, those are issues that are probably going to - may 
23 or may not continue playing if there's a significant 
24 amendment to the GuideUnas. That can be resolved and can 
25 b8 addressed in this issue even as we go forward, 
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MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1 But I'm just trying to point out to you that 
2 this statute may change this whole ballgame, depending on 
3 what cMlrse the Administrative District Judge takes and 
4 their insight into it, and what the position of the 
5 sureties is as to what that designated agent language 
6 means. Because I'm not sure how those thrngs play out, but 
7 that's a pretty clear mandate. 
8 I offer that to you for what it's worth. And 
Q I reabze you haven't had a chance to discuss that with 
10 your Mndpals. You're here - and 1 always like to catch 
11 lawyers on the wrong foot, if I can. And I do want to tell 
12 you that I almost dismissed this case thrs mondng, when 1 
13 showed up at 900 and none of you were here. And then, to 
14 my chagrin, I realized it was a 1:00 hearing and so I 
15 didn't dismiss it. We're here. 
16 That's the first question I want to ralse to 
17 you. l have a whole series of other questions. I'm not 
18 sure they relate to the issue of the preliminary 
19 k$unctii. h d  so that's probably the issue that should 
20 go forward. So why don't we at least give them to you. 
21 These are Wings that have been ~ n n i n g  
22 through my mind over the last couple months that have 
23 bothered me somewhat in looking at this whole issue, and 
24 that is: Upon the forfeiture of a bar1 bond, who has the 
25 obltgat~on to pay? Does the contract law of the agency 
Page 9 
(2081 938-0213 FAX (208) 938-1843 
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING 
1 of sureties in all this. And that's our hope, too, that 
2 this can be a catalyst for a change in these ~uidelwes. 
3 And I this is whet we have been say~ng all along. 
4 And if y w  look at our Complaint, we haw allegahons and 
5 they've described the role of the surety ~n Ihls. 
6 The surety is licensed by the Department of 
7 insurance. And the Department of Insurance determ~nes thal 
8 the surety is solvent and has the ablllty to pay and 
9 guarantee payment of a ball bond 
10 And so that's why, when we're deal~ng with 
11 bail bond Guidelines that get to issues of the character, 
12 that - the fitness issues concerning the unilateral 
13 determination of the TCA of the wh 
I 4  agent, it's not so much an issue whe 
15 like Lincoln National (sic), which doe 
16 Aiaddin, who steps forward and 
17 of this surety bond and we're respons~ble for payment f 
16 there is a default." 
19 And so. yes, I th~nk there has been a 
20 recognition of that in what Your HWXX referfed to. And t 
21 think that, hopefuliy, that can be a catalyst for a change 
22 m some of the Guidelines at least that we're taking issue 
23 with here In thls lawsult. 
24 We have, of course. filed a Motion for a 
25 Preliminary Injunction. And we've set forth alternative 
(208) 938-0213 FAX (208) 938-184 
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING 
1 apply to the bar1 agents and the surety that issues the 
2 bail bond? 
3 What obligation does the bail agent have to a 
4 third pa@, the courts, for a contract, a bail bond, 
S entered into it by disclosed principal, the surety. Do 
6 We Fourth District Guidelines make the bail agent a 
? co-surely? If so. does the bail agent need to qualify as a 
8 surety and obtain a Certificate of Authority pursuant to 
9 Tie  41 of the Idaho Code? 
10 Those things kind of run through my mind. And 
11 that's one reason why I suggested that the changes to 
12 19-2927 may or may not -depending how those are taken to 
13 heart by the Fowth Judicial District, might obviate some 
14 of the issues that y W e  raised hew. 
15 Anyway, for whatever those are worth to you. 
16 And i would be happy, if you think it weuid be of any 
17 benefh, to take a short reass. You can talk among 
18 yourselves and with each other for a minute, or we can go 
19 ahead and hear the Motion for Preiiminary Injunction. 
20 MR. M Y :  I am prepared to go forward, 
21 Your Honor. 
22 MR. KANG: I am also, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go ahead. 
24 MR. W Y :  We'd like to thank you, 
25 Your Honor, for your remarks lhis afternoon abwi the role 
Page.10 
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1 bases for that preliminary injunction We submit that a 
2 preliminary injunction is appropriate under either 
3 Rule 65(e)l or 65(e)2, And 65(e)l makes a preliminary 
4 injunction appropriate - and I'm paraphrasing here -when 
5 it appears by the Complaint that the plaintiff is entitled 
6 to the relief demanded, and the relief consistent, 
7 restraining the commission or continuance of the acts 
8 complained of. 
9 And with respect to 65(e)2, relief or 
10 preliminary Injundion is appropriate when it appears, by 
I 1  complaint or affidavit, that the commission or continuance 
12 of some a d  during the litigation would produce - and the 
13 operative language I think that affects our situation here 
14 is "great" or "irreparable injury.' I'll come back, if I 
15 might, to 65(e)2 in a second. 
.I 6 But beginning with 65(e)t, we submit that we 
17 have demonstrated that we are entitled to relief. And I 
18 say that notwithstanding defendants' argument that this is 
19 a complex - or that this case presents complex issues of 
20 fact and law which lkould remove it from the context or 
21 remove it from the &ssibilii that we w u l d  be awarded a 
22 preliminary iflj~flctiofl, certainly there are no meaningfully 
23 contested issues of fact. 
24 We've set forth by Affidavit I think all of 
25 the operative fads that the State has set for the 
Page 1 l; 
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I 1 Affdavit of - or submitted the Affklavit of the I 1 it's not true. Nowhere in Rule 46 is there any mention of f 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION FOR PREL-WY INJUNCTION 
1 6  With respect to complex issues of law, I 1 6 and which I think we had some diswssion about at our last1 
2 Administrative Dlstrlct Judge and the Assistant TCA. And 
3 there just are not disputed facts, that I see, that are 
4 swirling around us that would prevent entry of a 
5 preliminary injunction. 
1 7 submit that we have narrowly talofed this, and presented, ( 7 hearing, 46(a)5 permits the Court to consider the persons 1 
2 the bail agent. And Criminal Rule 46 takes into 
3 consideration matters like the defendanrs nature, his 
4 history, the alleged crime that's involved. 
5 Now, 46(a)5 - which they point the Court to, 
1 8 I think, fairly clean questions of law for this Court to 1 8 who agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the 1 
I 9 consider. And the Court is right, this case is preceded by 9 proper time. 10 the Leader case. And I won't say that this case is so much 1 10 And i submit that that language, that does not 1 1 11 a reaction to that Leadermse, but there were some of [ 1 1 refer to the bail agent. That refers to individuals or I 1 12 those same issues that at least counsel attempted to argue 1 12 people, like a parent, a spouse, a relative, a friend. 1 
17 powers; and whether the removal of e bail agent from the 
18 operative list that the Fourth Judicial District 
1s maintains, that removal occurs without notice and an 
13 on appeal that are mare directly fronted in this case. 
And those issues are the separation of powers; 
r the licensing and disciplinary pmcsdure that the 
es have put in place violate the separation of 
17 practice criminal defense not only in the Fourth Judicial 
18 District, but I practice in a number of our districts 
19 around in couR And I wiU say that I have never heard, 
13 someone who has taken -maybe taken the person to their 
14 home or has stepped forward and said, "I'm going to take 
15 responsibility for this person to appear in court." 
16 Now, I practice criminal defense. And I 
1 20 opportunity to be heard, whether that violates due process. 1 20 and I've never heard anybody else heard that, Your Honor. 1 
I a Beglnnlng. first, with the separation of I 21 you should set bond at this amount, because, affer all, we 1 I 22 powers, these Guidelines establish a licensing process and 22 have Mr. Garske here who is going to be the bail agent. 23 they regulate substantive law. One does not have to look I 23 Frankly, I've never seen it argued to a Court that the I 1 24 very far to confirm that We have cited the April 6th, 1 24 Court should take into account who the bail agent is, 1 
25 2004, Administrative Order of the Court, which is found at 
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I 1 Bates (Not8 in the stipulated Guidelines And there% a I 4 ofd(a)l that refers to a person who's agreedf. 1 
26 And I think to sort of pounce on this language 
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1 2 paragraph in that Order that provides as follows: 1 2 assist a person in attending cowl is a misreading of Ihe I 
MOTION FOR PRELIMIWURY INJUNCTION MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1 7 moral character, and conduct their business in an ethical. f 'I Where it's the surety, who's licensed and regulated by the 1 
3 'Whereas, it is in the best interests of the general public 
4 and the Court to ensure that persons or entities who are 
5 permitted to present for acceptance of bail bonds in the 
6 Fourth Judicial District possess qualifications of good 
3 statute - or a misreading of the rule. 
4 I think one also needs to keep In mind what I 
5 think the Cwrt started today's hearing with, and what i 
6 responded to, was Ule nature of the bail bond process. 
1 13 legislature to define substantive rights. And substantive 1 13 case-by-case bask. It doesn't occur through the I 
8 prompt and law-abiding manner.* Again, that's at Bates 
9 00018. 
10 And we know from a number of cases that we 
11 ate in our bnef, "State vs. Currington," "Jones vs. State 
12 Board of Medicine," that it's the prerogatiie of the 
( 14 righb, according to these cases, indude the authority to 1 14 administration of a licensing process by not only the ADJ, 1 
8 Department of Insurance, who is guaranteeing payment of the 
Q bond if the defendant fails to appear. 
10 The Gddelines' Ucensing process, I 
11 SUbmit, are also not an exercise of judicial discretion. 
12 Judicial discretion o c w  in cases involving bond bn a 
1 15 regulate the rights to pursue an occupation for the I 16 but the Trial Court Administrator and his staff. I 1 f6  protection of the public healh, safety, morals, M general I 16 And we have cited this American Druggist case, I 1 17 welfare. 1 17 a case out of the Ekrvanth Circuit, which I mink captures 1 
1 l8 IYs aiso, Your Honor, a well-settled right 1 18 this idea quite cM#jsely. That case says that the key to I 1 19 that to follow a recognized and useful occupation is a 1 19 achieving the appropriate balance between regulation of 1 I M right protected by the Constitution. And in response to 1 20 sureties and j u d i i  discretion to create appropriate bail 1 
Zi this argument the defendants argue that the licensing and 
22 disciplinary procedure that the Guidelies create are only 
23 there to ensure the presence of a criminal defendant in 
24 court. 
25 And I have to say that Cs just simply - 
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21 conditions is to assure that the Court is actually 
22 exercising discretion anticipated for individual bond 
23 apprwal. And I submit that that is a reference to 
24 consHeration of bond on a case-by-case basis. 
25 Now, the defendants in thls case argue in 
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1 MR. McKAY: And I would say in response, I 
2 think these people have been preappoued. They have been 
3 preapproved by the Department of Insurance. 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
I response to Rat, that it would be too much of a strain to 
2 have bond heard individually -to have bond heard on a 
3 case-by-case basis, but that's how it happened. That's how 
4 it happens anyway, except in misdemeanor cases where 
5 there's a schedule and bond is established by a 
6 predetermined schedule, or In cases where an arrest warrant 
7 is obtalned and the prosecutor makes a presentation about 
8 what the bond should be and the factors for the Court to 
9 consider. 
10 And never in those ex parte communications, 
11 which we somebmes obtain tapes of, is there a d~scussion 
12 of who the bail agent is going to be. It's done Fight now 
13 on a case-by-case basis, and it does not overly tax the 
14 judiciarj, l submit. 
15 THE COURT: Aren't they talking about -- not 
16 that - on an ind~vidual basis they're saying that, without 
17 a preapproval of the list of bail agents, every time a bail 
18 agent wanted to post bail, he would have to appear in cwrt 
19 to be approved by the lrial judge, That's their argument 
20 Is that it's the fact that we have a posting of 
21 these - you can't just go post the bad. And what the 
22 Administrative District Judge has done is say, 'Well, we're 
23 going to preapprove all these people as people who are In 
24 good character who can take and post a bal bond." At 
25 least that's the rattonale behind it. 
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1 business in the counties of Ada, Elmore, Valley. 
2 and Boise County. 
3 And it doesn't matter that it's only 
1 Because, after all, we're talking about licensing and 
2 substantive matters that we have -where we've vested the 
3 legisiature with the author~ty to govern In this area 
4 There is also mention by the defendants of 
5 how requiring this to occur on a case-by-case basis will 
6 overly tax the jud~cial - will cause the expendlure of 
7 unnecessary judlcral resources And I submit that if thls 
8 Court were to look at the Affidavits that we submitted and 
9 look at the process that's In place, this bureaucratic 
10 process that requires applications and investigation of the 
I 1  background and renewal, and all of the disputes that arise 
12 as a result of the operative Guidelines in this district, 
$3 and issues that we subml are totally divorced from the 
14 appearance of an individual defendant in caurt, that untold 
15 judicial resources wll be saved just by doing away with 
$6 this process. 
17 We also argue due process, Your Honor - 
18 procedural due process, that the Guidel~nes that these 
$9 defendants deprive and threaten to deprive pla~ntifls of 
20 protected interests without comporHng wlth the 
21 requirements of procedural due pmcess. And there IS a 
22 protected Interest. Now, that protected interest is not 
23 the produoer's license, but rather these Guidelines 
24 restrict and regulate licensed agents -- agents licensed by 
25 the Department of insurance, their ability to conduct 
Page 19 
(208) 938-0213 FAX (208) 938-1843 
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING 
WlTXON FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
I d  THE COURT: You're saying, then, the courts 1 4 restficted to those counties, to the Fourth Judicial 1 5 have no ability to take and require - do a separate I 5 District. Rather, it's the fact that the government -- in 1 6 preapproval? l thought American Druggist went the other 1 6 this case the Court - has stepped in and is depriving 1 7 way, myself. I thought it ckatly Wicated that the 1 7 W s e  agents of this constitutionally protected interest 
8 courts do have that discretion. 
9 MR. MMAY: I think American D~ggist was 
10 dealing with situations Involving sureties where there had 
8 without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
9 And, of course - I mean, the reason that the 
10 legislature, the reason that the Department of Insurance 
18 list of bail agents who have been approved and who am 
19 licensed by the Dapartment of lnsuranca. And that should 
20 be the operative list that a sheriff, that a derk, that 
21 the Court can rely on. And if there's a pmblem with those 
22 agents - and again, there's no evidence in the record that 
23 there has been a problem with these people not paying bonds 
11 been a number of - 
12 THE COURT: Ws the same argument. 
13 MR. McKAY: - had been a number of defaults. 
14 THE COURT: It's the same issues, I think, 
15 that we're taking here. 
16 MR. W Y r  Yes. I think wha: I said at the 
17 last hearing is that, yes, this Court can maintain a 
18 Now, we ate to Section 14(b) of the 
19 Guidelines that - as one of the areas where we say that 
20 tlrere was not notice or a hearing prior to removal. And I 
21 t h ' i  possibly there's some misunderstanding by the 
22 defendants of our argument on this. What happens under 
23 14(b) is the Trial Court Administrator sends notice to an 
11 has to provide notice and oppoFtunity to be heard is 
12 because a producer's license imbues a person with a right 
13 to pursue an ocwpational liberty - their occupational 
14 liberty. And that's exactly what's occurring here. When a 
I 6  person is denied the opportunity to lae en the list, they're 
16 denied an opportunity to pursue their right to occupational 
17 liberty. 
/ 24 that they're obligated to pay, but if there's a problem, / 24 agent informing them of a violation, telling them that you 1 25 then you'd take that up with the Department of Insurance. 1 25 have ten days to the violation or you'll be subjed 
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1 to removal. 
2 At that point the bail agent has a choice. 
3 They can file a p e f i i n  and they can challenge this 
4 determination that a violation occurred. They can also 
5 choose to redify the vlolatlon. They can send the 
6 papemork in or do whatever is descraed -whatever the 
7 deficiency that is described in the letter, they can 
8 attempt to remedy that. And if they haven't also 
9 challenged the violation and they've only attempted to 
10 rectify the violation, the Trial Court Administrator, at 
11 that point, if they determine that they have not rectified 
12 it, they have the authority, and they have, in the past, 
1 situation that the TCA could have dealt with by Simply 
2 responding with a letter that said, "You're right. If a 
3 motion is pending in that case we woh't take action. But 
4 you don't have a motion pending in this case." And what 
5 she sent is - she sent back a letter -- she sent back a 
6 letter &at just said the first part of it and referred 
7 only to "State vs, Carla Grieve," without reference to a 
8 case number, without referenceto any of the other tracking 
9 information that you always see in correspondence from the 
10 TCA's office. And then what happens two days later is 
I 1  Mr. Garske is, again, removed from the list. 
12 And I submit - if you look at not just that 
13 removed that person from the list without further notice 13 situation in Isolation, but If you look at the totally of 
14 and without an opportunity to be heard. And we submit tha 14 the situation, I think that there is a certain amount of 
15 there's very llttle effort that would be required to 15 gotcha quality to this. That the interest is -and the 
16 provide this additional notice and a pre-removal hearing. 16 actions by the TCA's office in this case - it's not just 
117 Mathews vs. Eldridge, a U.S. S u p m  Court f 17 driven by a desire to ensure the defendants appear, but I 1 18 case, says that the relevant factor in determining the I 18 it's diiven by this rigid application and interpretation of I 1 19 process due is the likelihood that the pre-procedure will 1 19 the Guidelines. 1 
20 prevent erroneous deprivation. 
And if you kok at the two situations that we 
22 presented to the Court by way of Affidavit involving l 21 20 And I guess at the risk of sounding 21 self-sewing - or more self-serving, my clients did not go 22 into thb litigation lightly. They don't relish this 1 23 Mr. Garske, both of those situations w l d  have been 1 23 litigation. Thls isn't a whimsical exerdse sulng the I 
24 avoided simply by some communication, by notice and an 
25 opportunity to be heard. 
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25 Assistant TCA, who they do business with on a daily basis. 
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WIR McKAY: Well, it was not a perfed And the ability to shut down Aladdin and put 
25 situation. It was not a perfect situation. But it was a I 
I In 2006, it was a situation involving the 
2 criminal history - his prior criminal - his purporled 
3 failure to provide a criminal history check to the TCA's 
4 office. And of course the TCA later found that that had 
5 been delwered by Interdepartmental mail. But, In the 
6 meantime. Mr. Garske was removed from the list on a Friday, 
7 and he and 39 agents who operate under his supervision were 
8 unable to do business for four days. 
9 Another situation Involves - that we 
10 described in the Affidavits of not only Mr. Ganke but 
11 Mr. Charney, W v e s  a situation involving a defendant, 
12 Carla Grieve, who had two cases pending. And the TCA sent 
13 a notice to Aladdin in cofuwm with one of those cases 
14 and said, "An Order has been issued foffeitii the bond. 
16 Pay thls bond withfn ten days." 
16 Counsel for Aladdin, in response to %at 
17 letter, sent back his own letter that said, "It's our 
18 understanding that if a motion is pending, according to the 
I 9  Guidelines. you will not remove the bail agant or take 
20 adion until the motion is re~olvad.~ And counsel h that 
21 case. frankly, confused the two cases. He thought it was 
22 one case and not the other case. 
23 THE COURT: Who's at fault in that one? 
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1 They would much rather have it be like every other judicial 
2 district where they could just go about doing their 
3 business. 
4 But the situation - and you see this in the 
5 Affidavits; you see this in all of the attachments to the 
6 Affidavits. The situation, Your Honor, simply has become 
7 untenable. It's got to the point where we have brought 
8 this litigation and we're asking this Court to enter a 
9 preliminary injunction to assist them in continuing to do 
10 business. 
$1 NOW, the other prong of our argument, of 
12 course, is whether the Complaint and Affidavit show great 
13 or irreparable injury. It's in the disjunctive; %(e)2 
14 speaks to "great" or 'irreparable injury." And we submit 
15 that we have demonstrated both great and irreparable 
16 injury. 
17 The TCA's office has m p l e t e  control over 
18 Aladdin's business. They have the ability to shut down 
19 their business over de minimis matters. They have a say in 
20 who - what licensed agents they utilize to do business in 
21 this district. And the plaintiffs in this case am 
22 constantly having to defend their ability to do business by 
23 responding to violation notices. 
1 the situatioo involving Mr. Garske and the 39 bail agents 
2 who were put out of business for four days. And if I 
3 could - and I recognize this is somewhat redundant. This 
4 is Exhibit C to Exhibit 5 of the Dennis Chafney Affidavit 
5 But if I could hand this to the Court. 
6 (The document was handed to the Court.) 
7 MR. McKAY: And I'll also provMe counsel with 
8 coptes. 
9 (The document was handed to counsel.) 
10 MR. Md<AY: Under these Guidelines, 
I 1  Your Honor, only one supervising agent can be listed per 
12 bail agency. And so the effect of the TCA suspending 
13 Mr. Garske without notice is th8t - you see here in 
14 Exhibit C is a letter dated January 13,2006, from the PCA 
I S  where 39 - possibly it's 30; 1 believe it's 39; maybe It's 
16 38 - bail agents, together with Mr. Garske, were shut dowf 
17 for four days until counsel for Aladdin could get in front 
18 of the judge and get hhn reinstated. 
19 Mr. Garske is a *year veteran of the bail 
20 bond business. He's always passed his criminal history 
21 checks. This Court has never had to file a civil action to 
22 recover on a bond that he's been involved with. And yet 
23 he's been threatened with removal as late as January 3rd, 
24 2006, May 1st 2007, and June Ist, 2007. He was actually 
25 removed in connection with thls situation on January 1W, 
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I 2 in the Affidavits we have submitted; the Affidavits of 3 Mr. Chamey and Mr. Garske. 
1 4  Just on June 26,2007, just prior to when we 1 5 filed this motion, the TCA's office informed Mr. Garske 
1 6 that he had committed his sixlh violation by not I 7 immediately informing the TCA's office that an agent had 
8 relocated out of state. And so according to the 
8 Guidelmes, under your fourth violation they can petition 
10 for your removal. So Mr. Garske is now in a state of 
11 having the TCA's office having determined he's committed a 
12 sixth violation, and he continues to do business subject 1 13 to their decision to not petition for hi removal, 
14 Offentimes, this removal occurs - or the b e a t  of removal 
15 occurs over matters that are simply outside the control of 
16 the plaintiffs. 
17 I referred the Court to the criminal history 
18 check that was sent by ISP through the hterdepaitmentel 
19 mail. Mr. Garske had nothing to do with when that was 
20 delivered or received by the TCA's office. There's 
1 21 reference to a situation involving a death certificate - a 1 22 Uueat of violation, because them wasn't a death 
23 certificate presented. when no death wtificate was 
24 available. 
25 The case has been corrsdidated with the 
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1 Sunshine Musick case. That was a situation w h e r e  h e r  
2 foner employer had failed to pay forfeited bond. So 
3 because her former employer had failed to pay forfeited 
4 bond, Ms. Musick was assessed with two wolations. 
5 There's the Rebecca Salines situation which I 
6 think this Court is familiar with. It's alleged in her 
7 Complaint she was threatened with removal because of a 
8 check charge that was dismissed, that she was never made 
9 aware of. It was a charge that was filed and dismissed, 
10 together with a dog at large case that, yes, she was 
11 aware - she became aware of, but the TCA's office was 
12 aware of it as well. 
13 The TCA's ofice also has a hand in 
14 how Aladdin -how the plaintiffs utilized their Department 
15 of Insurance-licensed employees. There's three situations 
16 that we've describe in our Affidavits, m involving Jerin 
17 Liscinski, where he had to file a petition, including a 
18 filing fee. to resume doing business as a bail agent, 
19 because he was a prior bail agent and he had voluntanly 
10 removed his name from the list, bemuse he decided to work 
ll in the real estate business. 
22 But than when he came back to work, because he 
23 had removed - albeit he had voluntarily been removed from 
24 the list, the Gu~delmes provided he would have to file a 
25 petition and pay a filing fee with the Court It just 
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1 wasnl enough to submit an application. 
2 Waiter Almaraz was a victim of identify theft. 
3 The Trial Court Administrator's office, we submit, was 
4 confused by his criminal history. And although he was 
5 licensed by the Department of Insurance, although he had 
6 been adiveiy doing business in the Third Judicial 
7 Distrid, he was repeatedly denkd requests to be placed on 
8 the Fourth Judicii District l i t .  
0 Jeremy Beal is another situation. He was 
10 denied almost iive years ago, because he had a rnisderneano~ 
I1 criminal history. Under the revised version of the 
12 Guidelines the criminal history that he had would not even 
13 be considered at this date, but it was another snuatlon 
I4 where he's licensed by the Department of Insurance, he's 
15 posting bond in the Third Judicial Distii,  and he has to 
(6 fib a petition, pay a filing fee and, through counsel, 
17 . pursue placement on the Ust. 
18 These aren't isolated instances, we submit. 
18 This is, to use !he words of a few treatises, CJS, these 
20 are constant daily threats and expenditures of time and 
21 resources. And CJS provides an irreparable injury exists 
22 where a wrtain pecuniary standard to measure damage is 
23 lacking, of when the avauable remedy at law consists of a 
24 large nwrber of sults for damages whlch, by mason of their 
25 number and cost, would produoe no substantial result. 
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I guess it's a way of saying we litigate thls I 3 understand, the general law in Idaho is that an agent has 4 stuff all the time and Vs not enough. It doesn't change I 4 no responsibility and no liability on a contract that he 1 I 
I That's also in the 42 Pan.Jur. This is in our briefing, 
2 Your Honor. 
1 this contract that you have with the bail agent? 1 
2 understand you've got one with the surety. But as I I 
and the threat of irreparable injury that exists on a 
day-tday basis in this district. 
There was some mention in the defendants' 
brefing that they w~ll suffer ineparable injury If a 
prel~minary Injunction is entered. I submlt that they wlU 
not. There's a process In place. The Court considers bond 
in these cases on an individual basis. The surety -- if a 
bail agent - if a licensed surety -if a licensed bail 
agent engages in misconduct or demonstrates incompetence 
there's a diiplinary procedure avalable through the 
5 thlngs. And there is no adequate remedy available. We are 
6 cornpeiled to seek the declaratMy judgment that we seek by 
7 virtue of this lawsuit, and we also seek a preliminary 
8 injunction because of the irreparable injury that flows, 
it part of th~s record that I've got7 
MR. KANG: Yes. The contract with the bail 
agent, I'm not sure if It Is part of the record. But your 
question -- 
THE COURT: Well, if it's not. then I'm not 
going to consider it as part of the record. That's one of 
the things - I don't have a copy of the agency agreement 
between the bail agent and the surety, which is apparently 
filed with the Trial Court Administrator's office. I keep 
looking for this idea that --where does this personal 
6 enters into on behalf of a disclosed principal. 
6 I'm trying to f w e  -- and that's one of the 
7 reasons I raise that as one of the questions I have, to 
8 begin with. Where is the contract with the bail agent? Is 
1 19 Department of Insurance. I 19 responsibility of the bail agent come into this? I 
If the defendant doesn't appear, as the MR. KANO: And as I was preparing for this 
21 defendants point out in their brief, the defendants can 21 hearing I also had concerns about what does It mean when -- 
22 pursue a civil action which they do through the proseating 22 look, the State vs. Abracadabra refers to the surety. Who I 20 I 20 1 23 attorney's ofice. A preliminary injunction will not cause 1 23 has the responsibility in that contract? And it is one of I 
24 them injury. We submit that if the Cowt does not enter a 
25 preliminary injunction we will. And that it's appropriate 
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26 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
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1 to enter a preliminary injunction under both 65te)l and 
2 65(e)2 If I could, Your Honor, have a second to confer 
3 with my counsel to make sure l haven't missed anything? 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
5 MR. McKAY: Your Honor, that's all I have, 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. KANG: May I approach, Your Honor? 
8 THE COURT: You may. 
9 (Documents were handed to the Court.) 
10 MR. KANG: The first document, the fiow chart, 
11 is one created by myself in preparation for this hearing. 
12 The second one is the State defendant's additional 
13 authority which, per Your Honot's Older, he would like to 
14 receive copies of all the cases that are cited to; I have 
15 complied, and those are the cases that I will be citing to 
16 you during my presentation. Also, l you'li look at the 
17 index, I have specifically pointed out which pages that 1 
18 am referring to, but I'm not going to refer to those 
19 specific pages in my presentation today. 
20 THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, because 
21 I've got your flow chart on tap and it just jumps out at 
22 me, and that's the box at the bottom. And it says 
23 (reading) The relationship between the Court -the State, 
24 and the bail agent surety Is contractual (end reading). 
25 Now, 1 guess I'm trying to find out what is 
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1 MR. KANG: The Motion for Preliminary 
2 Injunction should be denied because the plaintiffs' fail to 
3 meet the burden of showing rightful injunction under either 
4 of the theories alleged; the reasonable likelihood of 
5 success, or great or irreparable injuries. 
6 I would like to first take up the issue of the 
7 surety under State v. Abracadabra. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. KANG: And then I will address each of 
10 their arguments, including separation of powers, due 
11 process, and authority, separately from the contract 
12 basis. As you can tell from the Row chart that I have 
13 presented to the Court, there are hvo distinct tracts of 
14 power, one from the Constitution, one from the State of 
15 Idaho for the Issues involved In thls case. 
16 The judiciary, based on its inherent authority 
17 and discretion to accept or deny bond, and the legislature 
18 which grants the Department of Insurance their authority to 
19 license bail agents, e licensed bail agent's ability to 
20 submit bail and the Court's discretion to accept or deny 
21 only interconnect when a Court chooses to enter into a 
22 contract with the bail agent. 
23 I understand that State v. Abracadabra refers 
24 to this agent -or this person as the "surety." And that 
25 is the first hurdle of Abracadabra's application to this 
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2 case? Did this fefer to the insurance company, as 2 that they go af&er the bail agent for recovering that. 
3 plaintiffs assert, like Lincoln National (sic), or is it in THE COURT: That's not in my record. 
4 reference to the ball agent? MR. KANG. I understand that. That's just my 
5 This question was answered by the Court in 5 representation of how l understand things to work. 
THE COURT: And there's nothing hem, IS 
11 c~ttes to a number of authorities which, pertinent to 11 in the court file, Isn't 117 
MR. KANG: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 Counts I and II of the additional authority. THE COURT: Now, I would note for the record 
14 And first I would like to point to Tab No. I ,  14 also, that we don't have a copy of any ball bond that ha 
16 And in that section Am.Jur. defines the surety as the 
20 agent is also considered a surety. THE COURT: Let me also say my guess is 
21 Further cementing thls principle that the bail 21 somewhat qualified, because l you look back in the 
23 the Department of Insurance. And I would direct the 23 has a language for the bail to give. And I assume that the 
25 agent license supplied in her Affidavit. 25 language isn't codified by statute. Go ahead. 
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1 You will note at the heading it says, "bail 
2 agent," underneath it "surety." You will also note in the 
3 two parts that ate given to the bail agent, on the sacond 
4 part to the right it says, "bail agent," and again, 
5 underneath, it states "surety." 
6 THE COURT: And does that reflect that this is 
7 a buslness In town practicing as a bail agent? 
8 MR. KANG: Yes, Ywr Honor. A bail agent has 
9 many hats. And I believe one of the hats is not only as a 
10 bail agent but also assumes the duty of a partial surety, 
1.1 or at least co-liability with the s u m  company that 
12 insures the - 
13 THE COURT: Do you have any case authority for 
14 thatproposition? 
15 MR. KANG: I do not, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: It's a wonderful theory, but then 
17 you raise the issue of if they are a co-surety for 
18 compensation don't they then have to qualify as an 
19 insurance company underneath the insurance code of the 
20 state? And, if so. that means we should throw al the bail 
21 agents in ja l  for violating the insurance code. 
22 MR. KANG: I don't have any further author& 
23 for this, Your Honor. My understanding of the relationship 
24 between the bail agent and the insurance company is that 
25 they enter into a separate contract whereby if a forfeiture 
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1 MR. KANG: Getting back to State v. 
2 Abracadabra with their contractual designation of the 
3 relationship between the Court and the bail agent, and the 
4 Court's majority oplnion refenlng to - or referencing 
5 these two that I have designated in Tab No. 1 and 2, it is 
6 evident that when they are discussing the contract between 
7 the Court and the surety they are talking about the 
8 contract between the Court and the bail agent. 
9 The question then before the Court is whether 
10 or not a contract violates constitutional principles under 
I 1  the separation of powers doctrine or due process. First, 
12 there is no separation of powers issue. The Guidelines 
13 provide the minimum standards by which the Court in the 
14 Fourth Judiial District will accept from bail agents with 
15 whom they will contract. 
16 If we were to accrtpt plaintiffs' theory an6 
17 place every agent that is l i e d  by the Department of 
18 Insurance on the list, then the legislature, through the 
19 Department of Insurance, would in effect be forcing the 
20 courts of the Fourth Judicial District to enter into 
21 contracts with every bail agent that is licensed. This is 
22 contrary to the very essence of a contract. 
23 In Wilbur vs. Blanchard, 22 Idaho 517, 
24 126 P, 1069, which is designated in Tab 4 of the additional 
25 authority, the Court stated ". . . all contracts and 
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I 1 agreements shall be founded upon the exercise of the free or irreparable injury present in this case. 2 wit1 of the parties which is the real essence of all However, as I stated at h e  beginning of my 1 3 contracts." The maklng of a contract requires the free 1 3 presentation, I would also like to address it outside the / 
1 8 today -do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, 1 8 the State, 142 ldaho 640, 132 P.3d 397, which is in Tab 5 ( 
4 exercise of the will or power of the contrading parties 
5 and the free meeting and blending of their minds. 
6 The Guidelines - specificaly the portions 
7 dealing with the list which is being challenged here 
( 9 because it does not encroach upon the central functions of ( 9 of additional authority, that our state constitution is a 1 
4 contractual context and discuss the separation of powers, 
5 authority, and due process, and tern. First, I wwld Like 
6 to take up authority. The Idaho Supreme Court held in 
7 Idaho Press Club, Incorporated, vs. State Legislature of 
I 10 the legislature and Department of Insurance, but rather 10 limltatlon, not a grant of power. 11 sets forth minimum qualifications and standards that they I 11 Because the Constitution is not a grant of 
1 16 and the Court? 1 $6 list However, where the framers drafted a provision 1 
12 seek in persons who they will contrad with of their free 
13 accord. 
14 THE COURT: And again, %'s your position that 
15 the contract that's posted here is between the bail agents 
MR. KANG: That is cqrrect, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
19 MR. KANG: The contractual nature also 
12 power. there is no reason to believe that a constitutional 
(3 provision enumerating powers of a branch of government was 
14 intended to be an txclusiw list. The branch of government 
15 would inherently have powers that were not induded in that 
17 expressly limiting certain powers, there is no reason to 
18 believe that they intended that llmitatmn to be broader 
19 than as enumerated in the Constitution. statute or rule. 
1 20 disposes of the due process clalm, because a 1 20 The purpose of such a provision Is to define 1 
1 21 constitutionally recognized propety requires not only not 1 21 the limitations. So had they wanted to impose limitations. 1 
22 just a mere entitlement, but requues a legitimate claim of 
23 entitlement to it. If we go under State v. Abracadabra, 
24 and the framework provided that it is a contrad between 
22 they auld have easily done so. Why is this pertinent to 
23 the case before the Court today? There is the universally 
24 recognized nrle which is also cited in that case, Rule of 
25 the bail agent and the Court representing the State, then 
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1 there can be no legitimate claim of entitlement to it, 
2 because the contract, by its very essence, is to enter into 
3 a contract by a free will. Because it is dependent on the 
4 free will of another party, there can be no legllmate 
5 claim of entitlement to it, Your Honor. 
6 Furthemre, there are no great or irreparable 
7 injuries which arise under the contractual theory, because 
8 by entering into a contract with the Fourth Judicial 
9 District, the bail agent agrees to abide by its terms. Any 
10 injuty which results is due to the breach of the terms of 
11 the contract. 
12 THE COURT: You're now talking about the 
13 contrad It is not the bail bond. But you're saying by 
14 submitting to the licensure, that's the contrad they have 
15 before the Diitrict, is what you're trying to tell me? 
18 MR. KANG: No, Your Honor. What I'm saying is 
I? the contad between the bail agent and the Court and that 
18 the terms of the Guidelines are part of that contract when 
19 they enter into - 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. KANG: On that basis, Your Honor, if we 
22 continue to go down the road of State v. Abracadabra, w d  
23 the legal framework that it provides, then the plaintiffs' 
24 request for preliminary lnjunctlon falls bemuse there is 
25 no reasonable likelihood of success, and there is no great 
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1 spedfies certain things, the designation of such t h i s  
2 exdudes others. 
3 What we need to do in applying that stance 
4 by the Idaho Supreme Court Is to determine whether 
5 Administrative District Judge W~fliamson had the authority 
6 to promulgate the Guidelines, and we must look at the power 
7 granted to determine whether there was a limitation on the 
8 power or it was enumeration on the power. If it was 
9 enumeration on the power, then she is not limited by just 
10 what is written down. If it's a limitation, then she is 
11 limited to what's spedficaliy enumerated. 
12 Idaho Code Section 2-90? allows the 
13 Administrative Judge to adminlster the operation of 
14 district court. This is clearly a grant of power, Your 
15 Honor, and not a limitation, and does not Kmii the 
16 AdministraBw District Judge in her authority over the 
17 operation of the courts. 
18 In the Idaho Supreme Court's Order dated 
19 August 4,2005, the Court recognized this by stating, under 
20 Idaho Code Section 1-907, 'The powers and duties of 
21 Administrative District Judge indude, but are not limited 
22 lo, ail those powers and duties set forth in statute or in 
23 other ~ l e s  of the S u p m e  Court as well as the following." 
24 And under Section 18 they say spedficalty "EstabUsh 
25 guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, 
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1 forfeiture, exoneralion and all other matters." The Order 
2 of the Supreme Cwrt is also a grant of power and not a 
3 limbtion. 
4 THE COURT: Doesn't it, by its terms, at least 
5 as you express it right there - it's saying it's granting 
6 this under 1-Q07? 
7 MR. KANG: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: So maybe lt is a limitation W ' s  
9 contained in 1-907. 
10 MR. KANG: And under 1-907 our argument is 
11 that it goes to the operation of the court. And so i f  the 
12 power exerased in promulgating the Guidelines related to 
13 the operation of the courts, because it k not lim~ted in 
14 any other fashion in 1-907, that It is within the swpe of 
15 the Administrative District Judge to promulgate. 
16 The Supreme Coal. as stated, granted this 
17 power under their Supreme Court Order dated August 4,2005 
18 having knowledge of M s  rule of construction. We can 
19 asMane that they could have limited it or devwd the Order 
20 so that it is m limit~ng language - or language of 
21 Ibnttation rather than a grant of power, but they chose not 
22 to, Your Honor. 
23 The Guidelines established by the 
24 Administrative Distrid Judge Williamson falls within the 
25 scope of Ulis Order in 1-907, because it does relate to the 
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1 operation of the district courts, and it does so by 
2 promoting efficiency within the court system. And to 
3 further eiaborate on thet, Your Honor, the list that is 
4 created that is being dralknged today is nterely a 
5 mechanical device. it is an administrative toot. Counsel 
6 for plaintiffs contend that the list affects the 
7 substantive rights of ball agents. I dlsagree. 
8 It isn't the list that is affecting the Fights 
9 of the bail agents, because the Court has inherent 
10 authority on an individual case-by-case basis to approve c 
I 1  deny a bond. Whether they choose to approve or deny a 
12 bond, that is what affects the bail agent The list is 
13 merely a creation, a mechanical device, by which the list 
14 of all those people that they have preappmved within theif 
15 discretion is placed. The list itself - 
16 THE COURT: Just so we're clear here, you're 
17 saying that Ws preapproved within the discretion. You're 
I 8  saying the Admhristrative Distrid Jodge basically has the 
19 authority, due to discretion, for every judge in the 
20 district? 
21 MR. K4NQ If you will look at the Affidavit 
22 that was submiied by Administrative District Judge 
23 Williamson, I believe that she did testify that she took 
24 into consideration and asked for advice from a variety of 
26 people. 
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1 THE COURT: That wasn't my question. She may 
2 have gotten advlce from a whole bunch of people. Are you 
3 saylng that every judge in the Fourth Judicial D~strict who 
4 has the discretion by statute, the case law to approve 
5 balance, that that discretion is trumped by the 
6 Administrative Distnd Judge? And isn't that the case 
T that we had - and maybe that's the American Druggist or 
8 one of the other cases, but we had that very issue out 
9 there. If you're going to have ~ndividual discretion, yes. 
10 Now you're just saying we're going to exercise it for you. 
I1 You're saying that she -- can she do that also on 
12 sentenungs? 
13 MR. KANG: Your Honor, my response to that 
I4 would be that I don't belleve that - each court does have 
15 the inherent authority to approve or deny a bond The 
16 Admin~strative District Judge is speaklng for the courts 
17 under her authority, because she is the one charged with 
I8 exercising the duty of - over the administrative operat~on 
19 of the courts. I guess exercis~ng that discretion of all 
20 the other underlying courts. Is that troubling, in terms 
21 of how you pose the question? Yes, Your Honor. I can't 
22 deny the fact that the Administrative District Judge is the 
23 one who placed the Order on there. And it does not say 
24 that it is within - it is the discretion of all the 
25 courts, and it is - 
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1 THE COURT: You know, there is a provision for 
2 adopting local rules that require a majority action by the 
3 district judges and then approval by the Supreme Court. 
4 Now, you might have a clearer thing if that was the 
5 statement of the discretion of all the judges. But I'm 
6 trylng to find out, are you saylng that the Admlnlstratlve 
7 District Judge has the power to make that exercise -- or 
8 Iimii the diswetion. I should say, is really what it 
9 does - I S i t s  the discretion of all the other judges in 
'10 the district by saying you can't accept a bond except from 
I 1  mylist? 
$2 MR. KANG: The way 1 would answer that, 
13 Your Honor, is the now of power from the Constitution to 
14 the ldaho Supeme Court says that the ldaho Supreme Court 
15 has the ablllty to administer the affairs of all the lower 
16 courts. 
It THE COURT: The Supreme Court could say, 
18 "Okay, no judges will accept bonds except from A. 0. C. 
19 and D'? 
20 MR. KANG: Going off the power of the 
21 Contiiution, I would have to say that is our position, 
22 Your Honor, 1s that that authority is provided to Ule 
23 Administrative Distrid Judge, which flows horn the Supreme 
24 Court, which has the authority to administer the affairs of 
25 the district courts. The Administrative District Judge has 
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1 been appointed to be the person to administer the affiin 
2 of the district courts And within that discretion and the 
3 authority granted to her, she took upon herself to 
4 determine, in the of the Fourth Judicial 
5 District as a whole, the terms of which bail agents that 
6 they wish to contract with, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. KANG: Your Honor, cons~deratton of bail 
9 agents, golng back to the authority of the Court, is a 
10 critical factor in approving or denying a bond as reflected 
11 n ldaho Criminal Rule 46(a)(5). I understand opposing 
12 counsers posltion that he interprets subsection 5 to be 
13 referring to friends, family. But it does not say or limit 
14 it to friends and family. It says, "Persons who are going 
15 to be responsible for the defendant attending court" 
16 THE COURT: Where does the responsibility for 
17 the bail agent come for dolng that, just as long as we're 
18 talking about 46(a)? 
19 MR. KANG: In that responsibility, Your Honor, 
20 it comes from when the bail agent submits itself to the 
21 Court and represents that they are going to be tendering 
22 the bond for the defendant. 
23 THE COURT: They don't submit themselves to 
' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
24 the Court. All they do is sign a Power of Attorney and a 
25 bond and give it to the sheriff and the guy gets out of 
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1 language to refer to only families and parents. 
2 THE COURT: Isn't the question related to 
3 whether or not a person wouM be released on therr own 
4 recognizance, or the amount of bail, or admltted to bail, 
6 aren't those factors that are made oftentimes wlthout even 
6 knowing whether the bail agent is golng to be involved? 
7 MR. KANG: If it is to their own recognizance, 
8 yes, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Well, let's say that I set the 
10 bail on a defendant of $50,000, and he goes downstairs to 
11 the SheMs Office and he gives them a cashier's check 
12 for $50,000, and he's posted bail. I haven't given any 
13 thought with releasing him to a bail agent, have I? 
14 MR. K . G :  In that scenario, no, Your Honor. 
15 But I think once a bail agent imposes themselves as 
16 representing or being a representative of the defendant, 
17 that is a different scenario. 
18 THE COURT: And is he a representatrue of the 
19 defendant or a representative of the surety? 
20 MR. KANG: Again, I believe that's where the 
21 multiple hats are being worn, is that the bail agent is an 
22 agent for the surety. And at the same time, under the 
23 Court's perspective, the bail agent is coming to the Court 
24 and representing to the Court that they are going to do 
25 what they can to reassure that the defendant is present. 
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1 jail. That's generally the way it works, isn't it? I 
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2 MR. KANG: I would say by signing that 1 
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3 document il Is a representation to the Court that they are I 
4 releasing - w they are assisting the defendant in being 
5 released on bail after having met with the defendant and 
6 determining that the defendant is likely to return to 
7 court. And in support of that I wouid cite to the I 
8 memmndum that l filed in response -or reply to the 1 
9 Motion to Dismiss where there are some cases which I cite 
10 talking about the bail agent's responsibility. 
11 THE COURT: And whlle we're dolng that I can 
12 tell y w  that a large number of the cases that have been I 
13 cited are under statutory schemes and bail schemes 
14 significantly diierent from those of Idaho, where they 
15 actuaky have a personal bail agent who personally is the 
16 surety for the - and clearly Ihe surety for the bond. 
17 They posted t!eir deposits and they have all different 1 
18 things. So a lot of those are not helphrl in analyzing 1 
19 this, bemuse they do come W w  a different scheme. Some I 
20 of them are helpful in giving me some direction. though. 
21 Go ahead. 
22 MR. KANG: Going back to the Rule of 
23 CMStnrdion as applied to ldaho Criminal Rule 36(a), it is 
24 also a grant of authority, a grant of the discretion, and l 
25 would say that Section (a)5 should not be limited in its 1 
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1 M E  COURT: Where do I get that representation 
2 from the bail agent? Does he come Into court and tell me 
3 that or does he sign some piece of paper that tells me 
4 that? How do l get that? 
5 MR. KANG: I would have to - when they're not 
6 actually appearing before the Court. I think the Court 
7 would have to rely on the signing of the documents. 
8 THE COURT: You're just saying just from the 
9 sheer fact that they're going to act with the power of 
10 attorney on behalf of a surety, that's their assurance? 
11 They're gang to take thls person under their wing and take 
12 them home, and feed them, and think that they'll be back tc 
13 court? 
14 MR. KANG: Again, I think there's the multiple 
15 hats that come into play. And they're not only the agent 
16 for the surety, but they are also the person &at the Court 
17 looks to for reassuring that the defendant comes to court. 
18 THE COURT: And what is the basis for the 
19 Court to look to the bail agent to make sure the defendant 
20 comes to couit? 
21 MR. KANG: I belleve in releasing the 
22 defendant into their care. 
23 THE COURT: And do you think there's actually 
24 a physical release of the defendant into their care? Is 
25 there anything that says that? Tttere's a lot of cases that 
Page 48 
(208) 938-0213 FAX (208) 938-1843 
ACCUTZATE COURT R&PORTING 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1 talk abo& dease to the @re of the surety. The surety 
2 has - it's a different kind - it's not a total freedom. 
3 You're really free underneath the Surety's more - 
4 mnefidal incarceration" I think is the Language one of 
5 the cases used. But Is it really the bail agent? 
6 MR. KANG: I believe that it isn't an actual 
7 physlml release of custody to the bail agent. But I think 
8 the bail agent has a respansibility for bond here, and to 
9 be in contact with the defendant, to essure them that they 
10 will return to court. 
11 n-IE COURT: Is there any contract between the 
$2 court and the bail agent or the court and the surety, for 
13 that matter, or even in the Guidelines, that say that the 
14 bail agent IS going to keep In contact with the defendant 
15 and advlse h i  of his court appearances and make sure he 
16 shows up? Or is it only the payment of money if he 
17 doesn't? 
18 MR. W O :  It is the payment of money if he 
19 doesn't - if the forfeiture occurs then . . . 
20 THE COURT: And the bag agent doesn't owe any 
21 of that, does he? 
22 MR. W G :  It is the surety insurance company 
23 that does owe that, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
25 MR. KANG: I would now like to move on to the 
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1 sepamZwn of powers argument, Your Honor. 
2 M E  COURT Sure. 
3 MR. KANG: The main argument by the plaintrffs 
4 with regard to the separation of powers is that the 
5 Guidelines take into consideration facton that are also 
6 used by the Deparbnent of Insurance in their licenstng 
7 procedure. The Maho Supreme Court, in Electors of 
8 Big Butle Area vs. State 8oard of Education, 78 Idaho 602, 
9 308 P.2d 225, which is hated in Tab 6, "It Is not always 
10 possible to draw a sharp line of d i i ndon  betwwn 
11 legislative, judicial and executive Powers or functions, 
12 nor does it appear necessary to the purpose of h 
13 constitutional separation of powers, to do so." 
14 How do we determine when a violation of a 
15 separation of powers occurs if it is this murky area? 
16 The Ninth Circuit provides us with an answer in Chadha v. 
17 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634, F.Zd, 408, 
18 wh~ch is located III Tab 8. The Court defines the 
19 ~ ~ ~ ~ t i t ~ t i ~ n a l  violation of the separation of powers as an 
20 assumption by one branch of power; in other words, central 
21 or essential to the operation of a branch, provided also 
22 that the assumption disrupts the court and branch in the 
23 peFfmance of its duties and it's unnecessary to implementl 
24 a legitimate policy of the government. 
25 In this case, Your Honor, the Guidelines do 
MOTION FOR P R E L W N M Y  I~Jl lNCl"l!ON 
1 not affed the iicensing authority of the Department of 
2 Insurance. And the judiciary has an interest in ensuring 
3 that the defendants are released in10 the custody of tl~ose 
4 that maintain the confidence of the Court to retum the 
5 defendant badr at the court when Ys time The presence 
6 of the defendant to detemtne guilt or lnnocxmce is 
7 essantial to the judlclal process, so the judiciary does 
8 have a significant interest in that area 
9 The separation of powers doctrine s not 
10 intended to prohibit one branch from taking action probably 
11 withln a sphere that has an incidental effect of 
12 duplicating a function or procedure delegated to another 
13 branch. I will direct the Court's attention to Tabs 8 
14 through 10. which are 16 CJS Constitutional Law, Sect~on 
15 217, Younger v Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102, and Way v. 
16 Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.3d 165. 
17 "Consideration of some similar factors as used 
18 by the Department of Insurance in the licensing of ball 
19 agents is merely incidental and does not deprive or 
20 encroach upon the fundin essential to the operation of 
21 the Department of Insurance's licensing procedure." Once 
22 again, Your Honor, the Guldellnes did not take away the 
23 bail agent's license. 
24 To advocate a strict separation of powers 
25 requiring three airtight departments is an archaic view and 
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1 should be disregarded by this Court. Now, except in Nixon 
2 v. Administrator of General Services, whtch is located in 
3 Tab 11,433 U.S. 425, Due Process. Can I just assert that 
4 they have a property right in their occupational ltberty 
5 and, therefore, they are entitled to procedural due 
6 process. The right to pursue the plaintiffs' occupation rs 
7 not being dented. Your Honor, as any agent that IS not on 
8 the 1st can pursue and continue to pumue their occupation 
9 In any other parts of the state. 
10 What is being contended, Your Honor, is the 
11 plaintiffs assert that they are nat being allowed to 
12 practice in a certain locale, a certain place of their 
13 choice. Merely po&wsing a license to practice an 
14 occupation does not entitle the person to choose where he 
16 or she wants to work. 
16 And I would direct the Court's attentton to 
17 Tab 12, 16B Am.Jur. 2d, Constitotlonal Law, Section 592. 
18 To put it into context, Your Honor, merely because I am 
19 licensed by the ldatio State Bar doss not ent$le me to work 
20 for the Office ofthe Attorney General. I had to fulfill 
21 other additional cnteria that they were looking for. 
22 Regardless, plaintiffs are afforded due process under the 
23 law, and the topic W been exhaustively covered in 
24 briefing, and I will refer the Coucs attention to 
2s Section 14 of the Guidelines. 
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1 To address one of the arguments that Mr. McKay 
2 made a moment aga regarding Section 14@), it is true, 
3 Your Honor, that the bail agent has a choice that they 
4 wubj attack any violation through the TCA's office or they 
5 could go to the Court and petiffon. But the language that 
6 14(b) uses is "and" shsh "or," which means that they can 
7 preserve their right to a hearing by fling a petnion at 
8 the same time that they challenge - through the same 
9 challenge through the TCA's office. And I would respond 
10 that by chooslng to only go through the TCA office that 
11 they walve their rfght to a predeprivatlon period if kt 
12 comes to that point. 
13 Great or irreparable injury. Taking a look at 
14 the Aitidavits demonstrates that the process works and the 
15 status quo should be maintained over granting the extreme 
16 remedy of a preliminary injunction. Rebecca Salinas's 
17 Affidavit shows that on March 22,2007, the TCA petitioned 
18 to have her name removed from the list because of a charge 
19 filed against her wh~ch was not disclosed -- actually, two 
20 charges, Your Honor, one for fraud for lnsufiident amount 
21 in her cheddng account, and the second one for misdemeanor 
22 stalking incidents. 
23 The petition for removal was heard by the 
24 court, Admnistmtive Judge Wtlliamson, and it was denied. 
25 She was not removed from the list. The system works. And 
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i Guidelines that is a valid request to ask for. 
2 THE COURT: Do you think in that part~cular 
3 circumstance it might have been a fair administrative step 
4 to advise the bail agent that thsre Isn't a death 
5 certificate, or Ms. and this letter may not be 
6 suffcient; you may want to be there when the judge 
7 considers thts so you can explain why you don't have one? 
8 MR. KANG: It seems to me. Your Honor. based 
9 on the Affidavlt of Mr Charney, the bail agent d i i  have 
$0 knowledge of that. Because Mr. Chamey was employed to - 
11 THE COURT: After the fact, though, wasn't he? 
12 After the denial? 
13 MR. KANG: I apologize, Your Honor 
14 escapes me on tha 
IS  THE . It's not critical I'm just 
16 saying that a se, particularly where you have 
17 handwritten notes on there, or if that note had been 
18 stamped on there and it had been sent back - a copy would 
19 have been sent to the bail agentin a limety fashion so 
20 they could have elther appeared or made some record why 
21 they couldn't get a coroneZs report or a death 
22 certtficate, they at least would have gotten an extension 
23 of time, at least arguably you would have. It seems to me 
24 thars one of the complaints they have is their relatively 
26 wooden approach to - it says it's got to be on blue paper. 
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1 I will direct the Court's attention to the Memorandum in 
2 Support of the Motion to Strike, which has that Order, and 
3 also to Mr. McKay's Affidavit which contains a transcript 
4 of that hearing. 
5 Mr. Chamey's Affidavit discusses various 
6 incidents. Wever ,  all of Ulem have been resolved. 
7 First, ttiefe was some issues regardii judges relying on 
8 the Trial Court Administrator's office's handwritten 
9 motions, and denying motion to exonerate without a hearing. 
10 They appealed that decision, Your Honor, and they've won. 
11 The system works. 
12 Plaintiffs were advised by the TCA that an 
13 appeal bond has to be in cash. Mr. Chamey stated in his 
14 Affidavit thal he contacted Administrative District Judge 
15 Williamson personalty and got that issue nsohred. And 
16 Judge WiKiamson conceded that a *rstdeh - or slated 
17 that a cashier's ch& is the same as cash in her eyes. 
18 There is no issue there. 
19 Mr. Chamey discusses an incident where a 
20 Motion to Set Aside Forkdture was filed and denied, 
21 because it was not accompanied by a death certificate or a 
22 coroner's re*. The coroner's report and death 
23 wtificate is what validates the dalm of death, 
24 Your Honor. To be exonerated on that basis we would 
25 require some sort of proof. And so l believe under the 
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1 If irs not on blue paper - even if it's the right thing 
2 on pink paper -you know, that type of thing. And I'm not 
3 sure those all rise to due process issue. But they sure 
4 arise to nltplcklng Irritations. 
6 MR. W G :  Your Honor, I wiU state that if 
6 those are matters that they want to address through the 
7 amendment of the Guidelines, J W e  W~liiamson has had an 
8 open door policy in listening to those suggestions. as 
8 stated in her Affidavit. And as seen from the Guideiines 
10 that were presented to the Court with the Eates stamps. 
11 there are numerous amendments to the Guidelines in an 
12 effort by the Court to Work with bail agents in 
13 streamlining and makimg it better for everybody. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. KANO: Mr. Chemey next talks about how he 
16 cantacted the T W  an behalf of a baii agent who was 
17 voluntarily removed from the list at the employer's 
18 request. Under the Guidelines, Your Honor, when an 
19 employer - and this is under 1%~)  -when an employer 
20 requests that an agent be removed we give deference to that 
21 employer and automatically remove that person from the 
22 kt. 
23 Now, as saon as that person Is remowd, we 
24 do - the TCA office does provlda immediately a 
25 notificatlan to that agent so that they can preserve their 
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I right to remain on that list. Now, the agent in this case, 
1 as represented by Mr. McKay, I guess, was leaving the bail 
I bond business for a different occupation of real estate. 
I And I believe when you do leave, yw know, there are other 
5 arcumstances that could come back or could arise during 
i your absence, and I W i v e  that the Court and the TCA - 
1 or the Court has the authority to ask for a petition for 
B reinstatement lo those matters. 
4 Sunshine Musi&, where the bail agent received 
0 two violations for not erwuring payment on two forfeitures. 
I She was warned by the TCA that two more vidatlons could 
2 lead to removal from the list. However, the bonds ended up 
3 getting paid, and that is reflected In the Motion for 
4 Consol~dation. 
5 W E  COORT: Let's talk about that. though, 
6 just a minute. That's one of the things that really causes 
7 me some puzzlement is that where a bail agent has a Power 
8 of Attorney and is the agent for a surely, but 1s 
19 terminated from that, whether voluntarity by the surety or 
!O by her own choice, then how can she still be held liable on 
!l the bond? 
!2 I recognue m this case it all got resolved 
!3 because somebody paid the bonds. But the process started 
out saying, "So you no longer work for this bonding 
!!3 company. We don't care. You get it paid or else we're 
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I going to remove you from the list." 
2 MR. KANG: And under the Guidelines, Your 
3 Honor, it isn't that we hold the bail agent penonally 
4 liabie for the payment We're asking them to contact the 
5 proper patiis. If she had an insurance surety at the time 
6 that s b  made that bond, to contad them and say, "Look, 
7 there was a forfeiture." 
8 THE COURT: Why doesn't the Guideline say 
9 that, if that's what you're trying to do? Because that 
10 isn't what it says. It says that we want you to ensure the 
1 I payment of this. 
12 MR. KANG: And I would state that ensure, I 
13 guess, could be taken two ways. But our position is that 
14 "ensure" means that we require you to take further effort 
25 into getting the amount paid. 
16 M E  COURT: And that's one of the reasons why 
17 I Suggested she change in statute might eliminate some of 
I 8  those issues if you were giving those to the surety as 
19 opposed to the bail agent. 
20 MR. KANG: And as a matter of practice - 
21 again, this is not in the record, but I also did the 
22 argument for the 'In re %eter" caw. And during that 
23 case, and talking with the TCA's office, they informed me 
24 that when they do send out those letters, they do "cc" the 
25 insurance surety. Again, that's not in the Guidelines; 
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I that's just a representation I'm making to the Court. 
2 M E  COURT: They want the agent, then, to 
3 contact the surety - 
il MR. KANG: Correct. 
5 THE COURT: - but they've already contacted 
6 the surety. What are they trying to do7 
7 MR. KANG: Well, I think that by do~ng the 
8 "cc" they're just givlng notice to everybody. But the 
9 ultimate responsibility for getling the matter resolved 
0 lies with the bail agents. 
1 THE COURT: On what theory? 
2 MR. KANG: On the theory that the custody of 
3 the defendant was released into the bail agent's care. 
4 Next, let's take up Mr. Gerske's Affidavb, 
5 He states that the eppkcations of two bail agents were 
6 denied because of past criminal history Their 
7 applications were resubmitted, reviewed, and denled once 
18 again based on their cnmtnal history, Your Honor. And I 
19 would just state that is a reflection of the Fourth 
!O Judicial District's pollcy of taklng matters of their 
L l  character and to whom they release the defendant very 
22 seriously. And that is what the effect of the Guidelines 
13 is. 
14 Mr. Ganke next states that he was removed 
25 from the list for failure to pay. He mistakenly believed 
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1 it was for another matter. l believe this was involving 
2 the Grieve incident And when he realized what had 
3 happened he immediately paid and was reinstated on the 
4 list. There may have been a mix-up. It was his ultimate 
6 responsibility. He didn't pay, but when he did pay, he was 
6 immediately reinstated. The system works. 
7 Wtth regard to Almwaz, Mr. Garcia states that 
8 he did not request her name to be removed from the Irst. 
9 He was uncertain whether she would be remaining in the 
20 office, when she was transferred to the Cafifornia offices. 
11 However, Mr. Garske dms not agree that he did not abide by 
12 the terms of the Guidelines in which the supe~sing agent 
13 is required to report to the TCA's office when an agent is 
14 no longer working. 
15 And so rather than saying that he abided by 
16 Ute terms, he just provides 6 rationale fer why it was not 
17 followed. And I don? think that has any impact with 
18 regard to Irreparable injuty. 
19 The Injuries alleged have been rectmed, and 
20 demonstrate that the system works, Ywr Honor - that the 
21 Guidelines work. Tb& plaintiffs asked the Cowt to grant a 
22 preliminary injunction on the basis of future actions that 
23 may occur fe$arding defense of vioiations. This is not an 
24 immediate need or demonstrated greater need for injwy, 
22 irreparable injwy; that was a preliminary injunction which 
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3 and therefore the status quo should be maintained and the 
4 request for preliminary injunction denied. In conclusion, 
5 Your Honor, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their 
6 burden, demonstrating reasonable likelihood of success or 
3 (The Court's exhibit was marked.) 
4 MR. McKAY: Thank you, Your Honor. And I 
5 think that you see - in this agreement you see an 
6 inscription of an amount quite different than that 
1 7 irreparable - great orifrepafable injury to the granting 1 7 represented by mmel for the defendant. You see in this I 
1 8 of a preliminary injunction, either under the theory of the 1 6 papenwk Lincoln General Insurance Company. which accessed I 
9 contract 3 stated by State vs. Abracadabra, or on an 
10 individual basis aside from contract principle. And for 
11 the foregoing reasons the State and defendants whouM 
12 respectfully request that the Court deny the preliminary 
13 injunction and maintain the status quo at this time. May I 
14 stand for any questions? 
15 THE COURT No. 
16 MR. KANG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 MR. M a y :  I toM you that I was not gong to 
18 caU any witnesses, but I -the Court Identified In hi 
9 the surety and Ute guarantor associated with the defendant. 
10 And there's no mention of any obligation on the part of the 
11 bail agent, who has responsibility for ensuring the 
12 appearance of a defendant, or uMmate respons~bility for 
13 payment of the bond, if there has been a failure on the 
t4  part of the defendant to appear. 
15 Counsel has also pointed out, and polnttng the 
16 Coun to the l~cense -- a copy of the llcense - Department 
17 of Insurance license for Rebecce Sal~nas which Is found at 
18 Tab 3 of its submissions to the Cwrt. i Wink counsel / 19 question of counsel a number of issues that I t h i i  would 1 14 simply misreads the ~ P Y  of the k m e .  This license does I 1 20 be resolved if the Court had in front of it the actual bond 1 20 not say that Rebecca Salines is a surety. What it says is I 
1 24 exonerated from today's proceedings. So I would propose 1 24 that we've just entered into the record here. I 
21 and surety agreement that Aladdin uses. In the middle of 
22 counsel's presentation here an employee of Aladdin ran 
23 downstairs and grabbed a stack of bonds that had been 
26 to - and counsel hasn't seen this, I know. 
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22 is involved in the surety l i e  of insurance. And that is 
23 consistent with the bail bond and the Power of Attomey 
25 Counsel made mention of under 14(b) a bail 
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2 see if he's going to have any objection. You may not need 
3 a witness. / MR. McKAY; Your Honor, I have a stack of 
1 
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2 attempting to cure the deflckrncy identified by the TCA. 
3 And I t h M  that Ignores the situation where the bail agent 
4 recognizes that there is a deficiency. And that at least 1 5 these bonds, and they're all -you can grab one out of the 1 5 under the Guidelines as presently configured, that the TCA I 
6 middle. They're all the same, except for the defendant's 
7 name. 
THE COURT: Why don1 you give me one and I11 
6 was correct in identifying that as a violation of the 
7 Guidelines. So rather than pay a filing fee, rather than 
8 hiring counsel to represent the bail agent who chalrenged 1 9 make sure the Clerk makes copies lor everyone of the I 9 , that. me bail agent slmply tries to cure the deficiency. I 
10 specific one we have. 
11 MR. McKAY: Yes. Your Honor. I'm handing 
12 the Court a copy of a Power of Attorney and bail bond - 
13 an actual original - not a copy, but the original Power 
14 of Attomey and bail bond in connection with the 
10 If, in the opinion of the TCA or the assistant 
I I TCA, he or she does not cure that deficiency, he or she can 
12 be removed from the list without notice, without an 
13 opportunity to be heard. 
14 THE COURT: And whether U~at's a violation of 1 15 Roderick &own case in which bond in the amounl of $1,000 1 15 due process depends on how much process is due. And that I 1 16 was posted by AIaddin Bail Bonds and their surely, Lincoln 1 16 may be something that could be tixed with a discussion of ( 
b2 THE COURT: And I'll take it and make sure 1 22 got resolved." It's really not resolved. She has two I 
17 Genenl (sic) Imliince Company. And I understand the 
18 State does not - 
19 THE COURT: You're offering that as an 
20 exemplat? 
21 MR. M c W :  l am. 
1 23 there is a photocopy of that, and the original will be 1 23 violations that are counted as violations. Under the I 
17 changes in the ball bond Guidelines, even? 
18 MR. McKAY: Yes. Coonsel makes reference 
19 to all of these various issues have been resolved. And I 
20 know - I don't mean to pounce on Your Honor's words, but 
21 in the Sunshlne Musick case you make reference "that all 
24 returned to you before we leave today. 
25 MR. CHOU: Thank you, Your Hmar. 
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25 of&% can peaon for her removal. Mr. Garske has - I 
Page 64 
(208) 938-0213 FAX (208) 938-1843 
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
t according to this recent letter he received, has six 
2 violations. 
3 So even these what are often fairly trivial 
4 violations, even though they have been redressed, they're 
5 still violations. And the TCA's office still has at her 
6 disposal the ability to petition for the removal of these 
7 bail agents 
8 THE COURT: Isn't there a provision in there 
9 where you can petition the Administrative District Judge to 
0 remove these violations? 
1 MR. M W Y :  I thlnk that to remove a person 
2 after a fourth violation requlres a petition which will 
3 trigger - 
4 M E  COURT: No. No. Where the bail agent can 
5 petttion the Adminlstratlve District Judge to remove a 
6 violation? 
7 MR. McKAY: Yes. 
8 (To Mr. Garske): I think the Court is right 
19 about that. 
!O MR. GARSKE: Yes. 
!1 MR. McKAY I would adml it would often be an 
!2 exercise in futility if there was an actual vldation. If 
23 there had been some technical violation of - 
24 THE COURT: That may be true. 
25 MR. McKAY: - of these Guidelines. 
Page 6E 
(208) 938-0213 FAX (208) 938-104: 
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1 THE COURT: That may be [rue. 
2 MR. McKAY: Counsel refers to the - and 
3 there's some colloquy between the Court and counsel - 
4 these handwritten notes of the Trial Court Administrator 
5 and then an appeal to Judge McKee, and that resolved it. 
6 Well, there was two appeals to Judge McKee for the exact 
7 same thing. The TCA's office wrote on one of these motions 
8 this u n s w n  - unsworn representation. which was not 
9 provided to Aladdin. 
10 Aladdin appealed to Judge McKee. They 
11 prevailed. Judge McKee issued a written decis'm. And 
12 following that written decision it happens again within a 
13 short period of time. And again, Aladdii is forced to 
I4  retain counsel, file another appeal, pursue it with 
15 Judge McKee, and yet they appeal again. But it's this 
16 day-today - it's this day-today, week-to-week operation 
17 of Guidelines, and pmblem alter problem and e m i t u r n  01 
18 legal resources, and the company's resources just in having 
19 to deal with this that create the irreparable jury that 
20 I l e  described. 
21 I know - I have great respect for 
22 Judge Williamson. Her Affidavit does, in fact, refer to an 
23 open door policy. We've tried that. We've bied. And 
24 here we are. I think this lawsuit is a fundion of not 
25 being able to get there with that open door policy. 
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1 I know the Court indicated I should be short 
2 and I think I have been short. And I'II sit down and be 
3 quiet, unless the Court has any further questions. 
4 THE COURT: I don't have any further 
5 questions. I think, because there's an interrelationship 
6 between the issues raised by the Motion to Dism~ss and 
7 this, 1'11 probably issue one opinion on that and try and 
8 dothat 
9 I guess I would conclude this - you'll get 
10 your copy of the bond thing. I would conclude, as l 
11 started saying, that I think all parttes need to take a 
12 careful look at what the changes in the 2007 legtslatron 
13 were. And it seems to me that they provide a - at least a 
14 starting point to look at trying to beak -- I like that 
15 word, tweak these Guideiines that may remove some of th 
16 problems and smooth the processtng of the. 
17 I have every confidence that Judge Will~amson 
18 does desire to try and make a smooth-operating, and ever 
19 running court system here, and to the extent they can savt 
2 0  any time by reducing administrative logs on the Trial Coud 
2 1  Administrator, she's probably going to be interested in 
22 that, as long as it will still keep within what she 
23 believes is the power of the administrative - of the 
24 courts to regulate its business. 
25 And certainly almost all of the cases out 
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1 there that have been sat on, both sides indicate that the 
2 courts have some -- at a minimum, have some power to ust 
3 some regulation of who are the sureties and bail agents 
4 that appear in those clause in theu courts. 
5 Now, what the parameters of that are, are, I 
6 guess, some of the things I'm going to try and resdve, to 
7 the extent I can, on the motions as they posture this 
8 matter. It's not a submission of the entire case to me. I 
9 understand that Sometimes we all get impatient and want 
10 to rush ahead and get it all resolved, and that may not be 
11 the course we take on this. We will take it in small steps 
12 and see what we can come up with. 
13 But I encourage you to use some of this time 
14 to take a serious look at - maybe you want to go in and 
15 address trying to resolve some of those ksues. 
16 Particularly I'm concerned with the one that ! think is 
17 one of the linchpins on this, is thls notlce Issue and the 
18 whole thlng about you can't deal directly with a surety 
I 9  under the prior statute. 
20 And I think Judge Eismann summed U~at up veFy 
21 weU and vigorousty. the problem of trying to engraff a new 
22 system on the statutes that basically haven't changed sin= 
23 1860. Okay. We will get this exhibit to you. I'II k t  
24 you know when I get an opinion out on this thing. 
25 MR. McKAY: Thank you. 
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MR. KANG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE CLERK: All rise, please. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., dba AUDDIN B 
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL 
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND 1 case NO. CV OC 07 0661 9 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 
ORDER ADDING 
Plaintrgs, ) ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT 
VS. ) TO RECORD ON APPEAL 1 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) 
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,) 
in her official capacity as ) 
Administrative District Judge; 1 
LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court 1 
Administrator; and DIANE 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as) 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator, ) 
Defendants. 1 
The Reporter's Transcript in the above matter was lodged on July 22, 
2009. The parties have stipulated to add a transcript of the August 24, 2007 
proceeding to the Reporter's Transcript. 
Good cause appearing and pursuant to I.A.R. 22, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that: 
1. The Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings held on August 24, 2007 in 
the above matter, which was certified by Jeanne M. Hirmer, RPR, CSR on 
00614 
ORDER ADDING ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT TO RECORD ON APPEAL Page I of 2 
September 4, 2007 be added to the record on appeal in ldaho Supreme 
Court Docket Number 36476-2009. 
DATED this day of August, 2009 
CERTIfICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 *day of August, 2009 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed. postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via 
facsimile to: 
Fax Service j Fax 
I; Service. 
David Z. Nevin I Steven L. Olsen 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe 
d \ Michael S. Gilrnoie 
345-8274 1 Karl T. Klein 
w 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP : Melissa Moody 
854-8073 
P.O. Box 2772 + kcrnL Deputy Attorneys General f C L S ~ U $ I L  
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2772 j P.O. Box 83720 
j Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Clerk of the mtrict Court 
ORDER ADDING ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT TO RECORD ON APPEAL 
00615 
Paae 2 of 2 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
NO. 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE, ISB # 1625 
MELISSA MOODY, ISB # 6027 
Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Telephone: 
michael.gilmore@ag.idaho.~!ov 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly ) 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 
business as Aiaddin Bail Bonds and Anytime 
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and ) Case No. CV OC 07066 19 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) 
) STIPULATION TO ADD 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, ) SUPREME COURT ORDER 
) TO RECORD ON APPEAL 
VS. 1 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellants. 
The parties, through their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree that the 
attached August 4, 2005 Idaho Supreme Court Order be added to the record on appeal in Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket Number 36476-2009. 
DATED this 1 q day of August 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants- 
Cross Respondents 
DATED this day of August 2009. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
Cross Appellants 
The parties, though their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree that the 
attached August 4,2605 Idaho Supream Court Order be added to the record on appeal in Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket Number 364762009, 
DATED this 1 q day of August 2009. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Off ICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MEUSSA MOODY 
Deputy Attonteys General 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appe1Iant;s- 
Cross Respondents 
p. 
DATED this day of August 2009. 
NEVM, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & E~ARTLETT LLP 
Attorneys for ~lsintiffo-~es~onden'ts- 
Cross Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 day of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
CHAMBERS COPY: 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
@'6.~. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
a Overnight Mail 




Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
C] Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: 
C] Statehouse Mail 
Deputy Attorney General 
STIPULATION TO ADD SUPKEME COURT ORDER TO RECORD ON APPEAL - 3 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
IN RE: ADmSTRATTVE DISTRICT ) 
JUDGE - JOB DESCRIPTI.ON * POWER 1 ORDER 
AND .DUTES 1 
following job description for Administrative District Judges, to read as follows, and the Court 
being m y  informed; 
NOW, THEREFOTCE, IT IS HERBBY ORDERED, the job description f ~ r  Administrative 
District Judge be, and is hereby, adppted as follows: 
ADMINISWTIVE DISTRICT JUDGE - JOB DESCRIPTION - POWERS AND DUTIES 
Under Idaho Code $ 1-907, the administrative judge of each judicial district has adminispi-ttive 
supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrate division in the 
district. The administrative judge's role is an integral part of the administration bf the judicial 
system. Under article V, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, the courts. constitute a unified and 
integrated judicial system under the administration anif supervision of the Suprime Court. The 
Supreme Court maintains flexibility in carrying out its constihitional and, statutory mandates in 
. 
managing and mrpervising a unified court system by delegation of authority to the admurrstrative 
director of the courts, the administrative judges and the trial court administrators. Consequently, 
the following list of powers and duties should not be: viewed as exhaustive or limiting, and the 
administrative district judge retains such inherent power as needed to carry out the duties of the 
office. 
The administrative judge, subject to the rules of the stp'rernk Court, has administrative 
supervision abd authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrate division in the 
district. The powers aad duties of the administrative judge include, but are not limited to, all 
those powers and duties set forth in statute or in other rules of the Supreme Court, as well as the 
following: 
(1) meet with county commissioners and other county and local officials. within the 
district on budgets and other matters,, and foster productive relationships with 
such officials to secure sufficient funding for the operation of the courts; ' 
(2) supervise the business of the judicial district and court calendars in such m e r  
as to insure the expeditious and efficient processing of all cwes and equitable I 
distribution of the district court caseload among the district judges, and of the 
magistrate division caseload among the magistrate judges; 
monitor the status of court dockets and calendars, and, where appropriate, 
implement improved methods and systems of managing dockets and caseloads; 
discuss any problems of delays ih. resolving cases with district judges or 
magistrate judges, offer aSsistance in addressing such delays, and take remedial 
action; 
encourage Ad promote the investigation, consideration and implementation of 
innovative approaches to managing the court's business, solving problems and 
addressing particular types of cases; 
provide supervision and direction to the trial court administrator in the 
performance of the duties of that off~ct; 
seek the assistance of other perions in addressing issues affecting the improved 
administiation of justice, by appointing codf$ees, calling meetings of district 
judges or magistrate judges, or assigning individual district judges, magistrate 
judges or other court personnel; 
oversee the development and preparation of the annual budget request, and 
approve and submit the budget request to the Supreme Court; 
act as spokesperson for the court, within the district, in al l  matters with the 
execritive and legislative branches of state and local ~ government, and with 
community groups; 
establish .effective. relations between the court and the media, by scheduling 
forums or other .opportunities for discussion with, the media, and by providing 
general information to the media about the courts, the law, and court procedures 
and practices, to the extent permitted by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct; 
attend meetings of the Administrative Conference; 
conduct conferences of judges and clerks within the district; 
(13)' preside at meetings of the district judges and/or magistrate judges within the 
district; 
(14) in cooperation with local and state officials, develop plans and procedures for 
insuring the security of courthouses and courtrooms, and address security 
concerns identified by the district judges, magistrate judges or other court 
personnel; 
. , 
(15) supervise the daily operations of thc courts, and oversee the employment and 
supervision of all personnel in the performance of their court functions and in 
. court-related programs, consistent with suggested model agreements developed 
by the Shared Employees Committee; 
(16) assign court reporters to attend court proceedings and perform the duties set forth 
in Rule 27 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules; 
(17) delegate powers and duties to judges and court personnel as necessary and 
(18) establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, forfeiture, exoneration 
and all other matters; 
(19) perform such other duties,and exercise such powers as may be provided for by the 
rules or orders of the Supreme Court. 
IT IS FUR'IFER ORDERED, that this order shall be effective on the 15th day of August, , 
. 2005. 
DATED this day of August, 2005. 
I 
. . 





FiLpM. L/ ..35 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN BA 
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL 
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND ) case NO. CV OC 07 0661 9 SHANTAUA CARLOCK, 1 ORDER ADDING 
Plaintiffs, ) IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
VS. 1 ORDER DATED 
AUGUST 4,2005 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) TO RECORD ON APPEAL 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) 
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,) 
in her official capacity as 
Administrative District Judge; 
LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court 1 
Administrator; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as) 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator, 
Defendants. ) 
A Transcript on appeal in the above matter was lodged on July 22, 
2009. By a stipulation filed on August 21, 2009, the parties have stipulated 
to add a copy of an ldaho Supreme Court Order dated August 4, 2005 that 
was considered in this proceeding to the Clerk's Transcript. 
Good cause appearing and assuming that the stipulation to this court 
is timely, pursuant to I.A.R. 29, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The ldaho Supreme Court Order dated August 4, 2005 that was 
ORDER ADDING IDAHO SUPREME COURT ORDER 
DATED AUGUST 4,2005 TO RECORD ON APPEAL 
considered by the court in the above matter, a copy of which is attached to 
this order, be added to the record on appeal in ldaho Supreme Court Docket 
Number 36476-2009, 
!28 DATED this 2 7 day of August, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
d- 
I hereby certify that on the 2 4  day of August. 2009 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via 
facsimile to: 
David 2. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Fax Service 
Robyn ~yff; 345-8274 
NEVIN. BENJAMIN. McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ldaho 83701 -2772 
ORDER ADDING IDAHO SUPREME COURT ORDER 
DATED AUGUST 4,2005 TO RECORD ON APPEAL 
Fax 
Service. 
Steven L. Oisen 
Michael S. Gilmore 




Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0011 0 
00624 
Page 2 of 2 
1. In the Supreme Court of the State of ~ d a h b  I 
IN RE: ADMINJSTRATNE DISTRICT ) 
JUDGE - 30B DESCWTION * POWER ) 0R.DER 
A ,  DuTm 1 
Ill The Coyt reviewed a recommendation from th.c AriminiRtrativc Conference to adopt the 
Ill following~job description for Adrninisuative District Judges, to read as follows, and the Court Ill . being tirUy informed; 
NOW, TNEREFOIU3, lT IS HeREBY ORD-, the job description for AdminisWve 
District Judge be, and is haby ,  adopted as follows: 
Undtr Idaho Code $ 1-907, the administrative judge of each judicid district has administrative 
supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrate division in the 
district. The administrative judge's rot4 is an integral part of the adminiStration of the judicial 
system. Under article V, soction 2 of the Idaho Constitution, the cam constitute a unified and 
integrated judicial system under the Bdministration and supervision of the Suprrht Court. The 
Supreme Court maintains flexibility in carrying out its constitutional and statutory mandates in 
managing and supervising a unified court system by delegation of autharity to the administrative 
director of the courts, the administrative judges and the trial cowt administrators. Consequently, 
the fDihwing list of powers and duties should not be viewed as exhaustive or limiting, and the 
administnrtive district judge retains such inherent power as needed to carry out the duties of the 
office. 
The ~ s ~ i v c  judge, mbjoct to the rules of tho ~&&eme Court, has administrative 
supervision &d authority 'over the operation of the district.courts and magistrate division in the 
district. The powers and duties of the adainistrative judge include, but are not limited to, dl 
those powers and duties set forth in statute or in other d m  of the Supreme Caurf as well as the 
f0Uowing: 
(I) meet with county commissioners and other county and local officials within the 
district on budgets and other matters, and foster prodwtive relationships with 
such officials to secure sufficient funding for the operation of tbe courts; ' 
(2) mpcrvise the business of the judicial district and court calendars in such manner 
as to h u r t  the expeditious and efficient processing of all cages and equitable 
fsB* ,&&;2z2 
%&:"-" 
w"&*^.*,s P8/24/.200'9 15:50 FAX k , - FOURTH DISTRICT C O ~ S ~  #$p$+*- ) -
distribution of thc didrict court caseload among the distri~t judges, and of the 
magistrate division cascload among the magistrate judges; 
(3) monitor the status of court dockets and calendars, and, where appropriate, implement improved methods and gystems of managing dockets and caseloads; 
(4) discuss any problems of deiap ih resolving cases with district judges or 
and tab rmcdial 
( 5 )  encoorage &id promote the investigation, consideration and implementation of 
innovative approaches to managing the court's business, solving problems and 
addrtssing particular types of cases; 
(6) provide supervision md direction to the trial court administrator in the 
performance of the duties of that office; 
(7) seek the assistanw of otha  persons in addressing issues affecting the improved 
adm'mis~tion of justice, by appointing committees, calling meetings of district 
judges or magistrate judges, or assigning individual district judges, magistrate 
judges or other court personnel; 
(8) oversee the development and preparation of the annual budget request, and 
approve and submit the budget request to the Suprma Court; 
R (9) act as spokesperson for the cowt, within (he districf in 611 mattes with the exenitiyc and legislative branches of state and local. government, end with c o m ~ t y  groups; 
(10) establish .effective' relatiow betwecn the court and the media, by scheduling 
forums or other .oppalunities for discussion with, the media, and by providing 
general infomation to the media about the courts,, the law, and court procedurrx 
and practices, to the extcnt permitted by the Idaho Code of Judiciral Conduct; 
Ill (1 1) attend meetings of the Adminbtrative Conference; 
(12) conduct conferences of judges and c1mk.s within ttre 
(13)' preside at meetings of the district judges andfor magistrate judges within the 
w e t ;  
(14) in cooperation with local and state ofticials, develop plans and procedures for 
insuring the security of courthou6ts and coutrooms, and address security 
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(15) supervise tho daily operations of the courts, aad oversee the employment and 
supervision of all personnel in the perfonnmce of their court functions and in 
court-related programs, consistent with suggested model agreements developed 
by the Shared Employees Committee; 
(1 6) assign court reporters to attad court pt-o~ecdiDgs n d  perform the duties sd forth 
in Rule 27 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules; 
(7 8) mtablish guidelines for bail bonds with regard td posting, forfeiture, cxonnaticn 
and dl other mattas; 
(19) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as may be provided for by the 
rules or orders of the Supreme Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this order shall be effective on the 15th day of August, 
